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THE

JOHNS HOPKINS

UNIVERSITY

THE SEA AND JAPAN'S STRATEGIC
INTERESTS, 1975-1985

by
Linton Wells II

Baltimore, Maryland 21218

, 93*44

THE SEA AND JAPAN'S STRATEGIC
INTERESTS, 1975-1985

by
Linton Wells II

A dissertation submitted to The Johns Hopkins
University in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Baltimore, Maryland
1975

7Z.

'^-^

ABSTRACT

Recent changes in military technology, commercial ocean
uses and the law of the sea are examined in relation to their
impact on seapower over the next decade. It is concluded that
technical developments will significantly narrow the alternatives
available to political decision makers during this period. In
addition, the foundations of the freedom of the seas are rapidly
being eroded, there are signs of increasing disorder at sea, and
the utility of great power naval vessels as instruments of
diplomacy may decline.

Elements of Japan's strategic interests and the status of
the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) as of late 1974 are
reviewed. Some potential changes in these interests and in
the constraints on the armed services are outlined. Particular
attention is given to pressures for and against a wider security
role in the Western Pacific. Existing evidence suggests more
continuity than change in Japanese foreign policy over the next
several years.

The elements of seapower outlined in Part One then are
applied to the strategic interests which were noted in Part Two.
Japan's need for a balance of power at the global, regional and
local levels is discussed, along with the role of naval forces

Ill

in securing such conditions. Some suggestions axe made for
future MSDF force structures. The concepts of protective,
acquisitive and suasive commercial seapower are introduced, and
Japan's potential is examined in each role. Though chances for
suasion will he limited, maritime activities can offer some
increase in Japan's resilience to foreign pressures. Her
marine-related expertise and capital stocks also will he well-
suited to acquire a wide variety of goods and services and to
take advantage of new ocean development opportunities.

To my Parents
who have given me every opportunity
and
The United States Navy
which has given me this one.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper was begun during a month's visit to Japan
in January 1973 a^ continued in Baltimore and Tokyo during 1973
and 1974* A trip to nine countries in Southeast Asia and Oceania
from May to July 1974 offered many additional insights into
Japan's image abroad and into coastal state perceptions of sea-
power.

A letter of introduction from the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., DSN, to the Chief of the Maritime
Staff, Admiral Samejima Hiroichi, JMSDF, established many of the
contacts which made the project possible, i am deeply grateful
to both leaders for their interest and support.

It is impossible to personally acknowledge each of those
who gave their time and assistance for this study. However,
particular thanks must go to five individuals without whose help
much less could have been accomplished. Miss Hakai Yoko of the
United States Information Service, Tokyo, provided introductions,
translations, source materials and encouragement. Her friendship
and enthusiasm were among the highlights of this research.

Mr. Taoka Shunji, defense correspondent for Asahi Shimbun,
has been an invaluable source of information on a remarkable
range of subjects extending far beyond Japanese strategic studies.

The hospitality which he and his wife Noriko have shown me both
in Japan and the United States is unforgettable.

Dr. Tsunoda Jun of the National Diet Library began my
education in Japanese security problems during my first research
visit. His perception and experience have been invaluable.

Vice Admiral Kitamura Kenichi, JMSDF (Ret.), offered basic
insights and corrected misconceptions from the beginning of the
project. He also took time from an extremely busy schedule to
review parts of the manuscript.

Captain Yamazumi Akira, JT.ISDF, Head of the Foreign Liaison
section of the Maritime Staff Office, was instrumental in
arranging many interviews and made available a variety of useful
services. His cheerfulness and attention to detail overcame
several periods of discouragement.

Dr. Robert W. Tucker of the Johns Hopkins University guided
the overall study, as well as most of my post-graduate education.
His criticisms have been useful both in style and substance. Dr.
George Liska posed many of the questions from which the seapower
section was developed and was second reader for the thesis. Dr.
Ann L. Hollick of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies initiated my interest in ocean policy and law of
the sea issues.

While in Tokyo, I was attached to the Defense Attache Office
in the American Embassy. Captain Wilton L. Atkinson, USN, and his
successor as Naval Attache, Captain Marvin L. Duke, USN, offered

VI 1

the support and assistance of their staffs. I am particularly
grateful to Commander John S. Viccelio, USN, for his comments
and advice.

Dr. Abraham M. Halpern of George Washington University's
Sino-Soviet Institute, Commander Michael MccGwire, RN (Ret.),
Mr. Odani Kosuke of the Japan Marine Science and Technology
Center, Commander Seno Sadao, JMSDF, Dr. Kenneth R. Stunkel of
Monmouth College, Admiral Uchida Kazutomi, JMSDF (Ret.), Captain
Don Walsh, USN, and Mr. Gerard P. Yoest of the American
Institute of Merchant Shipping were kind enough to read various
drafts of the paper and offered important criticisms.

Particular appreciation also is due to Lieutenant Commander
James E. Auer, USN; Lieutenant Commander Pukui Shizuo, IJN; Mr.
Roy A. Mlynarchik, Head of the Press Translation Branch of the
American Embassy, Tokyo; Dr. Okuhara Toshio of Kokusikan Univer-
sity; Commander Sekino Hideo, I JIT; Captain Yamaguchi Kaiji,
JMSDF, of the Maritime Staff College; and Mr. Yamato Kuril tami of
the Maritime Administration, American Embassy, Tokyo.

The Southeast Asia trip would not have been possible with-
out the active support of the Defense and Naval Attaches at the
American Embassies in Taipei, Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur,
Singapore, Jakarta, Canberra and Wellington. In addition to
giving their own assessments, they arranged contacts, transpor-
tation and other valuable assistance.

Words are insufficient to express my gratitude to Mr.

Vlll

Takahashi Tsutomu and his wife Takako. During each of my visits
to Japan they have opened their house to me and have given me
a greater appreciation of their country than they can ever know.

My parents, as usual, were my most thorough and construc-
tive critics. Any stylistic continuity in the paper is mainly
due to their efforts. Mr. David Wilson's help with the bibli-
ography also was greatly appreciated.

Finally, thanks are due to Mrs. Catherine Grover. Despite
last-minute revisions and indecipherable handwriting, she
finished typing the smooth draft with time to spare.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Eaga

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v

LIST OF TABLES xiii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xvi

INTRODUCTION 1

Part I: The Changing Nature of Seapower
Chapter

INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE 5

One: TECHNOLOGY AND CONTEMPORARY NAVAL OPERATIONS ... 10

The Nature of Military Innovations 10

Tactical Developments 15

Anti-Ship Missiles 16

Aircraft vs Surface Ships 27

Other Tactical Innovations 31

Strategic Developments 35

Submarine vs Anti-Submarine 35

Sealift and Airlift 40

Other Strategic Innovations 45

Environment-Level Developments 46

Real-Time Ocean Surveillance Systems .... 46

Command Control Communications 58

Two: THE CHANGING USES OF THE OCEAN 60

Merchant Shipping 61

The GroY,rth of Tankers and Bulk Carriers . . 64

Containerization 67

Barges, Barge Carriers and RO/ROs 69

LNG Carriers and OBOs 71

Fisheries 71

Non-Living Marine Resources 74

Alluvial and Continental Shelf Minerals . . 74

Offshore Hydrocarbons 75

Deep Seabed Mining 81

The Extraction of Materials from Seawater ... 86

Ocean Engineering Structures 89

Conclusion 93

Three: THE UNSETTLED MARINE POLITICAL CLIMATE 95

The Foundations of Freedom of the Seas .... 95

The Barbary Corsairs (1500-1830) 97

The Chinese Pirates M 832-1 869} ...... 99

The Slave Traders (1807-1890) ...... 102

Summary 104

The Current Status of Maritime Politics .... 107

The Limitations on Global Naval Force ... 107

Extended Coastal State Claims 110

The Regime of the Deep Seabed 123

Shipping 124

Conclusion 132

Four: THE OCEAN SETTING 1975-85 134

Signs of Disorder 135

The Changing Character of the Oceans .... 135

Asymmetrical Acceptabilities of Force ... 137

Current Weapons Technology 139

Diminished Freedom of the Seas 140

The Use of Force at Sea 140

Part II: The Setting of Japan's Seapovrer:
Purposes, Problems and Prospects

Five: JAPANESE INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC THINKING 1974 - • 151

The Physical Security of the Japanese People . 154

The Setting 154

Diplomatic Security 159

Military Security 173

The Maintenance of Economic Well-Being .... 177

International Measures 177

Domestic Measures 187

Preservation of Political Autonomy/

Independence 1 91

Contributions to the Development of the

International System 192

Six: THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MARITIME SELF-

DEFENSE FORCE AND THE CONSTRAINTS ON ITS

DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 194

The Current Status of the MSDF 194

Domestic Constraints 205

Constitutional-Political 205

Bureaucratic 210

Economic and Industrial 211

Manpower 217

Logistical 218

International Constraints 219

Great Power Reactions 219

Developing Country Reactions 220

Summary 221

Seven: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTRAINTS 222

Domestic Issues 222

An Uncertain Future 222

Japanese Militarism 2J1

The Quest for a Satisfying World Role . . . 236

External Changes 238

The People's Republic of China 238

The Soviet Union 241

The United States ..... 242

Other States 244

Changes and Continuities in Maritime Affairs . 245

A Twelve-Mile Territorial Sea 246

200-Mile Economic Zone 248

Oceanic States and the "World Lake" .... 253

Summary 255

Part III: The Sea and Japan's Strategic Interests

INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE 258

Eight: THE MILITARY DIMENSION—FART I: GLOEAL

AND REGIONAL INTERESTS 259

The Global Balance 259

Regional Balances 264

Options Involving the United States .... 265
Options Involving Countries Other than

the U.S., or Multi-Lateral Ties 272

Other Regional Considerations 280

Nine: THE MILITARY DIMENSION—PART II: THE

LOCAL BALANCE AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 284

Patterns of Threats 284

Direct Threats to the National Territory . . 286
Direct Threats to the Sea Lines of

Communications 300

Mine Warfare 313

Xll

Divisive/intimidating Actions 315

Threats which Promote Revolution

or Social Unrest 318

Defense of the Economic Zone 319

Naval Power as a Bargaining Chip 321

Summary 322

Ten: THE NON-MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF JAPANESE

SEAPOWER 324

The Scope of Japan's Commercial Ocean

Interests 325

Shipping 325

Shipbuilding 330

Fisheries 332

Whaling 338

Ocean Development 340

Japan's Organization for Maritime Development . 346

Non-Military Seapower and Japan's Interests . . 355

Protective Maritime Ventures 355

Acquisitive Maritime Ventures 358

Suasive Measures 36O

CONCLUSION 363

APPENDIX OIK: UNITS CONVERSION TABLE 368

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 370

Xlll

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1-1 Anti-Ship Missiles, Surface and Subsurface

Launched (SSM) 17

1-2 Diffusion of Missile Launchers (Estimated) .... 19

1-3 Air-to-Surface Missiles and Homing Ordnance .... 29

2-1 Composition of the World Merchant Fleet 61

2-2 Comparison of the Carrying Capacity of the
World Merchant Fleet by Basic Ship

Types 1967-1972 63

2-3 Leading Offshore Petroleum and Natural

Gas Producers 78

2-4 Nodule Metal Production 84

2-5 Potential Uses of Multi-Purpose Offshore

Islands and Platforms 90

2-6 Ocean-Atmosphere Energy Systems 92

3-1 Hank Order of Seabed Areal Allocations 118

3-2 Ocean Resource Potentials 119

3-3 Composition of World Trade 1960-1970 128

5-1 Japanese Strategic Regions — 1972

Resources Supply 1 67

5-2 Japanese Strategic Regions — Trade 168

5-3 Japanese Strategic Regions — Investments 169

5-4 Livestock Slaughtered 178

6-1 The Composition of the Maritime Self-

Defense Force 194

XIV

Table Page

6-2 Summary of the First to Fourth Defense

Power Consolidation Programs , 198

6-3 Some Comparisons of Blue-7/ater Naval Strengths . . 204

6-4 Company Reasons for Accepting Unprofitable

Defense Contracts 214

8-1 Foreign Naval Construction by Japanese

Shipyards 278

9-1 Soviet Pacific Amphibious Assets 293

9-2 A Comparison of Swedish, German and

Japanese Defense Forces . 298

9~3 A Comparison of Submarine and ASW Assets

in the North Atlantic and North Pacific

in 1974 and 1980 305

9-4 Japanese Domestic Transportation Shares ...... 314

10-1 Possible Nodule Metals Production as a

Percent of 1972 Japanese Demand 357

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

2-1 Seabed Mining Activities 76

2-2 Coastal Regions with Inadequate Fresh

Water Supplies 88

5-1 Japan in Asia 156

5-2 Japan's Exploration Effort (Petroleum) 185

6-1 Organization of the Liar i time Self-

Defense Force 196

6-2 MSDF Bases and Installations 197

6-3 The Southeast and Southwest Route Zones 202

7-1 A 200-Mile Japanese Claim Showing

Disputed Areas 249

7-2 Disputed Seabed Areas on the East China

Coast and Yellow Sea Continental Shelf 251

7-5 Japan's Share of a Partitioned Ocean 254

8-1 Northwest Pacific Cloud Cover 270

9-1 Japanese Air Defense Radar Coverage 289

10-1 Organizational Relationships in Sumitomo

Lianganese Nodule Mining 349

XVI

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADAV/S

ADIZ

AEW

ARM

ASDF

ASM

ASW

AWACS

Action Data Automation Weapons System (U.K.)

Air Defense Identification Zone

Airborne Early Warning (Aircraft)

Air Force

Anti-Radiation Missile

Air Self-Defense Force (Japan)

Air-to-Surface Missile

Ant i -Submarine Warfare

Airborne Warning and Control System

BCAS

BMEWS

Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

CIC
CLB
CNSP
CSE

CTS

CVAN

Command Control Communications

Combat Information Center

Continuous Line Bucket System

Council on National Security Problems (japan)

Central Studies Establishment (Australia)

Central Terminal Storage (for Petroleum)

Attack Aircraft Carrier, Nuclear powered

DDG

DDH

DOLIA

DPRK

DPRV

dwt

Guided Missile Destroyer

Helicopter Destroyer

Deep Ocean Minerals Association

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

Democratic People's .Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)

Deadweight Tons

ECCM

ECM

ECOR

EEC

ELINT

EUSC

Electronic Counter-Countermeasures
Electronic Countermeasures
Engineering Committee on Ocean Resources
European Economic Community
Electronic Intelligence
Effective U.S. Control Fleet
Electronic Warfare

F4EJ

F104

FAO
FB

U.S. Phantom II Fighter-Bomber

Japanese Variant of U.S. F4

U.S. Fighter Aircraft primarily built for export

U.S. "Starfighter" Aircraft

United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization

Fighter-Bomber

XV11

FBM

FEER

GNP

GRT
GSDF

Fleet Ballistic Missile
Fax Eastern Economic Review
Fiscal Year

Gross National Product
Gross Registered Tons
Ground Self -Defense Force

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

IDR International Defense Review

IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies (London)

IJN Imperial Japanese Navy

ITI International Trade and Industry (see MITl)

IWC International Whaling Commission

JAMS TEC Japan Marine Science and Technology Center

JDA Japan Defense Agency

JMSDF Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force

JOIA Japan Ocean Industries Association

JSP Japan Socialist Party

LASH Lighter Aboard Ship

LCT Landing Craft, Tank

LCU Landing Craft, Utility

LDP Liberal Democratic Party (japan)

LNG Liquified Natural Gas

LPG Liquified Petroleum Gas

LRI.EP Long-Range Marine Patrol Aircraft

LSM Landing Ship, Medium

LST Landing Ship, Tank

LSV Landing Ship, Vehicle

MDIJ Marine Development in Japan 1972

MDN Mainichi Daily News

MDP Marine Development Program of Japan, Fiscal Year 1974

MIG Common designation for aircraft designed by Mikoyan

of the USSR

MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry (japan)

MOBS Mobile Ocean Basing System (U.S. Navy)

MSA Maritime Safety Agency (Japan)

MSDF Maritime Self-Defense Force (Japan) ; also JMSDF

MTS Marine Technology Society (U.S.A.)

NADGE NATO Air Defense Ground Environment

NKIW Nihon Keizai Shimbun International Weekly

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

NTDS Naval Tactical Data System

0B0 Oil/Bulk/Ore Carrier

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

XVI 11

OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OTH Over-the-Horizon (Radars)

OTH-B Over-the-Horizon Backseat ter radars

PFLP

PIRAZ

PRC

PXL

RAN
ROC
ROK
RO/RO

RPV

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone

People's Republic of China

Patrol Torpedo Boat

New Anti-Submarine Patrol Aircraft (japan)

Royal Australian Navy
Republic of China ( Taiwan)
Republic of Korea (s . Korea)
Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships
Remotely Piloted Vehicles

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SAM Surface- to- Air Missile

SAR Search and Rescue

SDF Self-Defense Force (japan)

SENIT Syste'me d'Exploitation Navale des Informations

Tactiques

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SLAR Side-Looking Airborne Radar

SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile

SODECO Sumitomo Ocean Development and Engineering Company

SSM
SSN
SSPP

Surface- to-Surf ace Missile
Nuclear Powered Submarine
Solar Sea Power Plant

ULCC Ultra-Large Crude Carrier

USA United States Army

USN United States Navy

USNI United States Naval Institute (Annapolis)

USNIP United States Naval Institute Proceedings

USSBS United States Strategic Bombing Survey

VLCC Very Large Crude Carrier

V/STOL Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing (Aircraft)

VTOL Vertical Take-off and Landing (Aircraft)

INTRODUCTION

This paper will examine Japan1 s ability to influence other
states, and to protect herself from their influence, through the
use of the seas. The scope of these uses, which together com-
prise a nation's seapower, is broader than usually realized.

The last few years have seen changes in naval technology
and marine industries which will have a world-wide impact. In
some fields, operational capabilities have exceeded the ability
of governments to regulate them. In others, expansions of
jurisdiction have outpaced the capacity for both exploitation
and enforcement. For a few activities entirely new transnational
institutions have been proposed.

In any case, politics and technology are inextricably
entwined in ocean affairs. The reader therefore is asked to be
patient with what may seem excessive technical detail. An effort

has been made to include only that which is needed to understand
the nature of current seapower and the physical constraints
which have been imposed on the political process.

The time frame of the study will be roughly ten years.
With a few exceptions, specific numerical forecasts have been
avoided. In Japan1 s case, events since October 1973 have com-
pletely upset earlier projections of continued exponential

growth, while the studies that have been done to replace them
predict everything from economic contraction to a return to pre-
energy crisis expansion rates. Even for such a specific item as
the demand for U.S. natural gas tankers, 1985 estimates vary
between 29 and 84 (and between 29 and 180 for 1990)! Accordingly,
the analysis has centered on possible reactions to alternative
situations and on policies which offer the most flexibility under
a variety of assumptions.

Part One will review some recent developments in military
and commercial technology. Issues under negotiation at the Law
of the Sea Conference also will be summarized to illustrate the
depth and intensity of marine political problems. Attempts will
be made to identify elements of continuity as well as change.

The second part will consider Japan's strategic interests
and the current status of the Maritime Self -Defense Force as
points of reference for later chapters. The latter' s employment and
development is restricted by several domestic and international
conditions, which will be explored. Some possible evolutions of
Japan's definition of her national interests and the limits on
the Self-Defense Forces also will be included. Particular
attention will be paid to pressures for and against an expanded
naval role in the Western Pacific.

Finally, Part Three will look at the relationship between
seapower and the interests outlined earlier. Two chapters will
concentrate on military problems and potential. A third will be

devoted to commercial ocean affairs.

In general, metric units will be used herein. Many ocean

issues, however, axe defined in terms of nautical miles.

Mention of a 370.4 kilometer economic zone or a 22.2 kilometer
territorial sea, for instance, would be strange even to the most
metricized delegate at the law of the sea negotiations. In the
interests of clarity, therefore, the terms most commonly used in
discussions of a particular point have been retained. A con-
version table will be found in Appendix One.

A nautical mile (6080.2 feet) is equal to one 60th of a
degree of longitude at the equator, or very nearly one minute of
latitude anywhere. Thus it is a convenient unit of measure on a
chart. The international nautical mile is defined as 1,852 meters
(exactly), or 6076.1 feet.

PART I

THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEAPOWER

Chapter One . .

Chapter Two . .

Chapter Three .
Chapter Four

Introduction
. . Technology and Contemporary Naval Operations
. . The Changing Uses of the Seas
. . The Unsettled Marine Political Climate
. . The Ocean Setting 1975-1985

THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEAPOWER

Introduction

Two key ideas have been central to classical writings on

seapower (though they often have been left unstated). The

first is that the sea is a neutral medium. In Mahan' s words:

In itself, the sea is a barren tenure; only as
the great common, the highway of commerce, the seat
of communication, does it possess unique character
and value. 2

This principle has been crucial to the concept of freedom of the

seas, and with it the free mobility of naval vessels.

The second, related, point has been that there is a clear

distinction between the sea and the land: "Man marks the earth

with ruin — his control stops with the shore" (or at least at

Some of the major works after Mahan are: Julian S.

Corbett, Some Principles of Mari time Strategy (Annapolis: U.S.
Naval Institute, 1 971 ), reprint of 1 91 1 edition: Herbert Rich-
mond, Statesmen and Seapower (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946);
Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy, 4th ed. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1958); A. E. Sokol, Seapower in the
Nuclear Age (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961); S. W.
Hoskill, The Strategy of Seapower (London: Collins, 1962); and
Peter Gretton, Maritime Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1965) •

Alfred T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia (London: Kennikat

Press, 1970), p. 52.

George Gordon Byron, Lord Byron, Childe Harold (London:
J. M. Dent, 1898), Ch. IV, clxxix, p. 184.

the three mile limit) . The populations which have been important
to governments have lived, and largely worked, ashore. With the
exception of fish, resources and food also have come almost
exclusively from the land. It follows that many of the great
power rivalries of history (including the present one) have been
cast as dichotomies between those which have influenced these
populations and resources directly on land, and those which have
used the more subtle tools of navies and maritime commerce.

These principles, together with the concept that superior
force is the final arbiter of disputes, have underlain most
strategies for maritime warfare. The subordination of military
means to political ends usually has been acknowledged, but such
interactions have been seen mostly in the choice of the objective.
Since World War II attention has shifted to more restricted
arenas — non-nuclear warfare at sea, limited wars, counter-
insurgency operations, etc. However, once the scope of the
military activity was defined, it was expected that it would be
possible to bring forces to bear which were commensurate with
the potential threat.

By the late 1960s, however, it was recognized that major
naval powers, at least those of the West, were operating under
unfavorable asymmetries in the acceptability of force —

See B. H. Liddell Hart's criticism of past military
practices in this regard in "The Objective in War," a lecture
delivered at the U.S. Naval War College on September 24, 1952.
Also, Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1973) » passim.

particularly in the Third World. This spurred a number of

studies of the uses of naval power in non-combat situations and

5
under severe political constraints. Even more recently,

welcome attention has begun to be paid to the diplomatic

potential of non-military maritime instruments. The next four

chapters will concentrate on three factors which may undermine

the utility of great power naval forces as a political tool.

5
Two pioneering works were: L. W. Martin, The Sea in

Modern Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1967) and James Cable,

Gunboat Diplomacy (London: IISS, 1971)* See also, John T. Howe,

Multicrises (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1 971 ) ; and Edward Luttwak,

The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,

1974); other references are listed in the biography.

See Joseph Kasputys, "The Evolving Role of the Merchant
Marine as a Determinant of Seapower," Third International Sea-
power Symposium, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, H.I., 1 973>
pp. 134-170, and U.S. Naval Institute (USNl), To Use The Sea
(Annapolis: USNI, 1 974) » Sections I and II.

7
Definitions

(1) Great Power navies. These will be considered to be
those fleets which can conduct operations on a world-wide scale,
and which can single-handedly affect the global balance of power.
At present, only the U.S. andtheSoviet navies qualify for this
status. In the past, of course, Britain, France, Holland, Spain,
Portugal, Japan and Germany also have had such fleets.

(2) Middle Power navies. Despite the difficulties
attendant to definitions of middle powers, it is somewhat easier
to speak of middle power navies. They will be defined herein as
those which seek to exercise command of the seas, for whatever
purpose, beyond their own coastal waters, but not on a global
scale. One such group of fleets would be those which operate
within a well-defined geographic region, such as the Italians in
the Mediterranean or the Iranians in the Persian Gulf. But
other middle power navies, such as Australia and Canada, have no
such finite boundaries, while the Indian Ocean, though it pro-
vides natural limits for the attention of New Delhi's forces, is
too large to be the sole province of the present Indian fleet.
(The mere possession of nuclear weapons, and even submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) is not considered sufficient

The factors are: (1) The current state of naval technology,
(2) the growing economic importance of the oceans, and (3) the
changing marine political climate. The first and third have
augmented the usable power available to small and middle powers
at sea. All three, it will be argued, have undercut the
impartiality of the seas as medium of trade and communication,
and have begun to blur the distinction between the sea and land
itself.

The basic rationale for navies, indeed for all armed
forces, still lies in answer to the question: "What options do

you have if diplomacy fails?" The factors to be discussed do
not diminish the need for naval forces themselves, but they may
alter the conditions which govern their use. It must be remem-
bered, however, that naval force is only one component of sea-
power. Merchant fleets, geography, population, national produc-
tivity, etc. all have been a part of the equation in one writing

to raise a navy to great power status.)

(3) The editor of Jane ' s Fighting Ships has identified two
other types of forces: (a) the status-symbol navy — he uses
Ghana for an example, and (b) the coast defense fleet. (See the
forward to Jane's, 1 973—74 edition, pp. 73-78.) An interesting
statement concerning the latter unit was provided by Rear
Admiral Walujo Sugito, Indonesian Navy, when he stated that his
navy would develop: "... the capability in wartime to keep
the border seas in dispute. [This ability], without fining
command at sea, could impede the advance movement of the enemy.
If the enemy is superior, ... we at least would have given the
land forces enough time to make the necessary preparations • . .'
Address presented to the Third International Seapower Symposium,
U.S. Naval War College, October 17, 1973. (Emphasis supplied.)

I am indebted to Admiral Arleigh Burke for this point.

or another. The seapower that will be examined herein, however,

is broader still. The ultimate aim will be to understand what
leverage Japan or any other maritime nation can exert, and how
it can insulate itself from the pressures of others, through the
uses of the oceans — be they economic, military, scientific or
recreational.

William Reitzer, in "Mahan on the Use of the Sea," Naval

War College Review, XXV (May-June, 1973), PP» 73-82, makes the
useful distinction between seapower (commercial movement) and
sea force (navy) as subsystems of a nation's total maritime
power.

Chapter One
TECHNOLOGY AND CONTEMPORARY NAVAL OPERATIONS

The Nature of Military Innovations

Changes in technology can affect military operations on

three levels — tactical, strategic and environmental. A given

development may lead from one level to another in any sequence.
The advent of steam, for instance, first transformed naval tac-
tics by reducing some of the elements of chance inherent in wind
and weather. In time, the need for coaling and maintenance led
to a greater reliance on bases than had been the case in the
days of sail, thus altering the strategic picture. Most impor-
tant, however, was the fact that steam eventually helped destroy
the indivisibility of the seas, which had been the key to
British power in the 1?th, 18th and early 19th centuries.

1
Tactics refers to the conduct of operations for immediate

and specific objectives, usually when opposing forces are in

contact. Strategy encompasses a broader scale of both position

and objectives and generally applies to measures taken prior to

the joining of forces. Environmental changes are those which

alter the setting in which warfare as a whole is conducted.

Bernard Brodie, in Seapower in the Machine Age (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1 941 ) , pp. 90-91 and Chapter XXI,

makes the distinction between tactical and strategic impacts of

steam and ordnance developments.

So long as Britain controlled the waters from the North
Sea to the Straits of Gibraltar during the age of sail, she con-
trolled the oceans of the world, at least insofar as other Euro-
pean Powers were concerned. From the Armada (1588), through the
Dutch Wars, to La Hogue (1692) and eventually Trafalgar (1805),
the truly decisive naval battles were fought in European waters.
There were important peripheral campaigns, to be sure — Suffren
in the Indian Ocean, De Grasse in the We stern Atlantic — but
these were not crucial to England's overall supremacy.

Steam, however, enabled forces to be concentrated rapidly.
Moreover, it (along with the development of the torpedo and the

submarine), virtually destroyed the feasibility of the close

blockade, which the Royal Navy had used for so long to keep the

fleets of her enemies separated. It also made the effectiveness
of a force roughly proportional to its proximity to a base,
whereas sailing ships had been much more independent. The

A "close" blockade implies a cordon of ships around an

enemy's harbor to detect his movements immediately, and bring
him to action should he try to escape. See Arthur J. Marder,
The Anatomy of British Seapower (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1940),
for a description of the fiasco attendant to an attempted
blockade during the Royal Navy's 1897 fleet problem. Legal
problems associated with blockades by mines, submarines and more
distant warships arose during both World Wars, without definitive
resolutions. See C. John Colombos, The International Law of the
Sea, 5th ed. (New York: David Mckay Company, 1962), Chapter XIX.
The 1972 mining of Haiphong, supported by Seventh Fleet units in
the Gulf of Tonkin, was similar to a close blockade, but only
was possible since the U.S. had control of the air over the area.

By 1904> the situation was exemplified by Jackie Fisher's
famous comment that: "Five keys lock up the World! Singapore,

result was a beginning of a partitioning of the seas, an
environmental change which has continued to this day.

Telecommunication developments affected naval operations
in a reverse order. The first impact was environmental, in that
the transoceanic cable (1858) destroyed the sailor's monopoly of
intercontinental communications. Thereafter, it was put to
strategic use, ordering Dewey to Manila Bay (1898). Finally,
tactical wireless equipment was installed in most of the major
navies during the early years of this century. Its first combat
use came in the Russo-Japanese War and was instrumental in the
defeat of Admiral Rozhdestvensky at Tsushima (1905)*

The Cape, Alexandria, Gibraltar and Dover." (Quoted in Marder,
op. cit., p. 473) -

The powers- that-be were not unaware of the implications
of this technology. In 1828, the First Lord of the Admiralty
wrote:

Their Lordships feel it their bounden duty to
discourage to the utmost of their ability the
employment of steam vessels, as they consider that
the introduction of steam is calculated to strike a
fatal blow at the naval supremacy of the Empire.

(Quoted in Donald Maclntyre and Basil W. Bathe, Man-Of-War,
[.New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969], pp. 75"76.) Note that the
partitioning also coincided with the rise of non-European sea-
powers. These, in turn, were aided by the rapid development of
new equipment, which effectively forced the major navies to
rebuild their fleets every few years.

5
Linwood S. Howeth, History of Communications — Electronics

in the United States Navy (Washington: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1963). Japanese data from Fukui Shizuo, interview July

22, 1 974* Although the advent of telecommunications ended the

seaman's role in international communications, it actually

heightened the importance of seapower by resolving many of the

command and control problems which had plagued admirals for

Aircraft have passed from tactical to strategic roles. In
the sense that airpower has reduced the constraints of geography,
it has had an impact on the physical environment as well. How-
ever, as will be discussed below (p. 40 ) , it is likely to be
many years, if ever, before the skies will even begin to compare
with the seas as a conduit of international commerce.

One of the most dramatic shifts which has affected the
nature of seapower in this century has been the ability to pro-
ject power directly from one's own heartland into an enemy's.
Foreshadowed by World War II 's strategic bombing, the process
reached its culmination in the late 1950s with the development
of the ICBM. No longer was seapower, through blockade or
amphibious operations, the only link for the infliction of
damage between an island state and a continental one. Naval
power projection kept pace with advances ashore — first by
increasing the range of naval gunnery, and then through airpower,

from British seaplane raids on the North Sea zeppelin bases in

7
1914> to carrier-based nuclear weapons in 1949 and on to the

centuries. Moreover, there are few, if any, recorded instances
where control of the seas led to the capture of important dis-
patches, so the loss of the communications monopoly does not
appear especially significant.

The fact that these constraints still operate, however,
was made clear by the need for enroute airfields during the Yom
Kippur War airlift. These will partly be eliminated by the
development of a mid-air refueling capability for transport air-
craft, but only a few of the largest planes will be so equipped.

See Norman Polmar, Aircraft Carriers (New York: Doubleday,

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) of the 1960s.
These multiple systems added flexibility and survivability to
strategic forces, but the advent of intercontinental weaponry
itself eliminated much of the historic value of the sea as a
"buffer" between great powers. With it went the ancient justi-
fication of so many arms races, namely the direct threat posed
to Britain, and later the United States, by a strong navy in the
hands of a state with a large standing army.

Recent developments in military technology also may be
categorized according to their potential impact. Among those of
current concern to naval planners are:

(1) The production of sophisticated ship-launched weapons
systems such as surface- skimming missiles and their ready
availability to coastal state navies worldwide. These
weapons tend to favor the defender of inshore areas or
restricted bodies of water.

(2) The increased effectiveness of aircraft against surface
ships, particularly when equipped with electro-optically
guided, laser-designated or other homing ordnance.

(3) The disparity between submarine and anti-submarine
capabilities.

(4) Recent advances in strategic airlift.

(5) The possible deployment of real-time ocean surveillance
systems.

(6) Developments in Command Control Communications (C ) •

1969) for a history of the development of naval sea-based
aviation and the post-World War II in- fighting to keep the
carriers in strategic warfare. Also Desmond P. Wilson, Jr.,
"Evolution of the Attack Aircraft Carrier: A Case Study in
Technology and Strategy," in U.S., Congress, Senate and House
Armed Services Committees, CYAN- 70 Aircraft Carrier (hereafter
CVAN-70 Hearings), 91st Cong., 2ndSess., 1970, pp. 398-608.

The first two are tactical innovations. The third has
both tactical and strategic implications. The fourth is
strategic. Both the fifth and sixth are potentially environ-
mental. One eventually may strip warship movements of the cloak
of uncertainty which has been such an important part of past
naval operations. The other may make decisive victories possible
while the majority of an enemy's forces are still intact.

The size and scope of the world's research and development
budgets point to many other significant changes in the next few
years. Some of them also will be noted below. The factors to
be examined in detail, however, are especially important in the
context of the changing law of the sea and Japan's particular
situation.

Tactical Developments

Any innovation which confines its effects to the realm of

tactics is destined to be quickly superseded. This is true

even though such devices often seem to be the most "revolutionary"

9
of inventions. Nevertheless, improvements in a particular type

of weapon and the counter-measures thereto may shift the advantage

Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the electronic
warfare (Bff) field, with its array of seekers, counter-measures
(ECM), and counter-countermeasures (ECCM). See any recent
edition of Jane ' s Weapon Systems (London: Sampson Low, annual).

Q
Brodie, op_. cit. , p. <)] , makes this point with regard to

the ironclad.

back and forth between attacker and defender through several
cycles over many years. This seems to be the present case with
homing ordnance, both surface and air-launched.

Anti-Ship Missiles

In late 1974> there were over twenty types of surface or
submarine -launched anti-ship missiles (SSM) which had been
acquired or ordered by over forty navies. These are outlined

in Table 1-1. Although these weapons were introduced in the

late 1950s with the Soviet Scrubber, they did not get wide-
spread attention until they were used to sink the Israeli

destroyer Eilat off Alexandria in 1967. ' Styx missiles were

distributed throughout the Warsaw Pact and to selected Third
Y/orld countries during the 1960s, but Western systems have pro-
liferated more rapidly in recent years. Table 1-2 illustrates
their distribution.

1 0

Some sources use the abbreviation ASM (Anti-Ship Missile)

for these weapons. Herein the letters SSM ( Surface- to-Surf ace
Missile) will refer to weapons launched from surface ships or
submarines. ASM (Air- to-Surf ace Missile) will be used for those
carried by aircraft. Note that some equipment, like the U.S.
Navy's Harpoon, is capable of airborne, surface or subsurface
launchings.

1 1

Scrubber, Styx, etc. are NATO code names for Soviet SSMs.

The missiles in Soviet hands always caused concern among

Western analysts, but the response was mostly to develop counter-
measures rather than systems of our own. The Eilat sinking
certainly was the impetus behind the U.S. Harpoon SSM develop-
ment, but the starting dates for some foreign programs (Sea
Killer - 1963> Penguin - 1962) indicate that the danger (or the
potential) was seen abroad somewhat earlier.

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The implications of this diffusion are important. In fact,
given any sort of restraint by the maritime states, the missiles
have the potential to redress the naval balance of power in
inshore areas and restricted bodies of water. This alteration
will be in favor of the coastal states at the expense of the
major naval powers. This requires some explanation.

The modern surface warship is a highly sophisticated piece
of machinery. Radars, communications antennas and electronic
countermeasures domes are easily visible on most ships of
frigate size or larger. If missiles are added, the complexity
increases sharply. In order to save topside weight, many
Western navies have adopted aluminum superstructures, thus
effectively removing any protection for the transmitters, wave-
guides, computers and other devices which often are located
above the main deck. Although the ships are structurally sound,
and their hulls capable of absorbing considerable damage, the
vital electronics suit is quite vulnerable, even to schrapnel
from a near miss.

This was dramatically illustrated in April 1972, when
U.S.S. 7/orden was accidently damaged by an American air-launched
missile which homed in on its radars in the Gulf of Tonkin. The
offending weapon was a Shrike, whose warhead is considerably
smaller than those of most of the SSMs novj in service. Never-
the less, Worden, an $80 million guided missile frigate, was
virtually incapacitated, lost one man killed and nine injured,

and had to be towed to the Philippines for repair.

Published data on the Soviet Styx, one of the oldest SSMs,
indicate that shipboard warning time, once the missile is
launched, is at most two minutes. Moreover, many of the later
designs fly at heights of two or three meters above the water
(thus earning the name "sea-skimmer"). This profile compli-
cates the problems of detection and fire control radar solutions
while more sophisticated homing devices also make electronic
jamming or deception more difficult. The ideal answer would be
to destroy the launch-platform prior to firing. This is possible
in the open sea, where the more sophisticated weapons and sensors
of the larger ship might be decisive. In confined waters, how-
ever, such as straits, bays or gulfs, the advantage of surprise
lies with the patrol boat, unless its opponent is maintaining
airborne surveillance. It is perhaps worth noting that 43 of
the 116 straits to be closed by a 12-mile territorial sea

1 ^

^New York Times, April 19, 1972, p. 1.

The Styx's speed is rated at Mach 1 = 332 meters/second
(643 knots) at sea level. Maximum listed range is 42 km, giving
about 2 minutes and 5 seconds of flight time. So far, most com-
bat launches reportedly have been at less than 20 kilometers.
This decrease in range does not necessarily mean less warning,
however, since the launching can be anticipated by ECM tech-
niques.

Presumably this imposes some limitations in rough

weather, but the extent is not clear from published materials.

border developing countries. Twenty-seven of these are

bordered by states in possession of SSMs. This will be

discussed in more detail later.

Today, the most powerful surface warships of any navy are
vulnerable to small craft in the narrow seas. This is not a new
condition. Such ships always have entered restricted waters at
their peril. Not only do they sacrifice the advantage of their
long-range weaponry, but they also subject themselves to mines,
torpedoes, small submarines, shore batteries, and a host of
other devices which have long been used skillfully by coastal
states.

There is an interesting parallel between the current SSM

threat and that which was seen in the surface -launched torpedo

1 ft
around the turn of the century. ' The latter eventually was met

by improvements in gunnery ranges which made it possible to

destroy attackers at a distance. In time, an analogous

1 f\

U.S., Department of State, Office of Geographer, Chart

entitled "World Straits Affected by a Twelve Mile Territorial

Sea."

These include the important straits of Gibraltar, Hormuz,

Bab-el-Mandeb, Malacca, Lombok, Sunda, and Ombai-Wetar. Were
the Philippines, Bahamas and South Korea to get SSMs, the figure
would rise to 37 out of 43 •

1 ft

The years between the perfection of the Whitehead

torpedo (1867) and World War I often heard predictions of the

early demise of the battleship at the hands of the torpedo boat

and later the destroyer. See Harder, op_. cit. , p. 1 23 -

So far as is known, only the Japanese 61 cm oxygen

torpedo of World War II could outrange a battleship's guns.

Even so, most of its successes came at relatively close quarters

in night actions.

solution may be found for the SSM, as helicopters, VTOL (Vertical
Take-Off and Landing) aircraft, or RPVs (Remotely Piloted

Vehicles — radio-controlled drones) are fitted in more and more

ships. In the near term, however, ECM and point defense systems

will be the only available protection.

One effect of the SSM has been to expand the breadth of
the coastal danger zone. Moreover, this has more-or-less coin-
cided with the world-wide extension of the territorial sea and
the heightened awareness of ocean affairs. (See Chapter Three.)
In turn, these have increased the interest of coastal states in
defensive systems. Thus it is significant that the later SSMs —
such as Exocet (France), Gabriel (Israel), and Harpoon (U.S.),
are basically pre-packaged rounds. Unlike the widely- distributed
Styx, the more modern weapons require almost no maintenance.
Thus they can be effective in the hands of relatively unsophisti-
cated navies. Moreover, although the West has developed elec-

tronic countermeasures for some of the older Soviet missiles,

it is not clear that much attention has been given to defense
against the Western missiles held by coastal states.

Much of the above discussion has dealt with conventionally-

A point defense system is a missile or gun installation

with a high kill probability at short ranges. It is designed to

protect only the ship on which it is mounted. The opposite

approach is a long range, area defense weapon.

Note the Israeli success in decoying Egyptian and Syrian

Styxs during the Yom Kippur War.

armed SSMs against destroyer-sized targets. There are other
applications of these weapons. One option would be nuclear war-
heads. Such devices, which may already be operational in some

navies, pose a potentially lethal threat to any floating

target. They may well find employment in a general war, or a

nuclear war at sea, but such scenarios are outside the scope of
this paper.

Another problem is the vulnerability of aircraft carriers
to SSM attack, particularly those launched by submarines. Much

has been written about the survivability of these expensive

ships, and I shall not enter into that debate. I feel, how-
ever, that they are not in very much danger outside of a U.S.-

Soviet encounter. To attack an aircraft carrier is almost

certainly to go beyond the threshhold of retaliation for a
coastal state. Even during the Vietnam War, Hanoi made no
serious effort against Yankee Station. Fast patrol boats are
not likely to get close enough to a carrier to do much damage,

As noted in Table 1-1, the Soviet SS-N-3 is believed to

have a nuclear warhead. In any case, the nuclear-capable ship-
board SAMs (such as Talos) could be used in an air- burst mode.
The ballistic SSNX-13 also may be nuclear.

See, for instance, the CVAN-70 Hearings, op. cit. (note

1-7), and Paul Schratz, "The Nuclear Carrier and Modern War,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (hereafter USNIP), XCVIII
(August 1972), pp. 18-25, with comments in the issues of Decem-
ber 1972, p. 88, and April 1973, p. 86. Other criticisms of the
carrier have been contained in a number of articles by A. Kusmak
of the Brookings Institution.

TEhe present rate of arms transfers to the Persian Gulf
and Eastern Mediterranean could make these very dangerous areas
for the carriers before too long, however.

and few coastal states will have a submerged launch capability.
The actions between missile-armed patrol boats themselves
have been especially interesting. Although India employed the

Styx with considerable success during the 1970 war with Pakis-

25
tan, the first test involving SSMs on both sides seem to have

come in the night actions between Egyptian, Syrian and Israeli

boats during the Yom Kippur War. The Gabriel missile performed

well. The Israelis also apparently confused the Styx

guidance systems with relatively compact ECM equipment, thus

raising hopes for future encounters with such threats. It

should be noted, however, that the ships were at general
quarters prior to the engagement, thus minimizing the chances
of surprise. Moreover, the maneuverability of the small patrol
boats facilitated last-minute evasions while the presence of
multiple targets may have misled the Arab missiles. In short,
it is not clear how applicable these lessons are to larger war-
ships. Certainly they were of little help to the South
Vietnamese frigate sunk by Chinese SSMs off the Paracels in 1974*

Ravi Kaul, "The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing

Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean," USNIP, XCVII (May 1971),

pp. 172-195, presents the Indian view. A Pakistani outlook is

given by M. I. Butt in the "Comment and Discussion" section of

USNIP, XCIX (November 1973), p. 88. D. P. O'Connell notes the

damage to neutral merchantmen caused by errant missiles in "Can

The Navy Plan For Peace?" New Scientist (U.K.), October 25,

1973, P. 257.

Aviation Week and Space Technology (hereafter Aviation

Week), December 10, 1973, P« 20. An Israeli account is given by
Shlomo Ere 11, "Israeli Saar FPBs Pass Combat Test in Yom Kippur
War," USNIP, C (September 1974), pp. 115-118.

Aircraft vs Surface Ships

Across the Song Ma river in North Vietnam is the Thanh Hoa
bridge. Between 1965 an<^ 1967> American pilots flew nearly 700

sorties, dropped 1250 tons of ordnance, and lost 8 aircraft trying

to destroy it. Such are the stories on which sailors build

their hopes. If a fixed target withstood that much punishment
(although bridges admittedly are difficult to destroy because of
the amount of open space and inherent structural strength),
surely a maneuvering ship would have even a better chance.

On March 12, 1972, the Thanh Hoa bridge was attacked by a

single flight of aircraft using newly perfected laser-designated

ordnance and destroyed with a direct hit.

The threat posed by terminally guided air-launched weapons
to ships at sea is considerable. In the few times that a match

27
'Malcolm W. Cagle, "Task Force 77 in Action Off Vietnam,"

USNIP, XCVIII (May 1972), p. 104. So indestructable was the
bridge that new theories were developed to explain its
resilience. One of these was: "... that the earth was com-
posed of two giant elliptical hemispheres, spring hinged some-
where beneath the South Atlantic Ocean and clamped firmly shut
on the other side by the Thanh Hoa bridge. This theory had it
that if the Thanh Hoa bridge were ever destroyed, the world
would snap open, flipping man and beast thither and yon, and up-
setting the gravitational balance of the universe." Ibid. ,
p. 105.

^ew York Times, May 24, 1972. Laser-designated means
that the target is illuminated by a laser beam either from an
aircraft or from the ground. The attacking aircraft releases
its weapons in the general vicinity of the target, and a seeker
attached to the bomb aims it at the point "designated" by the
laser. The Thanh Hoa destruction is even more impressive since
the bridge had been hit by the television-guided Walleye bomb as
early as 1967* Despite the accuracy, however, the Walleye
damage was minor. ( Cagle, p. 97 )•

has been made, the results have been impressively in favor of
the aircraft. In 1943 the Germans introduced a primitive radio-
controlled glide bomb in the Mediterranean. In its first test
it sank the new Italian battleship Roma on its way to surrender.
The weapon seriously damaged a number of vessels off Salerno,
and later was to plague the Allies off Anzio. For some reason,
it was not used again in the war, but the potential was clear.
Excluding the Kamikaze, which, after all, had a special form of
terminal guidance, warships did not face such weapons again

until the late 1960s, when H.M.A.S. Hobart, and later U.S.S.

29
Worden were accidently hit by U.S. missiles. Although neither

ship was in any danger of sinking, they were rendered hors de
c ombat by relatively small warheads not designed for the anti-
shipping role. Under such conditions, the damage that might
result from a 250 or 500 kg built- for- the-purpose ASM hit is
sobering to imagine.

Table 1-3 represents an inventory of the homing or laser-
designated weapons now in production or under development which
have anti-ship missions at least as part of their tasks. While
these are not yet so widely distributed as the SSMs, their
proliferation probably will not be long delayed, especially in
light of the sophisticated arms now flowing to the Middle East.

H.M.A.S. Hobart, an Australian guided missile destroyer,

was hit by two Sidewinder air-to-air missiles in June 1 9^8, when

a U.S. pilot mistook her for a North Vietnamese helicopter. The

1972 Worden incident was noted above (p. 21 ) .

Table 1-3
AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES AND HOMING ORDNANCE

Est.

Country

Name

Guidance

Warhead

Ran^e

(kg)

(km)

France

AS. 11

AS. 12

AS. 20

AS. 50

250

Germany

Kormoran

250

Jumbo

nuc/conv

n.a.

Great Britain

Hellcat

10?

3.5

Skua

19?

Internat

ional

Martel AJ.168

n.a.

28-55

Martel AS. 57

n.a.

28-55

Otomat

n.a.

64-570

Japan

ASM-1

140

Sweden

RB 04 E

500

28-59

RB 05 A

150

n.a.

U.S.

Bulldog

n.a.

Bullpup

1 1 5-nuc .

Condor

227

65-85

Walleye I

585

bomb

Walleye II

907

bomb

Shrike

15-17

Maverick

n.a.

Hobo

907/1560

bomb

Pave way

225/540/
407/1 560

bomb
bomb

Harpoon

540

Standard ARM

n.a.

USSR

AS-1 "Kennel"

1000?

AS-2 "Kipper"

nuc.

215

AS- 5 "Kangaroc

nuc.

650

AS-4 "Kitchen'

nuc.

740

AS-5 "Kelt"

n.a.

220

AS- 6 -

n.a.

550?

Source:

Jane ' s

Fighting Ships

1974

-75

Jane' s

Weapon Systems

1973

-74

The Mi!

Litary Balance

1974-75

Guidance Codes:

1 . Wire Guided/Radio Command

2. Electro-Optical

5. Semi-Active Homing

4« Active riadar Homing/infrared

5. Laser designated

6. Anti-Radiation Missile (ARM)

The introduction of such weapons does not alter the long-
standing principle that ships should not venture into the range

of land-based aircraft without air cover of their own. How-
ever, it does downgrade the size and proficiency level of the
air fleet which is to be considered a strong threat. As with
the SSMs, pre-packaged ASM rounds can be nearly as dangerous in
unskilled hands as skilled ones. In those states with already
proficient ground attack or marine patrol squadrons, they lend

credence to the arguments that the air force should be assigned

a larger role in coastal defense.

In one sense, however, the advent of both ASMs and SSMs
has simplified the problem for the defender in that a point-
defense system designed for one may be able to deal with the
other. There are several such possibilities, ranging from

short-range missiles to aircraft 20mm cannon with firing rates

on the order of 6000 rounds per minute. In a longer time

frame the use of laser-designated projectiles fired from guns

See Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet, Aircraft and Sea
Power (New York: Stein and Day, 1970), passim.

The U.S. Air Force has shown an increased interest in

such a mission since at least the early 1970s. Conclusions sup-
porting greater Air Force participation in maritime operations
also were reached by the Australian Maritime Airpower Study
Group. Captain J. A. 0'Farrell, R.A.N. , to author, June 19, 1974«

Some of the best writing on this subject is contained in

the brilliant articles by Desmond Scrivener, "Weapons for the
General Purpose Escort," International Defense Review (hereafter
IDR). #3/1973, pp. 331-336 and "Escort Ships— An Alternative
Solution?" IDR, #4/1 973 , pp. 46O-463.

may shift the balance back in favor of the defense.

In short, the ASM and SSM represent a phase of the offense-
defense cycle which definitely favors the attacker. But, as one

respondent put it, the surface ship is too valuable a tool to

34
•'roll over and die." In time, technology will find a counter

to today's threats, even though new ones will arise in their

place. Nevertheless, for most of the period covered by this

study, all but the most sophisticated ships will be vulnerable

to the armed forces of small coastal states which heretofore

have posed few dangers.

Other Tactical Innovations

The addition of an air capability to medium-sized com-
batants, will greatly increase the tactical effectiveness of
single ships in both surface and ASW roles. It also will enhance
their defensibility against most forms of attack. As noted
earlier, shipboard aircraft eventually may reduce the SSM threat
in the same way that long range gunnery reduced that of the
torpedo boat — by making it possible to destroy an attacker
before he can get close enough to launch his weapons. Moreover,

The U.S. Navy is developing laser seekers for shore-
bombardment projectiles. Congress evidently has been satisfied
with the program to date. See U.S. Congress, House of Repre-
sentatives, Armed Services Committee, Keport 95~1035 Authorizing
Appropriations for Military Procurement and Research, Develop-
ment, Test and Evaluation, 93rd Congress, 2nd session (Washing^-
ton: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 974) , p. 45.

%r. Geoffrey Jukes, Australian National University,
interview, June 18, 1974*

in inshore waters, aircraft would permit reconnaissance before
the ship itself was placed in danger. However, the kinds of
vehicles to be found on destroyer- type ships will be no match
for shore-based, fixed-wing machines. More importantly, they
will not be continuously operable, and will be legally restricted
within the territorial sea. Thus, the danger of an effective
sudden strike by a coastal state remains in those situations on
the borderline between diplomatic and forcible solution.

Shipboard lasers will enter naval inventories in the next
few years, probably as range-finders or designators for bombs or
shells. The state-of-the-art in high-energy equipment (death
rays, as it were) is very highly classified, but perhaps they
will appear in point-defense roles before too long. Still, as
optical devices, they still will be subject to atmospheric limi-
tations.

The most rapidly changing, and perhaps the most important,
military field is that of electronic warfare (EST), some of which
was discussed in the previous section. Airborne EW equipment
was absolutely essential to the air war over Vietnam and to the

Israeli successes in the Middle East, and such devices have a

full range of shipboard counterparts. Tactical data systems

These are shipboard digital computer systems to assist

in command and control functions. Examples are the U.S. Navy's
NTDS (Naval Tactical Data System), Britain's ADAWS (Action Data
Automation Weapons System) and France's SENIT (Systeme d'Exploi-
tation Navale des Informations Tactiques). It may not be an
exaggeration to say that effective anti-aircraft or anti-missile
operations have become impossible without such automated infor-
mation processing.

already have transformed the internal organization of warships,
and promise to be extended still further. A side effect will be
more pressures for international standardization, if not in
hardware, then at least in software to permit interfacing
between national systems. It may be, someday, that battles will
be decided by EW operators before the weapons are even launched,
but the balance is shifting back and forth so rapidly that it is
difficult to make any long-term statements about it.

With speeds in the 40-100 knot range, surface skimming
vehicles can greatly improve naval mobility and flexibility.
Hydrofoils probably will continue to be limited to tactical roles
because of size and range restrictions. However, surface effect
ships or Wing- in-Ground-Ef feet transports eventually may grow
large enough and numerous enough to become a factor in strategic
planning. Given enough capacity, they could reduce the need for
overseas bases. Nevertheless, such breakthroughs will not come
quickly, and for the next few years, surface skimmers probably
will be confined to relatively near-shore operations.

Often overlooked, but of major importance, are mines.
Though there have been few dramatic breakthroughs, the potential

' For many years the naval professional literature has

been full of debates about whether or not a commanding officer
should fight his ship from the traditional position on the bridge,
or from the integrated sensor environment of Combat Information
Center (CIC). Having apparently been decided in favor of the
latter, the question now arises of how far weapons release
authority must be delegated to effectively respond to the ultra-
short warning times of modern threats.

of modern devices has "become so great as to have both tactical
and strategic implications. These will be discussed in Chapter
Nine.

Finally, there are environmental modification techniques.
Proposed activities range from localized rainmaking, as was
practiced in Vietnam, to selective destruction of the earth's

ozone layer, and "acoustic fields on the sea and ocean surface

to combat individual ships or whole flotillas." It must be

remembered that such operations currently are directed at
naturally unstable situations, where the relatively small
energies which man can introduce into the system may tip the
balance one way or the other. As such, artificial tidal waves
and typhoons are still mostly in the realm of science fiction.
However, even small-scale successes could have dramatic, if
unpredictable, effects on navies. One can imagine a group of
scientists trying to keep a task force hidden in bad weather
while the opposition seeks to bathe it in sunshine.

37
Resolution submitted by the Soviet Union to the United

Nations to ban such activities. Reported in The Washington Post,

October 23, 1 9T4> P» A27. It is not clear what is meant by

"acoustic fields." Perhaps they simply refer to the Western

hydrophone arrays noted below. Alternatively, they might be

sonic devices designed to blank out or deceive sonars. The use

of acoustic energy for destructive purposes at any distance is

rather limited by the laws of physics.

^ I am indebted to Captain Don Walsh, U.S. Navy, for this

point.

Strategic Developments

Submarine vs An ti- Submarine

Prom the dark days of 1941 and. 1942, the Allied anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) rebounded spectacularly. Towards the
end of World War II, the advantage in a contest between a sub-
marine and its pursuers lay almost entirely with the latter.
The primary reasons were four- fold. First, the development of
high-frequency sea and airborne radar denied the submarine the
time on the surface to increase its operating radius and recharge
its batteries. Second, the availability of escort carriers made
it possible to provide air cover for merchantmen all the way
across the Atlantic. Third, improvements in sonar capability,
operator skills and escort tactics gave a better chance of
detecting a submarine prior to attack. In any event, the speed
disparity between a submerged submarine and a surface escort
(6-7 knots vs. 20-35) left the initiative with the surface ship
once the sub was located. Finally, and perhaps most important,
the organization of Allied ASW had greatly improved. High-
frequency direction-finder stations ringed the Atlantic, and got
generalized fixes as the U-boats sent their nightly messages to

Admiral Doenitz. The U.S. Navy established the Tenth Fleet in

May 1943 to coordinate anti-submarine activities. Better

cooperation was achieved between British and American authorities.

^Ladislas Farago, The Tenth Fleet (New York: Ivan
Obelensky, 1962).

Strategic Developments

Submarine vs An ti- Submarine

From the dark days of 1941 and 1942, the Allied anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) rebounded spectacularly. Towards the
end of World War II, the advantage in a contest between a sub-
marine and its pursuers lay almost entirely with the latter.
The primary reasons were four- fold. First, the development of
high-frequency sea and airborne radar denied the submarine the
time on the surface to increase its operating radius and recharge
its batteries. Second, the availability of escort carriers made
it possible to provide air cover for merchantmen all the way
across the Atlantic. Third, improvements in sonar capability,
operator skills and escort tactics gave a better chance of
detecting a submarine prior to attack. In any event, the speed
disparity between a submerged submarine and a surface escort
(6-7 knots vs. 20-35) left the initiative with the surface ship
once the sub was located. Finally, and perhaps most important,
the organization of Allied ASW had greatly improved. High-
frequency direction-finder stations ringed the Atlantic, and got
generalized fixes as the U-boats sent their nightly messages to

Admiral Doenitz. The U.S. Navy established the Tenth Fleet in

May 1943 to coordinate anti-submarine activities. Better

cooperation was achieved between British and American authorities.

^Ladislas Farago, The Tenth Fleet (New York: Ivan
Obelensky, 1962).

These doubtless will be augmented soon by transfers from the
U.S. and Soviet fleets, as well as sales of European designs.
The possession of similar craft by several states could
raise serious identification problems in the event of
unacknowledged submarine attacks. Such acts are not unprece-
dented. Italian submarines torpedoed British, French, Spanish,

Russian and Danish vessels bound for Republican Spain during

46
July and August 1 937 > and again in 1939.

This leads to the second point, namely that it will take

organization to defeat a submarine threat or perhaps even to

identify it. Unconventional approaches, such as containerized

helicopter support systems aboard merchantmen, may offer

relatively low-cost solutions to tactical problems. These will

be examined in later chapters. But the greater difficulties of

early warning and target localization will require a complex,

wide-area intelligence network. This is something which the

major powers, particularly the U.S., would be in a position to

offer in the event of such "Nth Country" submarine attacks.

See Robert Goldston, The Civil War in Spain (Greenwich:
Fawcett, 1966), PP« 1 63 and 176. Also, James W. Cortada,
"Ships, Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War: Kyon Conference,
September 1937," II Politico, XXXVII, #4 (Diciembre 1972), pp.
673-689. Although all governments knew who was responsible, the
charges could not be proved and so diplomatic fiction was pre-
served to the extent of giving Italians the responsibility for
ASW in one sector! Whether or not today's acoustic identifica-
tion would be better grounds for indictment remains to be seen.

Sealift and Airlift

Despite the increasing capacity of cargo aircraft, the
merchant ship continues to be the foundation of the international
movement of both military and civilian goods. In the United

States, in 1969, 79.65/* by value and 99.8$ by weight of U.S.

exports went by ship. Figures for other industrial countries

are comparable.

Moreover, with the advent of industrialization, maritime
commerce developed further strategic importance. Guerre de
course has been an important part of naval activities since the
days of mercantilism. Piet Heyn's capture of a silver flota off
Cuba in 1628 was a devastating blow to Spain's financial credit
in Europe. During the time of Louis XIV, commerce raiders

took as proportionately heavy a toll of British shipping as the

49
U-boats of 1917 and 1942. But, since the only real strategic

materials of that period were masts and naval stores, there was

not the danger of starvation or industrial paralysis which

characterized the blockades of Germany and Great Britain during

Y/orld War I and Japan and Great Britain during World War II.

In the military sphere, the strides made by strategic

*' Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Lifelines-

09D-P1 (Revised), June 1 971 .

4 J. H. Parry, The Spa
Pelican Books, 1973), pp. 261-262.

Robert G. Albion and Jenni

time (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1942), Chapter 1.

Aft

J. H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (Middlesex:

49
^Robert G. Albion and Jennie B. Pope, Sea Lanes in War-

airlift were dramatically demonstrated by both the U.S. and the
USSR during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In 566 missions between
October and December 1 973» U.S. C-5 and C-141 aircraft delivered

22,395 tons of supplies, the Soviets 15,000 tons in 934

50
missions. The importance of these figures was not so much in

their size — over 13,000 tons were delivered in one day during
the height of the Berlin airlift — but in the distances over
which they were carried. It is nearly 12,000 kilometers between
Dover Air/Force Base in Delaware, where the airlift began, and
Lod airport in Israel. By contrast, Tempelhof airfield in West
Berlin was less than 220 kilometers from some of its supporting
bases.

The rapid response capability of aerial transport has
become an indispensable part of modern warfare. Yet the move-
ment of the quantities of equipment needed to support extended
operations and even to replenish stocks expended in short, high-
intensity combat remains the domain of sealift. The Chairman of
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had high praise for the Military
Airlift Command's effort during the Middle East War, but added:

Not so well publicized is the fact that from
October 6, 1973 to date (May 3, 1974) sealift
accounted for over 7O70 of the total tonnage
moved. 51

Aviation Week, December 10,1973? PP« 16—19.

J Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, speech to the Jacksonville

Council of the Navy League, May 3> 1974* Quoted in Navy Times
(Pacific), May 22,1974, P« 13-

In Vietnam, well over 95$ of the material arrived by ship.
It can be argued, of course, that it would have been better had
we not had the capability to sustain that effort, but that does
not detract from the potential of shipping itself.

None of the post-World War II airlifts, from Berlin to
Lebanon, to the Congo, Vietnam and the Middle East, were
seriously opposed (except for diplomatic problems involving
overflight). Neither were the post-war sealifts, with the
limited exception of the North Korean mines off of Wonsan in
1950* The impact of active resistance on modern logistics
remains untested.

The role of sea transportation in a general war is diffi-
cult to imagine. See, for instance, Peter Gretton's critique of

NATO resupply strategy in his Maritime Strategy. Neither is a

54
"Grey War" against the sea lanes alone very credible. Never-
theless, a mine or submarine campaign against the British Isles,
Japan, or Taiwan at least is technically feasible. Japan's
strengths and weaknesses in the face of such a threat will be

Robert J. Blackwell, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for

Maritime Affairs. Statement before the Sea Power Subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee (hereafter Blackwell
Testimony) . September 19, 1974 (Mimeo), p. 74*

55Gretton, op., cit. (note 1-1 ), pp. 76-80 and 190-191.

%ichael MccGwire has provided a convincing rebuttal to
scenarios of a Soviet attack on Western shipping alone. See his
"The Submarine Threat to Western Shipping" in J. L. Moulton,
British Maritime Strategy in the Seventies (London: Royal
United Services Institute, 1969) •

explored in detail later. It is worth noting, however, that
although strategic airlift may be invaluable in the delivery of
weaponry and other war materiel, there is little that it can do
to sustain an overall economy.

Based on the experiences of the World Wars, there are

indications that an island nation could suffer up to a bOfa

55
reduction of imports without complete collapse. From the food

standpoint, Japan currently produces about 1,530 calories per

day, some 40 per cent of her normal consumption in terms of

original calories. She is, of course, much less self-

sufficient in many other critical commodities.

The U.S. Air Force has some 77 C-5A and 276 C-141 transport
aircraft available. Using loading rates similar to those achieved

Interviews with Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force

(hereafter MSDF) Officer, April 20, 1974. It is based on the

fact that 1942 British imports reached a minimum of about 43$ of

1939-40 demand. Japan's war production, on the other hand,

deteriorated rapidly after 1944* when U.S. submarines reduced

her raw materials imports to 35$ of pre-war amounts. British

data from C. B. A. Behrens, Merchant Shipping and the Demands of

War, U.K. Civil Series (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,

1955)> PP« 65-200. Japanese figures from United States

Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), "The Effects of Strategic

Bombing on Japan's War Economy," USSBS, Yol. 53 (Washington:

Government Printing Office, 1947)* Similarly, the British

blockade of Germany in World War I cut the average citizen's

calorie intake to 1,431» about 44 '5 per cent of the peacetime

figure. See C. Ernest Fayle, Seaborne Trade , Yol. II: The

Submarine Campaign to the End of 19,16 (London: John Manning,

1923), p. 404.

Asahi Shimbun series, "Food and People," installment VT,

July 14, 1973* See below, Chapter Five.

57
during the 1973 Mideast War to cany raw materials from the

West Coast to Japan, the entire U.S. Air Force heavy lift capacity
could supply less than six percent of an austere (40/^ of peace-
time) Japanese iron ore need alone. This in no way diminishes
the value of these aircraft, but highlights the competitive
advantage of ships in the transport of the bulk cargoes so
necessary to everyday life.

Contrary to popular opinion, it is not only the West that
is dependent on this trade. Much has been written about the
Soviet Union's internal lines of east-west communications, the
Trans-Siberian Railway, the canal system, etc. However, a large
percentage of the goods arriving in eastern Siberia comes by
ship either through the Indian Ocean or by the Arctic route.

57 C-141 C-5A
Cargo Loadings (Yom Kippur

airlift) 15 tons 75 tons

Speed 465 kts. 465 kts.

Distance 465O n.m. 465O n.m.

Flying Time (Round Trip) 20 hrs. 20 hrs.

Sorties per aircraft/day (est) .75 »75

Available aircraft 276 77

Total Cargo/day 51 05 T 4556 T

Japanese Iron Ore Imports 118,785,000 tons/yr = 325,458 tons/day
4tyo of peacetime imports FY 1972 = 130,175 tons/day

Source: Aircraft data from Jane ' s All The World's Aircraft,
1973-74.

Imports from Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITl).
Comparable figures for other commodities (at the 4.O/0 level) are:
Petroleum - jfo, Coal - 14$, Foodstuffs - 58^. Note that cargo
loads could be increased to 35 tons and 110 tons respectively
over shorter distances or at full range with the mid-air
refueling now being developed for the C~5»

Robert E. Athay, "The Sea and Soviet Domestic

Thus, it would seem that maritime transportation will
continue to be the mainstay of peaceful international commerce*
Over a wide variety of wartime scenarios sealif t capability will
be important, both for long-term conflict resupply and to deter
by displaying the capacity to cope with blockades of long
duration. In many cases, however, an airlift, may be necessary
to buy enough time for the seaborne supply operations to become
effective.

Other Strategic Innovations

Weapon systems with strategic implications in modern naval
warfare range from the attack carrier to ballistic missile
submarines to land-based bombers and missiles which could be
targeted against convoys, task forces, etc. Although volumes
could be written on each, these devices generally are outside of
Japan's purview at present. They will be referred to later in
more specific contexts.

Transportation," USNIP, XCVTII (May 1972), pp. 158-179, does not
give exact figures, but states:

. . . large areas of the Soviet Union, chiefly on the
Pacific and in the Arctic . . . rely on shipping for
their main transport links with the rest of the
country and with the outside world, (p. 177)

See also U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, The Indian Ocean: Political and S_trategi_c
Future, 92nd Cong., 1st session (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1971), P- 3»

Environment-Level Developments

Rarely does technology actually alter the arena of conflict
itself. The aircraft and the submarine did, of course, by intro-
ducing new dimensions to the battlefield. Other developments
were noted at the beginning of the chapter. At present, however,
there are two interrelated programs underway which may one day
have similarly far-reaching effects.

Real-Time Ocean Surveillance Systems

One of the prerequisites to the SALT agreements was the

development of "national technical means of verification,"

59
primarily reconnaissance satellites. Having proved their

worth in strategic intelligence, attention has begun to turn to
their tactical potential. This has profound implications. Should
it become possible to monitor the movements of naval vessels on
a real-time (as occurring) basis, it would change the entire
environment of warfare at sea.

A 1972 study indicated that satellite cameras could resolve
objects of about one foot from an altitude of 100 miles. Infra-
red sensors and side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) also were felt
to be aboard some of the latest vehicles. Shipborne radar

^SALT I Agreement, Article XII, para. 1. The complete

range of national intelligence assets naturally would be devoted

to such work, but satellites are among the most important in this

case.

Ted Greenwood, Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms
Control, Adelphi Papers No. 88 (London: International Institute

signals can be monitored by electronic intelligence satellites

which have been orbited since the early 1960s.

There is thus no doubt that the capability exists for
satellites to detect ships at sea under clear skies, both day
and night. All-weather capability will depend on the sophisti-
cation of the satellite radars, but this seems to be developing

rapidly. ' The important words thus are "real- time." There

also is a significant problem with identification.

Treating the former question first, there are two ways to
obtain data from satellite sensors. The first is to store them

in a recoverable capsule, which is ejected at intervals

(typically three days or longer ) for processing. This method

is ideal for high-resolution photography, locating and analyzing

for Strategic Studies (lISS), 1972), pp. 6-8. SLAR gives a
photograph- like image even through cloud cover. Given the state
of current technology, the primary limitations on visual sensors
seem to be from atmospheric distortions. These are on the order
of 6" to one foot. Greenwood feels that existing lenses and
films could come close to these limits. Even if television were
less clear by an order of magnitude or two, it still would be
adequate for detecting ships. See also Greenwood's article
"Reconnaissance and Arms Control," Scientific American, 228
(February 1973), pp. 14-25-

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRl),

"Verification Using Reconnaissance Satellites," SIPRI Yearbook
1973 (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1973), pp. 60-101.

62u.

S. News and Y/orld Report, October 21, 1974, P» H,

reported that Britain "has perfected a satellite radar system
able to pinpoint every ship in the Eastern Atlantic."

Greenwood, Scientific American Article, op. cit.,
pp. 18-20.

fixed electronic emitters, etc. The second approach is to trans-
mit the data to the ground via radio link, often after processing
aboard the satellite. Such systems almost never would be out of
contact with U.S. listening stations for more than 30 minutes.

The limitations of the first approach for ocean surveillance
are evident. In 72 hours a 20 knot task force could be anywhere
in a 22,342,000 square kilometer area. In other words, if it
were detected at Guam, three days later it could be off TSkyo,
the Philippines, New Guinea or Wake.

Even with a continuous data link, there are problems. A

satellite with an orbital period of exactly 90 minutes will

retrace its path over the earth's surface once every 24 hours.

A satellite in a 200 km orbit could cover a circle roughly

Aviation Week, August 19> 1 974> reported that the Earth
Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS) would store data on its
tape recorder when out of touch with U.S. ground stations and
transmit it when communication was re-established about 30
minutes later. The U.S. Air Force reportedly maintains a
satellite monitoring station at Alice Springs, Australia which
might reduce the time even more.

Such a satellite would complete 16 orbits in 24 hours,

bringing it back over its starting point just as the earth began

another revolution, thus repeating the cycle. If the period

were not exactly 90 minutes, the satellite would trace a

different path each day. The limits of latitude covered by a

satellite are defined by the inclination of its orbit to the

Equator, i.e. an inclination of 90 degrees would reach both

poles, while one of 75 degrees or 105 degrees would go only to

latitude 75 degrees North and South.

3120 km in diameter, although presumably its high- resolution

sensors have a much narrower field of view. In any case, to

provide coverage of a given point once every 90 minutes, 13

satellites at 200 km would be needed. Given that such an orbit

would decay fairly rapidly (in about a month), perhaps as many as

twelve launches per year would be needed to keep each satellite

68
on station. At about $25 million per launch, ' such a program

quickly becomes prohibitively expensive.

Obviously, there are trade-offs. Four satellites in 1000

km orbit could cover the equator once every 100 minutes or so

and remain in orbit longer, albeit at a five-fold sacrifice in

resolution. A synchronous satellite at 36,000 km could provide

Calculations as follows:

1. Earth's radius (R) = 3448 n.m., radius

to satellite = (R+108) = 3556 n.m.

2. Cos Q- = .9696, Sin Q- = /l-Cos2 Q- = .2446

3. X = (R+108) Sin Q- = 869.8,

Y = X Cos & = 843.2 n.m. = 1562 km

The equational circumference of the Earth is about

40,066 km. If the diameter of each satellite's "view" is 3104 km»
then 12.9 would be needed to cover the equator at any one moment.
Fewer would be required for higher latitude coverage (i.e. 11
could cover all areas above 30 degrees) .

Estimate from Mr. Philip J. Klass, Aviation V/eek, tele-
phone interview, October 8, 1974*

A synchronous orbit is one in which the period of the

satellite is 24 hours, thus making it appear to x*emain stationery
over some point on the equator. The orbital plane can be inclined
slightly to cause it to trace out a North-South figure-eight, but
such satellites are basically confined to low latitudes.

continuous coverage of an entire hemisphere but with poor reso-
lution and serious angular viewing problems near the poles. The
former altitude, incidently, is close to that which the Soviets

reportedly have used for their recent ocean reconnaissance

70
vehicles. Given that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union

usually have maintained only one photo satellite in orbit at

any one time since the late 1960s, it is evident that ocean

surveillance from space will require an extensive, and expensive

additional effort. Nevertheless, both superpowers seem committed

to the project.

There is, however, another problem which may be even more
serious than the detection of ships at sea — their identification.
In 1971» some 22,900 merchant ships and fishing craft were at

' Aviation Week September 9, 1974, p. 26. The U.S. Navy's

Project 749? however, reportedly is looking at a "low-altitude

satellite," Aviation Week, August 9, 1972, p. 12.

SIPrtI Yearbook, op. cit. , figures derived from Tables

of military launches. Both countries, however, have a larger

number of electronic intelligence (ELINT) — so called "ferret11 —

satellites in orbit. At the end of 1972, the U.S. had 17 still

flying to the Soviet's 15, though it is not clear how many still

are working.

U.S. Navy officials revealed in 1973 that the Soviets
were using satellites for ocean surface surveil lance, stating
that the U.S. was five years behind in the field (Aviation Week,
September 10, 1973). Between December 1973 and May 1 974 the
Soviets launched 3 satellites with near-circular orbits which
were compatible with this role. (Aviation Week, September 9»
1974)* The USAF recently has alunched a number of vehicles
using the TITAN III-B booster which may be dedicated to Navy
Projects.

73
sea on any given day. The figure is projected to grow to

30,437 by 1980. 4 By contrast, the U.S. Navy in 1974 had some

268 ocean-going surface combatants and amphibious ships while

the USSR had 270. Even assuming that 50$ of the forces would

76
be at sea at any one time, they would constitute only slightly

more than one percent of the ships on the ocean, and only about

two and a half percent if fishing boats are excluded.

Thus there is a problem of identification. Warships

undeniably have electromagnetic signatures which are different

'^Robert P. Thompson, "Establishing Global Traffic Flows,"

Journal of Navigation, XXV (October, 1972), pp. 483-495. The

1971 figure was arrived at by applying the at-sea percentages

of Table I to the vessel categories in Table IV.

*7 A

Ibid. The forecast is flawed by assumption of (1) con-
tinued expansion of per capita oil consumption. in the indus-
trialized countries at 1960s rates and (2) continued closure of
the Suez Canal, but it is useful nonetheless.

^Jane's Fighting Ships 1974-75, pp. 642-643. This
includes: Carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes,
assault ships and landing ships. The point is not to compare
the sizes of the two navies but to point out the relatively small
number of major warships as a percent of total ships at sea.

Probably a high estimate, except in the most serious

crises. About a third of the U.S. fleet normally is deployed

overseas in peacetime, with the figure rising to 50-to-60 per

cent in periods of tension, and 90 per cent in a general v/ar.

(Washington Post, October 29, 1974). The commander of the U.S.

Atlantic fleet stated in 1974 that the U.S. peacetime target was

42 days at sea per quarter (46^0), but that the tempo of

operations had fallen to about 38 days (4?$) for deployed units and

34 days (3T/o) for others because of fuel and budget constraints. See

U.S., House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,

Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 12564, Department of

Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975*

Part 2 of 4, 93rd Cong., 2nd session (Washington: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1974), p. 940.

from those of merchantmen. Naval radars can be distinguished
from commercial ones, and the volume of communications from all
but the smallest man-of-war is likely to dwarf that from the
average merchant ship. But the time during which a suspected
reconnaissance satellite will be overhead can be predicted, and
various forms of deception exercised by naval and selected
merchant units during that period. It also is probable that
warship infrared signatures are different from those of com-
mercial vessels, especially for larger units. With sensor
resolutions of ten feet, a satellite should be able to distin-
guish a ship with two active firerooms (i.e. a warship or fast
liner) from one with only one. These would be more difficult to
mask, but presumably some ambiguities could be introduced if
desired. The difficulties are compounded if it is desired to
know which warships are present and where they are going (other
than just to distinguish between warships and merchant ships).

A small vessel can simulate a larger one fairly easily through

a number of devices. Among these would be: increased communi-
cations traffic, the use of special transmitters to simulate
radars not actually carried, and special repeaters to enhance
the energy of reflected signals from enemy radars to make a
target look bigger than it is. If a ship actually is being

Jane's Weapon Systems 1973-74, pp. 241-251, contains an

excellent description of basic Electronic Warfare (EW) pro-
cedures and equipments, from which the examples herein are taken.

tracked by certain types of radar, techniques to give false
direction and position information can be employed. In sum, the
problems of real-time ocean surveillance are formidable, even
with satellites. It is unlikely that a U.S. commander soon will
be able to ask about the Kresta class cruiser Krasnyi Krim and
be presented with immediate television coverage. On the other
hand, it is not unreasonable to expect information to the effect
that a Soviet destroyer- type ship was reported at Lat. X,
Long. Y within the past 24 hours. Anything in between will
depend on the amount of assets that one is willing to commit.
The most practical approach is likely to be through the

coordination of several sensors. In addition to the seabed

Tft
hydrophone arrays mentioned earlier (p. 36) • Over-The-Horizon

(OTH) radar systems can track ships from about 1500 to 2950

79
kilometers. Land-based patrol aircraft have long been an

essential part of maritime reconnaissance, and these may be

7ft

A knowledgeable trade journal has reported that: "One

early experimental installation (of seabed listening systems),

emplaced in 1956, was aimed at spotting surface and submarine

traffic leaving and approaching Vladivostok and Nachodka [sic]

through the Sea of Japan." Compass Publications, Sea Technology

Handbook Directory 1^74 (Arlington: Compass Publications,

1974), p. A/12.

Donald E. Barrick, "The Use of Skywave Radar for Remote

Sensing of Sea States," Marine Technology Society Journal, VII
(January-February 1973) > PP» 29-53* In addition to the back-
scatter radar at the Naval Research Laboratory on Chesapeake Bay
used for the studies reported in the article, the U.S. has
deployed OTH-B radars as part of its ballistic missile early
warning system (BMEWS). Whether or not these radars can (or
will) be converted for sea surveillance is not known.

80
supplemented by modified U-2s operating from carriers. High

Frequency Direction-Finder networks have been used with great

success since World War II. Perhaps the most cost-effective

combination would be a satellite to provide 24 hour position

81
checks with updates provided by aircraft or "tattletail" ships

as deemed necessary by on-scene commanders. Alternatively,

integrated sensor systems could be developed in high-interest

regions (such as the exits from the Baltic, the Norwegian Sea

or the Sea of Japan, or the approaches to the Persian Gulf.

Perhaps as in NTDS, targets could be assigned track numbers,

identified by electronic or other means, and then watched until
they passed out of the surveillance area or were turned over to
elements dedicated solely to their monitoring. In the near
future, the Soviets are likely to have an edge in this regard
since they are mainly interested in the relatively few U.S. air-
craft carriers, which can be trailed if necessary. On the other
hand, the U.S. has the computer technology to eventually develop
a better ocean-wide surveillance system through remote sensors.
Paradoxically, it may be easier to hide valuable ships in

80Aviation Week, May 8, 1972, p. 26.

A "tattletail" is a surface ship assigned to follow an

opponent's fleet and report its movements, state of readiness,

launches of missiles, etc.

See above, note 35* Aviation Week, August 9» 1972,

reported "A . . . series of three small software studies dealing

with track correlation for the ocean surveillance satellite . . ."

(emphasis supplied) .

peacetime than in wartime since there are merchantmen to get
lost among along the normal sealanes. At the same time, the
general location of convoys in wartime might not be too diffi-
cult if all ships were moving in discrete clusters. This,
incidently, is not an adequate argument for abolishing a convoy.
Its purpose is not to hide, but to provide for easier defense.
This it surely does in all but a nuclear environment, since the
initial detection problem of the submarine is partly solved if
it is known that he must come to the vicinity of the convoy.

What then, are the implications for naval operations of a
partial ocean surveillance system? In a general war environment,
it is uncertain. If there is no "tattle tail" in physical contact,
there probably still are enough deception measures available to
confuse the surveillance systems long enough to launch a carrier
strike, especially if there is some bad weather around to hide
under.

In any case, the information likely to be available from
any sort of ocean surveillance system over the next few years
probably won't be able to ensure a first strike capability
against ships at sea. In the longer term, however, it could
seriously erode the effectiveness of surface warships by pro-
viding targeting information for submarines, ballistic anti-ship

missiles (which, by then, could be fitted with homing war-

• 83
heads), or even IRMs.

This discussion has avoided the detection of submerged

In a limited wax, surveillance might be decisive, but the
evidence is not conclusive. Even if ASM-carrying aircraft could
find a task force, the outcome of an engagement between them and
an alerted group of fighters carrying the 60-mile-plus Phoenix
missile certainly is not a foregone conclusion, especially if
the ships also have point-defense systems.

If the ships themselves are not targets, the surveillance
does not seem likely to make too much difference. A Soviet
intelligence trawler monitored U.S. operations in the Gulf of
Tonkin throughout the Vietnam war and doubtless passed strike
information along to the North Vietnamese if, indeed, they could
not have detected it themselves.

In many peacetime operations it is helpful to have your
opponent know what you are doing as soon as possible. One com-
mentator has noted that, in the 1958 Quemoy crisis and the 1967
war:

Warship activity appeared to be an excellent
indicator of Washington's intentions. The ^^6'J
fleet maneuvers, in keeping with U.S. policy, were
deliberately restrained and aggressive only at the
time of presumed Soviet threat. Highly publicized
augmentations in 1958 demonstrated U.S. determina-
tion. In both cases, Soviet emphasis on naval

submarines by satellites. Although the Skylab astronauts
followed schools of fish in the Gulf of Mexico, some progress
has been made in the use of blue-green airborne lasers for
shallow water sea bed mapping, and other work has been reported
in satellite-based lasers, it does not appear that any radical
ASW breakthroughs will be forthcoming in the next few years.
See Tsipis, et al., The Future of the Sea-Based Deterrent, op.
cit. (note 45), pp. 121-1 50.

activity as a true reflection of American intentions
increased the significance of warship movements. 4

Thus, the two principal circumstances in which ocean surveillance

could undercut the political effectiveness of naval forces are

(1) when it is desired to make your opponent think that you have

much larger forces "just over the horizon" and (2) when it is

desired to transit a strait, or arrive on the scene before he

has a chance to prepare or protest. The classic example of the

first occurred during Graf Spee 's brief stay in Montevideo after

the 1939 action off the River Plate. Although the nearest heavy

reinforcements were several hundred miles away, the British

managed to convince her captain that the cruisers which had

brought her to bay had been reinforced by capital ships. This

knowledge doubtless was instrumental in the decision to scuttle

the German raider.

An illustration of the second might have been during the

December 1970 Indo-Pakistani war, when the carrier Enterprise

and her escorts entered the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Straits.

For most, the first word of this movement was the passage of the

86
task force through the straits, thus giving the riparian

Tlowe, _oj>. cit. (note 1-5) > P» 331 •

-^Dudley Pope, The Battle of the River Plate (London:
William Kimber, 1956).

U.S. sources officially have maintained that no prior

notification was given for this transit and this was substanti-
ated by interviews in Malaysia and Singapore during June 1974*

government no chance to decide on a course of action or lodge a
complaint in advance. Similarly, in 1958, shortly after Sukarno
proclaimed Indonesia's archipelago doctrine, U.S. destroyer
division 31 transited Lombok and Makassar straits to register

displeasure with the unilateral enclosure of heretofore open

R7
waters. One can imagine a similar scenario in which the

Soviet Union, or U.S., might make the movements of its adver-
saries known to a coastal state in order to allow it time to
prepare an embarrassing protest or even ready some of the
weapons noted earlier.

This once again emphasizes the value of organization.
While weapons technology may temporarily shift the advantage in
favor of attacker or defender, organization, particularly in
intelligence, is likely to be a permanent feature distinguishing
major maritime powers from small or middle power navies.

Command Control Communications (c )

Communications is the key to the effective utilization of
this intelligence. The revolution which has taken place in this
field with the advent of solid state electronics, computers and
satellites is breathtaking. At the shipboard level are tactical
data systems. More sophisticated equipment is required to
manage the world-wide scope of current U.S. (and Soviet)
operations. Finally, it is necessary to ensure that the

Cable, op_. cit. (note 1-5) » P» 216.

strategic nuclear forces can still receive their launch orders,
even if they have absorbed a first strike .

Errors will happen, to be sure. The communications failures
which preceded the Liberty and Pueblo incidents are good examples.
The trend, however, has been to concentrate more and more control
with centralized decision-makers. On occasion, for instance,
President Johnson was reported to have personally chosen the
targets for strikes from the Yankee Station carriers.

It is for this reason, as well as their close relationship
to surveillance systems, that developments in C have been
classed as an environmental change. Besides the flexibility
that centralization has brought, it also has greatly increased
a nation's vulnerability to attacks on its communications net-
work. By deception, cryptanalysis, electro-magnetic pulses,
jamming, or a host of other exotic measures, conflicts may be
effectively decided in the ether while the opponents1 major
forces remain intact.

Chapter Two
THE CHANGING USES OF THE OCEANS

Traditionally, there have been three occupations for those
who made their living at sea — as naval hands, merchant sailors,
or fishermen. Since the end of World War II, however, indeed,
in the past 15 years, an entirely new range of uses has emerged
for what has come to be called ocean space. Seabed resources,
ranging from alluvial tin deposits to continental shelf petroleum
to abyssal manganese nodules may bring more than 100 billion
dollars per year by 1 985 • Man-in- the- sea programs, although
they have not lived up to their original promise, may yet make
significant contributions to continental shelf resource develop-
ment. The press of population growth, industrial land use and
on-shore pollution have increased the incentives to move urban
and industrial activities afloat. A large percentage of future
nuclear reactors may be located at sea. In various parts of the
world, fertilizer plants, waste disposal facilities, airports
and oil storage tanks already are being constructed offshore.
A growing recognition of oceanic pollution has emphasized the
need for multi-national approaches to problems.

In the meantime, of course, the historic uses of the sea
also have been radically altered. Naval operations have been

dealt with in the last chapter and will be covered again in
Chapter Four. Fish are being tracked by satellite, cultivated
in both fresh and salt water, and dangerously over-caught in
some areas. Merchant shipping is being transfigured by tech-
nology.

The unsettled marine political climate, which will be dis-
cussed in the next Chapter, is intimately related to the changing
economic uses of the seas. As a preface, therefore, some recent
trends in ocean commercial activities will be reviewed, along
with some likely future developments.

Merchant Shipping

As noted in the previous chapter, maritime commerce domi-
nates international transportation and is not likely to be dis-
lodged in the near future. The economics are quite straight-
forward: For one dollar, a ton of U.S. freight can be moved 330
miles by water, 70 miles by rail, 14 miles by truck, and one
mile by air.

At the end of 1 973 » the world's merchant fleet totaled

2
over 59,600 ships of 289,927,000 gross tons, broken down as

follows:

Fairplay (British Shipping Journal), December 30, 1971,
cited in George H. Miller, "Necessary for the National Defense,"
Shipmate (May 1974), p. 16.

sea Technology Handbook Directory 1974, cp_» cit.
(note 1-78), pp. A/4-5'

Table 2-1
COMPOSITION OF THE WORLD MERCHANT FLEET

Percent

Type

GRT( 1,000)

Number

of Tonnage

Oil Tankers

115,360

6,607

39-8

Bulk/Oil Carriers

19,539

349

6.7

Ore and Bulk Carriers

53,110

2,954

18.3

General Cargo Ships

70,079

21,629

24.2

LNG Carriers & Othersa

3,967

838

1.4

Container Ships ,

5,900

344

2.0

Non-Trading Vessels

21,972

26,835

7.6

Source: Sea Technology

Handbook Direc

story, 1974, P.

A/5

Note: Includes chemical tankers, RO/ROs, large carriers,
and ocean tug barges.

Tugs, dredges, cable ships, ice breaker, fishing
vessels, etc.

In 1970, some 240 million gross tons of ships carried 2,510
million tons of seaborne trade (three quarters of it raw materials
and grain) and generated revenues estimated at about $40 billion
dollars. Marine insurance premiums in 1972 totaled some 2.5

billion dollars.

5
The individual and collective capacity of merchant ships

Charles C. Bates and Paul Yost, "Where Trends the Flow of
Merchant Ships," in John King Gamble, Jr. and Giulio Pontecorvo
(eds.), Law of the Sea: The Emerging Regime of the Oceans
(Cambridge: Bal linger Publishing Company, 1974), P« 249«

4
George W. Handley, "The Role of the Marine Insurance

Industry in the Emerging Regime of the Oceans," in ibid., p. 286.

5
The size of ships is measured by several different

standards. Merchant ships usually are registered by gross

tons and have their carrying capacity expressed in deadweight

has grown dramatically, more than doubling since 1967* Some
evidence of this may be seen in Table 2-2:

Table 2-2

A COMPARISON OF THE CARRYING CAPACITY OP THE
WORLD FLEET BY BASIC SHIP TYPES 1967-1972

1967^
DWT(10 )

1972,

dwtOo )

Percent

Type

Change

Tankers

105.5

192.5

82.5

Bulk Carriers

49.6

108. 5

118.8

Freighters

89.5

88.5

-1.1

Passenger and Cargo

5.1

4.0

-21.6

Barge Carriers

Container Ships

5'° a

733.3

LNG Carriers

.07a

• 54a

671.4

Source: Kasputys, pp. 140-142
Note: Trillions of Cubic Meters

tons. Warships typically are listed by displacement. Defini-
tions, and rough conversion factors, are given below.
GROSS TONS (GRT ) - Total number of cubic feet of enclosed space

divided by 100 (refers to space)
NET TONS(NRT) - That part of Gross Tonnage which may be utilized

for passenger and cargo (refers to space)
DISPLACEMENT TONS-The total weight of the vessel and its contents

expressed in tons of 2,240 pounds (long tons)
DEADWEIGHT TONS(DWT) - The difference between the displacement

of the ship loaded and unloaded. It is an

indication of the ship's carrying capacity

(refers only to weight)

To Find

Multiply

DWT. by

GRT. by

NRT. by

DEADWEIGHT TONS

1.00

1.50

2.50

GROSS TONS

0.67

1.00

1.67

NET TONS

0.40

0.60

1.00

DISPLACEMENT TONS

1.50

2.25

3.75

For large tankers and ore carriers, the ratio of DWT to GRT is
considerably greater than 1.5:1.

Note the dominance of large tankers and bulk carriers, the rapid
growth of specialized designs such as container ships and LNG
tankers, and the stagnation of general cargo freighter develop-
ment. Japan has played a major role in this transformation by-
pioneering the mass production of very large ships. So extensive
has such construction become that fully 40 percent of existing
world-wide tonnage is less than five years old. From inertia,
if nothing else, this trend will continue, as fully 90 percent
of the 114*3 million gross tons on orders in world shipyards in
September 1973 were tankers and bulk carriers.

Thus, the past twenty years have witnessed great changes
in the nature of merchant ships themselves, and these have had
a significant, though often unappreciated, impact on naval
operations, domestic and international commerce, and even world
politics.

The Growth of Tankers and Bulk Carriers

The economics and politics of ocean transport which have
driven tankers from under 20,000 tons in 1945 to nearly half a

million tons in 1973 have been eloquently recounted by Noel

7
Mostert. • The inflation of bulk. carrier size has been comparable.

Sea Technology Handbook Directory 1974» P» A/4- The total
value of these orders was some $175 billion for 4>678 new ships.
See also Joseph Kasputys, _op. cit (note 1-6).

7Noe*l Mostert, Super ship (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974) <
These ships frequently are referred to as VLCCs (Very Large Crude
Carriers — generally greater than 100,000 tons) and ULCCs (Ultra
Large Crude Carriers — usually above 300»000 tons).

Although projected 1,000,000 ton ships seem to have been
deferred, and renewed interest shown in 25-80,000 ton craft, the
super tankers will continue to be a dominant feature of ocean
commerce.

The political problems associated with ships of this size
mostly have been related to pollution and will be discussed in
the next chapter. At the same time, however, the massive vessels
have raised a host of technical issues. Marine insurance values
have risen from $2,500,000 for a World War II ship to $25,000,000
for the Igara, which was lost off Singapore in 1973, to $80,000,000
for the 477,000 DWT Globtik Tokyo. Liquified natural gas (LNG)

tankers now under construction may push this to $125,000,000 per

9
ship. As one expert has noted:

Right now, because of capacity limitations, it is
not possible to insure a $125,000,000 vessel com-
pletely in one insurance market, be it London,
Lloyd's, the United States or Japan. ... we are
approaching the maximum of the world insurance
resources presently available. 10

Suggested solutions from an underwriter's standpoint have
included mandatory traffic separation schemes in congested water-
ways, better training and licensing procedures for crews, as well

ivlarine Technology. Society Journal, VIII (February 1 974) r
p. 15» This was the largest single marine insurance loss in
history.

^Handley, "The Role of the Marine Insurance Industry . . .,"

op. cit. (note 2-4), passim.
10Ibid., p. 287.

as diversification of risks by sharing an expensive ship among
insurance markets in several countries.

The ships also pose special safety problems. 200,000 DWT
vessels draw more than 21 meters, which already limits their
operations in some parts of the North Sea, U.S. coastal waters,
the Straits of Malacca and the Indonesian Archipelago. Moreover,
the tankers are singularly unmaneuverable — requiring as many as
20 minutes and several miles to stop. This has strengthened

calls from operators and coastal states alike for navigational

controls ranging from total bans in some waterways to traffic

lanes in others. Mostert has recognised the heart of the issue:

For those on shore, shipwreck was once not an
unwelcome event; it drew the plunderers from far
and near. It was talked about for generations, with
wistful recollection of the drama and the spoils;
but shipwreck, once feared principally by those on
board, has become in our own time the more solemn
dread of those on shore than those on board. For the
first time we on land have more to lose and nothing
to gain. Helicopters get the sailors off, we clean
up the muck. That is why the responsibility for
ships has become ours, and is no longer the sailors1

• • •

Another consequence of the deep drafts has been the develop-
ment of offshore morring facilities (deep water ports or super-
ports). In addition to environmental and navigational

11Ibid., p. 291.

ships greater than 200,000 DWT are not permitted in the
Straits of Malacca.

1 3

Supership, op. cit. , pp. 331-332.

considerations, the legal status of these structures is
uncertain. There is a growing body of pertinent literature,
but the major point of interest to this study is the extent of
additional jurisdiction which coastal states can derive from
off-shore structures.

C on taineri zat i on

A freight container is nothing more than a large box of
standard dimensions to simplify cargo handling. Nonetheless,

since the late 1950s, the container revolution literally has

transformed international commerce.

This method of packing has reduced pilferage at trans-
shipment points, minimized customs delays (since only the mani-
fest of the sealed container need be inspected), and contributed
to world-wide standardization. Even more importantly, it has
led to inter-modal transportation systems, with door-to-door

%ee, inter alia, Allan Hirsch, "Special Circumstances:
Superports," and Albert W. Koers, "Artificial Islands in the
North Sea," with commentary in Gamble and Pontecorvo, op_. cit. ,
pp. 217-245. Can, for instance, man-made structures be used as
the basis for claims to the surrounding water area or continental
shelf? Can they be used to draw baselines?

1 5

The advantages of containerization for the shipping

industry have been given by K. LI. Johnson and H. C. Garnett,

The Economics of Containerization (Glascow: Social and Economic

Survey, No. 2077 1971. Some of the problems of integrating

containers hips and ports into rail and road networks are outlined

in European Conference of Ministers of Transport, A Study of the

Economic Influence of Containerization (Paris: OECD, 1974}*

1 f\ 17

freight rates, land bridges and multinational outlooks.

Special ships have been constructed for their conveyance which

are considered 6.5 times as productive as a "conventional" cargo

. . 18
ship.

One drawback of container! zati on is its lack of flexibility.
It is ideally suited for the movement of large quantities of
relatively high- value goods between modern terminals in indus-
trialized countries. It is not, however, appropriate for bulk
cargoes. Also, the capital requirements for supporting infra-
structure (container ports, rail and road nets, handling equip-
ment, etc.) are so high that it often is beyond the reach of
developing countries. Moreover, container ships are not nearly
so useful to the military planner as the versatile general cargo
ship which can load and unload a wide variety of goods even at

1 6

Denver to Paris, for instance. In the past, separate

rates would have been cited for factory to rail-head (truck),
rail-head to port (train), port- to-port (ship), port to depot
(train or truck), etc. Now a single fee can be quoted from
shipper to destination, independent of the transportation mode.

See George D. Saunders, "Land Bridge Comes of Age,"

USNIP, XCIX (December 1973), pp. 38-44. The two most important
are the North American Land Bridge, which links major Pacific
ports with those on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts via U.S. and
Canadian railroads, and the Siberian Land Bridge from Japan to
Western Europe. Both began to be developed around 1967 and had
matured by 1972. The North .American bridge, incidently, also
has partly undercut the strategic value of the Panama Canal, at
least for the United States.

1 fl

Xasputys, _op_. cit. (note 1-61 ) , p. 1 44- A conventional

ship is defined as a U.S. C-2 type freighter or T-2 type tanker.

unfinished or damaged "bases.

Barges, Barge Carriers and RO/ROs

As noted above, there are many ports (probably the
majority) which cannot support large-scale container operations.
At the same time, virtually any coastal pier or river wharf can
service barges, which still carry tremendous volumes of cargo
world-wide. Since the late 1960s, two novel approaches have
been developed to combine the potential of barges with modern
ocean shipping. The first is the barge carrier, or LASH,
standing for Lighter Aboard Ship. Thus far they have been used
mostly between the U.S. Gulf Coast and Europe, but they also

Nonetheless, containerisation does present certain mili-
tary advantages, which the armed forces are beginning to exploit.
See the essay, "War Logistics and the Freight Container," Jane j s
Freight Containers 1 973-74 (London: Sampson Lew, Mars ton, 1973)»
pp. 622-629.

In 1972, domestic water traffic handled 29.6% of U.S.

intercity trade (in terms of ton-miles). The cargo carried by
these vessels was 156$ of that taken by vessels of all flags in
U.S. foreign trade, and constituted 97^ of all cargo moving
under the U.S. flag. The DWT capacity of U.S. barges was more
than double the total of all self-propelled U.S. ships on domes-
tic, foreign and Great Lakes runs. See Wallace T. Sansone,
"Domestic Shipping and American Maritime Policy," US II IP, C (May
1 974) > PP- 162-177* Rear Admiral Hayes points out that the
expansion of American barge use has been " . . . so marked that
it may change the economic focus of the United States from the
Northeast to the Mississippi Valley and Gulf Coast." John D.
Hayes, "The Sea, 1967-1972," USNIP, XCIX (May 1973), p. 297.
European river traffic also is tremendously important to the EEC,
as the Soviet Union's canal system is to her economy. Throughout
much of the developing world, rivers remain the primary means of
internal transportation.

have potential for the developing country trade. A larger
design, on the same principle, is the Seabee. Each of these
$125 million vessels carries containers, break bulk cargo and
38 large barges of the size used on European waterways. Rated
at four to five- and- a-half times as productive as the C-2, a

three- fold expansion of barge carriers under the U.S. flag is

forecast by 1985* Foreign operators are expected to follow

suit.

The second innovation is the ocean tug-barge, in which a
pusher tug is mated with an ocean-going barge. Upon arrival at
its destination, the tug need not wait for the barge to be
unloaded, but can pick up a return cargo almost immediately.
This simply is an oceanic application of the principle that the
freight vehicle should be separated from its propulsion system —
a long standing practice ashore.

Another interesting, but not-so-new, design which is gaining
popularity is the Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) ship. This concept
enables wheeled vehicles to be driven directly on and off via
self-contained ramps.

The barge-related and RO/RO ships have restored some of
the flexibility lost by containerization and larger bulk
carriers. This is particularly important to the military.
Eventually, it may benefit the developing countries as well,

Kasputys, op. cit., pp. 144» 149" 150*

although the high cost of such vessels probably will concentrate
them in trade between a few we 11- developed river-mouths.

LUG Carriers and OBOs

Although they are related to the bulk carriers, two other
recent concepts deserve mention. The first is the Liquified

Natural Gas (LNG) carrier, which is now seen to be the most

needed ship type in the next several years. The problems of

handling LNG at temperatures less than -255 degrees P are
formidable, and the pollution and safety hazards are not yet
fully understood.

The other is the Oil/Bulk/Ore carrier (0B0) which trades
higher building costs for the option of carrying diverse cargoes.

Fisheries

Estimate of the world's maximum sustainable fisheries yield

range from 100,000,000 metric tons to somewhat over twice that

amount. The 1970 catch was 69 million tons, nearly 70 percent

John D. Hayes, "The Sea, 1967-1972, » op. cit., p. 301.

The author goes on to note that over 90 of these ships will be
needed in the next fifteen years — at a unit cost of 360-70
million (which certainly will inflate since some U.S. ships
already are over $100 million). Moreover, construction of the
associated shore facilities may require $25 billion in the same
period. He also illustrates the dangers of maritime forecasting
by citing a 1968 study of shipping over the next 75 years which
completely overlooked LNG carriers.

25Asahi Shimbun, "Food and People," XVI (July 30, 1972).

of the low end of the safe range and three-and-a-half times
1950's 21 million ton harvest. By 1985, FAO estimates, the
global take will he 100,000,000 tons — very close to the minimum
estimated limit. Moreover, it will mostly be comprised of sar-
dines, anchovies, and other seafood now used for animal feed
meal and protein concentrates. This implies a shortage of the
high and medium grade fish which heretofore have made up most of
human consumption.

Even today, warning signs have begun to appear in the
guise of 30 centimeter, two year old mackerel in the Northwest
Pacific where 50 centimeter, seven year old ones used to be
commonplace. Also of note are declining yields per boat in the
Gulf of Thailand, and the temporary collapse of the Peruvian
anchovy industry.

The problems have stemmed from a combination of techno-
logical sophistication and unequal geographic and species
exploitation. Japanese and Russian fleets sail with factory
ships for on-scene processing. Their new-construction trawlers,
equipped with advanced detection equipment, and backed by a
strong government supported research effort, have been accused
of overfishing certain regions. In U.S. waters, for instance,

^See Barbara A. Keith, Fisheries of Peru, 1972-75 (Wash-
ington: National Marine Fisheries Service, July 1974) •

Charges of overfishing by foreigners date back at least

to the early 19th century in European waters. See Colombos, op.
cit. (note 1-2), pp. 567-369, 374-376 and 385. Thus the Soviet

American fishermen have averaged 2 to 2.5 million tons per year
since 1960, while foreign fleets have caught 3 to 3*5 million.
Yet, because of the peculiarities of the human diet, some 14 to

15 million tons of non-commercial species go unused in the same

area.

Some efforts have been made to harvest new species of low-
grade fish or plankton to supply human protein through fishmeal

or other refined products rather than by direct consumption.

Aquaculture eventually may increase the supply, but now accounts
for only about 7 percent of the total catch. Moreover, it so far

has been profitable only for relatively expensive sea foods such

as shrimp, eel and shellfish.

and Japanese fleets have created a problem of defree, rather
than one of kind.

Sea Technology Handbook Directory 1974* _o£» cit. (note

1-78), p. A/16.

For a detailed analysis and specific suggestions on the

potential increase in yield through conventional and non-
conventional species (i.e. shark, krill, porpoises), see James
Joseph and Witold L. Klawe, "The Living Pelagic Resources of the
Americas," Ocean Development and International Law (hereafter
ODIL), II (Spring 1974), pp. 37-64.

A "sea ranch" will be developed in Okinawa for the 1975

Ocean Expo. There has been talk of setting off parts of the
Indonesian Archipelago for fish farms, though it would be diffi-
cult to maintain controlled conditions on such a scale. Some
experts doubt if aquaculture ever vail be able to provide large
quantities of relatively low-cost food. Even if the economic
problems could be overcome, they argue, the formidable hurdles
of distribution, increasing pollution and traditional non-seafood
diets will remain. While it recognizes the difficulties, EAO has
given high priority to aquaculture, noting that "several million

Fishing disputes and attempts at resolution will be treated
more fully in the next chapter. But whatever solutions are
sought, the harvesting of living ocean resources will remain an
important and controversial activity which will continue to focus
attention on coastal state interests at the expense of distant-
water ones.

Non-Living Marine Resources

These can "be divided into four principle categories:
Alluvial and continental margin minerals, offshore petroleum and
natural gas, deep seabed deposits, and materials extracted from
seawater.

Alluvial and Continental Shelf Minerals

Nearly all of the minerals found on land also exist on the
seabed, although higher recovery costs have not made them
economically attractive. Sand and gravel are the most widely
exploited, and sometimes contain placer deposits of minerals

hectares" could be developed for cultivation. Particular hope
is held for fresh and brackish water herbiverous species, such
as carp and milkfish. The Organization also has pointed to the
danger that excessive harvesting of krill may reduce the catch
of animals higher in the food chain which feed on them. For
overviews, see FAO, "The State of Food and Agriculture 1973"
(C73/2, August 1973, pp. 29-38) and "World Situation and Outlook:
Fisheries Problems" (C73/13, September 1973).

^See Manfred G. Krutein, "Ocean Mining," JJSJTP, XCV (May
1969), PP. 135-140.

30
such as magnetite. Tin has been dredged for years off the

mouths of rivers in Thailand and Malaysia, and diamonds are taken

along the western coasts of South Africa and Namibia. Other

minerals being recovered from relatively shallow water around

the world include phosphorite and potassium. Offshore coal

shafts have been sunk in some countries, usually from natural
islands but occasionally from artificial ones. Figure 2-1 shows
the distribution of these activities.

There were some 1,000 ocean-going dredges world-wide in
1 973 > with another 50 units under construction. Offshore
minerals production certainly will increase and may become very
important in some areas. On a global scale, however, it probably
will have only a peripheral impact on marine affairs.

Offshore Hydrocarbons y

As one review noted: "The one 'gold-plated,' guaranteed

Placer deposits contain mineral ores in sizes large

enough to be separated by physical means, such as washing.

Magnetite is a form of iron ore.

See Evan Luard, "Who Gets What on the Seabed," Foreign
Policy, 9 (Winter 1972-73), pp. 132-1 47. With the advent of
high gold prices, some Alaskan alluvial deposits might again
become profitable.

bea Technology Handbook Directory 1974» op. cit., p. k/3*
For more details see U.S., Department of the Interior, Minerals
Yearbook, 3 volumes (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
annual)" Offshore (vice coastal) diamond mining off Namibia was
suspended in 1 971 •

•Ttfany of the forecasts and statistics in this section are
taken from "Annual Drilling and Production Report," Offshore,
June 20, 1974> passim*

Figure 2-1

*:--S # -■•■--- Jv£ ■■ ■■ A is^'iOh iy^- m h^fZm

^.j VC <:-.. ~-r;'_vL • •.-•.■> ,...-• .'.•■• - < , ■> —. . «*«ro» V'V'.--» -. .

>^t.X ■•- •'- ■•■■ s ■ »:-* :-.■'.. : \' ~- J '• •■ • ' »' .-- ! A^ ' -

1. Salt extraction from sea water S. Diamondj dredged from jea floor 9. Phosphorite nodule*

2. Oyster shells dredged from sea floor' 6. Gold from sea floor 10. Mangonese nodules

3. Iron sends dredged from lea floor 7. Coal underground below sea floor

4. Tin ores dredged from seo floor 8. Sulfur underground belcw sea floor

SEABED MINING ACTIVITIES
(from Krutein)

growth industry around the world is offshore petroleum and
gas, ...

Experience in offshore oil production grew from the gradual
extension of onshore fields into the swamp lands of Louisiana and
the shallow waters of the Caspian Sea. Only in 1947 was the
first platform erected in 20 feet of water in the Gulf of Mexico.

By 1973t offshore output had grown to 10. 4 million barrels
per day, or some 18^ of the world's pre-embargo output (22^ of
non-Communist production). Mid-1974 estimates indicate that as
many as 25 million barrels per day (35?°)> matf come from offshore
fields by 1985-

In 1973> Venezuela was the largest producer of offshore
oil, followed by Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Table 2-3
illustrates oil and natural gas production by leading countries.

Note, however, that this reflects discoveries made several
years ago and does not include a number of recent developments,
such as the British North Sea fields. These are expected to
produce 3 to 4 million barrels per day by 1980.

As of mid-1974 the Persian Gulf and Lake Maracaibo held
the lion's share of the proved offshore oil resources, with 53
and 21 percent respectively. The Persian Gulf and the North Sea
held the major gas fields, with ^O/o and \y/o each.

Aside from the U.S. and Venezuela, the most intensive

Sea Technology Handbook and Directory 1974» P» A/1 .

Table 2-3
LEADING OFFSHORE PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS PRODUCERS

Pe troleum

Natural Gas

1973

1972-73

1973

1972-73

Production

Percent

Production
(l06cu.ft/d)

Percent

Country

(106 b/d)

Change

Country

Change

Venezuela

2.70

U.S.

7,130.8

-21

S. Arabia

1.90

+33

Iran

3,360.0

-25

U.S.

1.70

U.K.

3,000.0

+17

Nigeria

.52

+26

Italy

762.0

Abu Dhabi

•45

+31

S. Arabia

721.7

World

10.43

+15

World

16,938.1

-3

The Fastest-Growing Producers were:

Congo .03 +340 Angola 558.1 +409

Brunei- Trinidad/

Malaysia .26 +210 Tobago 16.8 +57

Indonesia .17 +149 U.K. 3,000.0 +17

Source: Offshore , June 20, 1974, pp. 86-87

drilling activities in 1973 were centered in Indonesia ( 1 43 wells),
the United Kingdom (82), Mexico (49) and Brazil (48). The desired
rate of both exploration and exploitation has been limited by

shortages in drilling rigs and tubular products. While some of

these constraints will be eased in the next few years, it should

not be expected that offshore discoveries alone will rapidly shift

The Japanese Ministry of Transportation estimates that

620 drilling ships or platforms will be required by 1985 (vs.
about 250 in operation in 1974) • Zosen, September 1974, P« 48.
Some 117 are planned for 1974~76. Nihon Keizai: Shimbun Inter-
national Weekly (hereafter NKIW), March 26, 1974, P» 6-

the center of gravity of international oil away from the Persian
Gulf. Proven and probable offshore petroleum reserves total 137
billion barrels, compared with 453 billion ashore. It is esti-
mated that these figures could be increased to 571 and 1038
billion, respectively.

The Middle East continues to be the most promising location
for future discoveries, followed by the North Sea. Other areas
with good potential include the USSR, Southeast Asia, West
Africa and the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic shelves of North
America. Exploration of the Northeast Asia Seabed has been
restrained by the complex political situation there, while U.S.
leases have been slowed by environmental concerns.

These new projects doubtless will produce finds which will
be great boons to certain countries, as recent ones have been
(or soon will be) to Norway, Great Britain, and Nigeria. How-
ever, it takes two and a half to ten years to convert discovery
wells into commercial production, so a dramatic short-run trans-
formation of the world energy picture through offshore efforts
is improbable.

Perhaps the most immediate physical problem of seabed
drilling is the hazard it poses to navigation. It is difficult

to learn how many wells actually are in place, but the figure is

considerable. Most such platforms have safety zones of

Over 25OO "oil well structures" are reported in the Gulf

of Mexico by itself. John D. Hayes, "The Maritime World in 1973»"
USNIP. C (May 1974), p. 252.

37
500 meters around them, thus effectively restricting navigation

in the vicinity. Nevertheless, some 50 collisions in a three-
year period have been reported between merchant ships and off-
shore platforms in the Gulf of Mexico alone. Therefore, more
stringent measures probably will be necessary, especially in
busy areas like the North Sea.

Whether or not a coastal state intends it, the development
of offshore resources cannot help but bring expanded national
jurisdiction. The rumor of a terrorist plot to blow up Britain's

North Sea oil rigs in 1974 made headlines as far away as New

Zealand. In any case, it followed by only a few months the

revelation that V/hitehall was "considering security problems
presented by North Sea oil and gas field development." Since
some of the fields lie over 120 miles offshore some extension of
sovereign rights (if only those of self-defense) at least is
implied.

The deepest well now spudded (mid-1 974) , is 656 meters off
Gabon, and drilling vessels capable of working in 900 meters are
in operation. Production operations currently are no deeper
than 112 meters, but North Sea development will extend this

•"Permitted under Article 5 of the 1958 Geneva Convention

on the Continental Shelf.

58Hayes, "The Maritime World in 1973," op. cit . , p. 252.
59The New Zealand Herald (Auckland), July 1, 1974-
4°IDR, VII (February 1974), PP- 23-24.

beyond 120, and plans for the Santa Barbara Channel call for
production from about 255 meters. While some of the deeper
water systems probably will be completely subsurface, thus
reducing the navigational hazards, it is evident that the limits

of national interest already extend beyond the 200 meter

isobath.

Deep Seabed Mining

Between 1872 and 1876, H.M.S. Challenger, on her historic
cruise, recovered some unimpressive objects resembling smooth
lumps of coal from the deep ocean floor. Chemical analysis later
showed them to contain ores of manganese, nickel, copper, cobalt,
zinc, molybdenum, and other metals, but because of their
inaccessibility little attention was paid to them for nearly a
century.

By the mid 1960s, however, the progress of technology, the
growth of world-wide minerals demand and (presumably), the
increased possibility of expropriation of land-based facilities,

* H. R. Brannon, C. G. Lyons, D. E. O'Brien, "Offshore
Drilling and Production Technology for Deep Water," in Marine
Technology Society (MTS), 10th Annual Conference Proceedings,
September 23-25, 1974, pp. 517-528.

^ bee J. C. Shore and C. B. Reeds, "Subsea Oil Drilling
and Completion," ibid. , pp. 547~555»

The situation only is complicated by the ambiguous
language of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention which defines
the depth of the continental shelf limit in terms of exploita-
tion capability.

44
sparked an interest in deep seabed mining. By 1 974» firms

from Canada, France, West Germany, Great Eritain, Japan and the

U.S. were actively engaged in the field, and commercial pro-

45
duction may begin as early as 1976.

The most promising nodule locations discovered to date are

46
in the Central Pacific, but experts emphasize that only about

three percent of the ocean floor has been extensively surveyed.

The nodules occur most commonly at depths beyond 4000 meters

(13»100 feet), but have been found in much shallower regions,

and even in the Great Lakes. Just what causes them to form is

uncertain, but they seem to grow around shark's teeth, pieces of

bone, or other previously-existing cores. Whatever their origin,

they are being formed continuously at a rate which makes them

effectively non-deple table.

The approximate metal content per unit weight of dry

nodules is: Manganese 24$, Nickel 1.6$, Copper 1 .4$» Cobalt .21$,

%ee descriptions of preliminary survey efforts in United
Nations, Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Economic Impli-
cations of Seabed Mineral Development in the International Area:
Report of the Secretary General ( hereof ter Seabed Mining Impli-
cations) (A7conf. 62/25), May 22, 1974, pp. 14-15. One U.S.
recovery system was patented in 1965.

Ibid., p. 8. With the possible exception of Howard

Hughes' venture, the principal constraints thus far appear to

have been at least as much political as technical. See the next

chapter. The USSR also has done nodule surveys.

* Roughly from latitude 6°N to 20°N and from longitude
110°W to 180°W, an east-west belt extending from a few hundred kilo-
meters off Acapulcoto about 1850 kilometers WSW of Hawaii.

trace metals .37$. By 1985, the UN has estimated that 15
million tons of nodules may be recovered annually, yielding
metals as shown in Table 2-4.

The economic implications of these operations depend on a
variety of assumptions, but the estimated gross return for a
3 million ton per year mine site ranges from about 250 to 300

million dollars per year, yielding net revenues from 236 to 152

48
million. Nickel and copper are expected to be the most valu-
able metals extracted, but recent studies have found traces of
precious metals such as platinum. Even in small amounts, these
might be economically significant. Aside from the commercial
benefits for the firms involved, these developments could have
important strategic consequences. Industrialized states could
reduce their dependence on Third World resources while improving
their balance of payments. Developing countries, however, have
been more concerned with the potential damage to land-based pro-
ducers from price reductions caused by seabed mining. Gabon,
for instance, gets some 2C^S of its foreign exchange from
manganese, while Zaire produces two- thirds of the world's mined
cobalt. ^

After careful scrutiny, it has become apparent that
manganese nodules will be a less lucrative source of funds for

Seabed Mining Implications, op. cit. , p. 28.
48Ibid., p. 71.
49Ibid., p. 39.

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50
international distribution than once thought. However, they

are sufficiently promising for Howard Hughes' Summa Corporation

to make the necessary quarter-of-a-billion dollar initial

investment on a ship and processing facilities. They also have

induced a number of international consortia among less well

endowed firms. Once considered to be an area only for the very

rich and technologically sophisticated, there are signs that

participation may become much more widely accessible as deep sea

mining matures — rather as jet aircraft now can be found in a

51
host of developing country airlines.

Yet it has been simply the attention paid to the nodules

itself which has brought some of the most profound changes to

the oceans. Wide recognition of their potential began to

52
develop in the mid 1960s. More importantly, the prospect of

seabed mining was one of the primary motivations behind Ambassa-
dor Arvid Pardo's famous 1967 speech to the United Nations and

Foreign Affairs article which led the way to the "Common

50
Several million dollars a year could be made available,

but competing demands will spread this very thin.

John L. Mero, Ocean Resources Incorporated, comments at

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
Conference, "Conflict and Order in Ocean Relations," October 21-
24, 1974-

See, for instance, John L. Mero, The Mineral Recources

of the Sea (Hew York: Elsevier Publishing, 1965 J ajld William T.

Burke, Ocean Sciences, Technology, and the Future International

Law of the Sea (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966).

^"Who Will Control the Seabed?" Foreign Affairs, XLVII
(October 1968), pp. 123-137.

Heritage of Mankind" concept and the Third UN Law of the Sea
Conference. It seems unlikely that deep sea mining alone will
transform the oceans in the same way that weapons technology,
containerization and petroleum drilling have done. Neither is
it clear what kind of a regime will govern such operations. But,
by focusing national interest on the riches beneath the deep
seas (as opposed to adjacent waters), the nodules have contributed
to the death of nes nullius, and accelerated the demise of nearly
all traditional concepts of order in ocean space.

The Extraction of Materials from Seawater

It has long been known that ocean water contains vast
amounts of dissolved minerals — 165 million tons of solids in
each cubic mile of the sea, 350 million cubic miles of the sea
itself. Most chemical elements have been detected, but only the

extraction of salt, magnesium and bromine now are commercially

54
attractive. In the future, however, more uses certainly will

be found. Japan recently announced a study for securing stable

55
uranium supplies from seawater. Should fusion power ever be

54.,

TSdward Wenk, Jr., "The Physical Resources of the Oceans,"

Scientific American (September 1 969) , pp. 82-91. Over
89 percent of U.S. magnesium and the majority of bromine pro-
duction came from seawater or brine.

•^Nihon Keizai, July 29, 1974* There are about 14 tons of
uranium in every cubic mile of sea water. A similar British
study in 1972 found seawater extraction to be competitive if
uranium ore prices rose to about $70 to 5140 per pound. (1974
prices are in the $8-10 range.) Even such highly priced uranium
could produce economical electricity in breeder reactors.

developed, the oceans would become an unlimited energy source

since the deuterium which could be used to fuel such a plant

occurs naturally as an isotope of hydrogen.

Fresh water itself is an ocean extract whose importance

will grow, particularly in the developing countries,. The

problem, as usual, is the uneven increase in demand associated

with improved living standards. In the words of one authority:

In highly industrialized lands, the demand for
water will increase about 5Q/° in the next 10 years,
for some developing countries, an increase of as
much as 5OO/0 is expected during this period. 5°

The minimum subsistence level of fresh water per person is about

2 litres per day ( »73m per year). In Tropical Africa the annual

per capita consumption averages about 1.5m , compared with about

3
500m in V/estern Europe, and twice that in the U.S. Yet, some

projections hold that world-wide demand soon will reach 1500m /

57
year per person.

There is plenty of natural fresh water available to support
this demand, but it is inequitably distributed. Figure 2-2
indicates the coastal regions which have shortages of fresh
water.

Some 800 desalinization plants now in operation produce
about 1.2 million m of fresh water. Most of it comes from the

Hubert K. J. Hauser, "Desalinization: The Sea as a

Source of Fresh Water," Underwater Journal (February 1 973) »

pp. 9-17.

^7Ibid.t pp. 9-10.

r—

•H

P"4

G CO

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■-3 PM

u £

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sea, but some facilities purify brackish water, rivers or
sewerage. This capacity is expected to increase between 5 and
8 times by 1980.

To date, energy costs have been the principal constraint
on the widespread production of fresh water from the sea. This
is reflected in the concentration of existing facilities in
regions like Kuwait, where energy is cheap or on Ascension
Island, where there is no alternative. In time, however, the
press of demand, together with new technology and the spread of
nuclear reactors (whose waste heat can be used for desaliniza-
tion) will combine to make fresh water plants both more competi-
tive and more important.

Other new and potentially exciting sources of undersea
wealth are the hot brine pools discovered in 1964 ^n ^he ^e^ Sea.
With concentrations of minerals nearly ten times as high as those
found in ordinary sea water, they are associated with bottom
sediments rich in heavy metals such as zinc, copper, lead,
silver and gold. Similar outflows were discovered along the
mid-Atlantic ridge in 1974*

Ocean Engineering Structures

Quite apart from oil rigs and seabed storage tanks, the
proliferation of man-made offshore structures seems only to have

wenk, op_. cit., p. 352.

begun. Simultaneous developments in military and petroleum
technology, on-shore crowding and pollution, and the growth of
tanker size have pushed more and more urban and industrial
activities out into the coastal zone. A recent summary of

potential uses for offshore islands and platforms developed the

59
following list:

Table 2-5

POTENTIAL USES OF MULTI-PURPOSE
OFFSHORE ISLANDS AND PLATFORMS

DEVELOPMENT AND NUISANCE USES— Possibly harmful to the environment

Waste disposal & recycling

Solid waste
Dredge material
Sewage sludge
Incineration plants
Y/aste treatment plants

Transportation & Access

Terminals, storage & shipping
-petroleum products & LNG
-dry bulk cargoes
-general cargo & container-
ship, import, export,
transfer
-pipelines
Airports
Highways and bridges across

sounds
Access to is lands- -Causeway,
tunnel, ferry, workboat,
cables, pipeline, trestle,
belt conveyor

Power & energy

Steam electric generating

plants
Nuclear plants
Lesalinization

Industry

Manuf ac turing

Oil refineries

Ship building, repair,

base for offshore

operations
Commercial fishing port

& processing plant

Oceanographic & research
activities

^John McAleer, "Multi-use Potential of Offshore Facilities,

Artificial Islands and Platforms in Bays and Estuaries, " 10th

Annual MTS Conference Proceedings, 1974* PP» 697-714*

CONSERVATION AND ATTRACTIVE USES— Compatible with or enhancing

environment

Fish & Wildlife habitat Public recreation & cultural

Marine parks (limited visitors) Marine parks, museums

and preserves Aquariums, underwater
Wetlands tourism

Artificial reefs Beaches, swimming, water
Mariculture ski areas

Boating, marinas, moorings,
Private recreation & limited harbor of refuge

residential use Fishing piers and diving

Same headings as above,

plus coastal tourism
Restaurants, sport & bait shops
Motels, hotels — boat charter &

rental
Amusement park & boat rides
Residential

reefs

All of these proposals are within the current state-of-the-
art in ocean engineering. Indeed, construction of a special
shipyard to build floating reactors has been begun in Jackson-
ville, though its status is uncertain since some potential custo-
mers recently have postponed their orders. The new Osaka airport
will be located offshore. A floating city prototype has been
built in Hawaii which could have real estate costs below those
in Waikiki. Additional uses of such platforms have been sug-
gested by the Navy's Mobile Ocean Basing System (MOBS) and the
need for mid-ocean weather monitoring stations. Their construc-
tion has been facilitated by recent advances in materials tech-
nology (notably cement) for ocean engineering. One of the major
current problems, however, is a world-wide lack of maritime

capacity. Offshore petroleum exploration is being delayed by a
shortage of drilling rigs and tubular products. New construction
is limited by the supply of steel and skilled personnel. This
condition is expected to persist for several years.

Other studies have indicated the competitiveness of several
ocean-atmosphere energy systems, with primary attention being
given to the Solar Sea Power Plant (SSPP) employing of solar
cells and/or ocean thermal gradients. Table 2-6 outlines some
of the possibilities:

Table 2-6

Amount of Energy
if Harnessed

Technologies

World-Wide

Currents

small

Tides

small

Winds

small

Salinity
gradients

medium/large

Thermal
gradients

large

Percentage of U.S. Electricity

Demands Y/hich This System

Could Meet in the Year 2000

10#-19#

12^-17$

Mr. Roger L. Nelson, Triton Oil and Gas Co. (Manila),
interview, May 15, 1 974» and Mr. James Blake, Geological Services
Ltd. (Singapore), interview, May 50, 1974

See Richard Frye, "The Economics of Unconventional Energy
Resources," Patricia J. McWethy, "Process for Determining the
Federal Role in Stimulating Development of Ocean Energy Tech-
nologies," and L. Wechsler, et al., "Engineering Analysis of
Systems for Extracting Useful Energy from the Sea," in 10th MTS
Conference Proceedings, pp. 455— 499-

The implications of these proposals are consistent with
other trends to focus attention on near-shore areas and to
broaden the range of off-shore equivalents to traditionally land-
based activities. Moreover, they contain the seeds of innumerable
disputes, not only over ownership and responsibility, but also
over onshore effects from seaward projects. A classic example
was offered by the reactions of New York, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware and Maryland to the possible location of a
superport off of Delaware. In addition to environmental worries,
there were questions of revenue sharing, compensation for
business lost by the Port Authorities of New York, Philadelphia,
Baltimore and other cities, rail and road access, coastal storage
and piping facilities, and a myriad of other problems. One can
imagine the difficulties if the location had involved inter-
national interests.

Conclusions

None of the developments outlined in this chapter has been
conducive to the continued minimum regulation of ocean space.
Moreover, with the exception of manganese nodule mining, the
effect of technology has been to reinforce demands to bring the
adjacent waters more under national control. Should no inter-
national regime of the deep seabed be negotiated (or perhaps
even if it is), pressures for the partition of the abyssal floor
may follow as well. The struggle between proponents of

unilateral and multi- lateral solutions will be considered in
more detail in the next chapter.

Distant-water interests remain strong among the shipping
companies, offshore oil producers (if they drill off others'
coasts), certain fishermen and the great power navies. The
first three, however, are increasingly learning to live with
the restrictions through multinational operations, while the
last are constrained by political and technical factors which,
though changeable, are largely beyond their control.

Chapter Three
THE UNSETTLED MARINE POLITICAL CLIMATE

In response to advances in both military and commercial
technology the marine political climate also is changing-.
For the most part the legal and political changes have been
directed at specific new activities, but the cumulative effect
has been to undercut the basis of unimpeded maritime commerce
and naval operations.

The Foundations of Freedom of the Seas

The freedom of maritime commerce was codified at Paris, in
1856. In fact, this was the culmination of a lengthy process,
corresponding in part to the replacement of mercantilism by free-
trade liberalism. In 1805, Britain gave up her demand for
Channel salutes. The Royal Navy started its work as the world's

policeman even before the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and soon

was pressing for a universal three-mile territorial sea.

Where Britain finally accepted the principle that free
ships make free goods — to her great regret in 1914* This decla-
ration also eliminated privateering, although privateers were
sponsored by the Confederacy as late as February I863.

Michael Lewis, The History of the British Navy (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1959), PP« 189-197.

In 1855» Denmark began the abolition of the Sound Dues — the last
of the government-imposed tolls in international straits.
Finally, by the mid-1 850s the multitude of coastal jurisdictions
which had harbored the Barbary Pirates, the East and West African
slavers and the Asian pirates nearly had been eliminated.

The process by which piracy and slave trade finally were
brought under control deserves consideration at some length.
Not only is it illustrative of the fragility of the concept of
freedom of the seas, and the conditions necessary for its
maintenance, but it also provides some pertinent analogies for
the present era of expanding coastal state jurisdictions. This
is not to suggest that coastal state claims are equivalent to
piracy. Neither is the resumption of widespread slave trading
expected. The point is that infringements on maritime commerce
usually are concentrated in a fairly limited geographic region.
If there are no universally accepted norms governing the
relations between coastal states and shipping, or if there is

See Charles E. Hill, The Danish Sound Dues and the
Command of the Baltic (Durham: Duke University Press, 1 926) ,
pp. 228-67.

"Freedom of the Seas" has been used in a variety of ways.
In fact, it is much easier to define what it is not than what it
is. Herein it shall mean the establishment of an environment at
sea which is conducive to the free and safe passage of maritime
commerce, subject to a minimum of disruptions in peacetime by
governments or other organizations. This description is offered
in clarification of a general concept. Further precision
probably would lead to more semantic difficulties than it would
solve .

no single power or coalition capable of defending the freedom of
navigation world-wide, it quickly will be restricted somewhere .
Thus, it is in the interest of the trading nations to see that
there are naval forces in each region which are strong enough to
protect seaborne trade. These may belong to the maritime powers
themselves, or to regional states. In the latter case, however,
it behooves the trading states to ensure that the regional power
in question has enough of a stake in free maritime commerce to
defend it rather than control it for her own interests.

The brief histories that follow may seem unrelated to
modern Japanese seapower. Hopefully, however, they will illus-
trate some of the problems of restoring order at sea once it has
broken down. Of particular note is the coordination necessary
between political and military activities in the resolution of
regional maritime problems.

The Barbary Corsairs (1 500-1 850)

The Barbary Corsairs evolved from the Moors expelled from
Spain in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. At first
motivated as much by political and religious motives as by the

5
Captain Walsh has argued that merchant shipping may be

exempt from many of the North-South disputes since the flow of

goods also has become critically important to the developing

countries. This may well be true in general, but such an

exemption will require that all countries take a more-or-less

unemotional view of their interests. It seems at least equally

likely, therefore, that there also will be exceptions

(restrictions on commerce) from time to time.

search for plunder, they soon became identified with the Turkish

cause. One of their number, Kehyr-ed-Din actually supervised

the building of the Ottoman Navy in 1534* After the myth of the

"Invincible Turk" was shattered at Malta (1565) an<^ Lepanto

(1571)> the seamen of the Barbary coast reverted to piracy, at

which they remained until the 19th century.

Lane-Poole charges that there was no real European attempt

to suppress the piracy between the death of Andrea Doria in 1 56O

and the British- Dutch bombardment of Algiers in 181 6. The reason

was basically that the European states had recognized the

sovereignty of the Barbary Pirates and used them in various

alliances against each other. Pella repeats this charge, noting:

L' Eur ope, dont 1' unite fut detruite par la Reforme,
se refusait a faire bloc contre le danger commun.7

Some relief was provided, however, by Louis XIV s Ordonnance de

la Marine of 1681.

The United States' campaign on the Barbary Coast between

1801 and 1805 was the first serious effort against the pirates

since the 16th century. It led to the freeing of U.S. commerce

from tribute and the release of prisoners, albeit at the cost of

an indemnity. But when American warships were withdrawn from

the Mediterranean in 1812 the piracy began again and another

Stanley Lane-Poole, The Story of the Barbary Corsairs

(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1890)7"

7
Vespasien Pella, "La Repression de la Piraterie," Recueil

des Cpurs, XV (1926-V), p. 162.

naval exercise was necessary in 1815* By this time, however,
European attitudes toward freedom of the seas had begun to change
and further tolerance of the pirates was short-lived.

In 1816, the response to an especially outrageous set of
demands by the Dey of Algiers was a bombardment of the city by
a British squadron with some Dutch units in company. Although
several concessions were extracted, by 1820 nearly all had been
abrogated and another bombardment followed in 1824.

Piracy on the Barbary Coast was not finally suppressed
until 1830, however, when the French invaded Algeria and exiled
the Dey.

Thus the maritime strength of the Barbary States was
developed for religious and political wars and turned to piracy
in the absence of adequate police authority at sea. Their
immunity was guaranteed by the struggles for European hegemony,
and the piracy remained until the political climate on the coast
itself was changed by the imposition of French rule. Seapower
alone was insufficient.

The Chinese Pirates (1 832-1 869)8

Although piracy had existed along the China coast for
thousands of years, Admiralty interest really stemmed from 1832

lAost of this section is from Grace Fox, British Admirals
and Chinese Pirates, 1832-1869 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1940) and Harry Miller, Pirates of the Far
East (London: Robert Hall & Co., 1970).

100

under the influence of Sir James Graham's economy reforms and
fleet re-deployments. Even more important was the expiration in
1834 of the East India Company's monopoly of the China trade.
Heretofore, the company had used its own resources to protect
its ships and His Majesty's warships rarely were required.
Thereafter, however, especially after the Opium War (1839~42),
the Koyal Navy's responsibilities in the region increased
markedly.

Significant problems with multiple jurisdictions soon were
encountered. The Admiral commanding the station was responsible
for activities on the high seas, the Peking government for those
within Chinese territorial waters, and the British Consul at
Hong Kong (a pirate center) for those within his sphere. In
1848, the standing orders to flag officers on the China Station
were changed to include the suppression of piracy in Malaysian
and Chinese waters as a major target of the Royal Navy. The
Navy also was ordered to cooperate with Chinese authorities in
coastal regions.

Britain bore this burden alone between 1848 and 1860,
without great success. Chinese authorities usually insisted on
primacy in their own areas which led to the ineffective enforce-
ment of anti-piracy laws. In 1858, however, the Treaty of
Tientsin included a provision on piracy, thus becoming the first
formal agreement between London and Peking which specifically
dealt with the issue. Hong Kong finally took effective measures

101

to control pirates in her harbors in 1866. More significantly,
liability soon was extended to those who traded in pirated goods
as well. Finally, concluding a momentous year, Britain proposed
that (a) China should let the Royal Navy handle pirates anywhere
on the coast, (b) other maritime powers should assist in the
campaign and (c) China should pay for the increased British
involvement. By 1869 "the international force was operating,
although Britain still carried the lion's share.

At last, in 1869, after his own attempts to disarm junks
had proved unenforceable, the Viceroy of Canton established a
junk register, which reduced the problems of junk identification.
Once this was implemented, the British tended to leave the sup-
pression of pirates which preyed only on non-European shipping
to the Chinese, while their own task was greatly simplified.
Within a year (!) attacks on foreign merchantmen had all but
ended, and the Royal Navy soon restricted itself to the high
seas and those remote parts of the coasts where the Chinese
needed assistance.

There was some resurgence of piracy during the 1920s and
30s in connection with the general breakdown of internal order
in the country. This eventually was curtailed by strict security
measures aboard merchant ships and the large number of foreign
warships then on China station.

The problem of maintaining freedom of the seas along the
Chinese coast was largely one of overcoming sanctuaries created

102

by multiple jurisdictions, some of which did not have the power

to enforce their regulations. Similar circumstances are evident

in the history of the Caribbean, Indian Ocean and Malay pirates.

The Slave Traders ( 1807-1 890)1°

The Royal Navy began its campaign against the West African
slave traders in 1808, a year after the Abolition Act. For
nearly twenty years it was an almost unilateral activity. More-
over, it was frustrated by insufficient forces, the unwillingness
of France and the United States to permit foreign searches of
their vessels, excessively strict rules of evidence, the
personal financial liability of British commanders in cases of
nonconviction and the reluctance of governments and businessmen
alike to suppress a profitable trade.

Progress was made with the enlistment of French assistance

in 1828 and the progressive acceptance of the equipment clause

1 1

by various countries. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842

9
See, for instance, George A. Ballard, Rulers of the

Indian Ocean (London: Houghton Miff lin Co., 1928), Nicholas

Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World (Singapore: D.

Moore, 1973), and Albion and Pope, op_. cit. (note 1 -49) » PP« 139"

147.

Most of this section is from E. A. Alpers, The East

African Slave Trade (E. African Publishing House, 1969), sond

W. E. F. Ward, The Royal Navy and the Slavers (London: George

Allen and Unwin, 1 969) .

1 1

This clause considered the presence of irons and other

slaving equipment to be sufficient evidence that a vessel had

been slaving. Previously it was necessary to catch a ship with

slaves aboard.

103

led to the establishment of an American West African squadron
(although USS Dolphin had patrolled the coast two years earlier)
which was well coordinated with the British. This was important,
since a ship could no longer avoid search merely by hoisting
American colors. About the same time, anti- slaving treaties
were concluded with some of the African chiefs.

By 1850, the principal surviving trades were with Brazil,
and with the U.S. via Cuba. The first was notoriously slow to
enforce its anti- slavery laws and so, after five years of unsuc-
cessful negotiations, a British admiral finally acted on his own
against slave ships in Brazilian waters. Numerous diplomatic
protests ensued, but the measure was successful and the Brazilian
slave market was closed by 1853*

Throughout the 1850s British presence and commerce increased
along the West African Coast, further restricting the sources of
slaves. The American Civil War was the coup de grace, and the
final closure of the Cuban market came in 1869*

The East African slave trade was slower to develop but
outlived its West Coast counterpart. In part its growth was
stimulated by the British campaign in the Atlantic. For many
years, the Atlantic south of the equator was beyond the juris-
diction of the anti- slavery patrols. Therefore, Brazil began to
shift its procurement to Mozambique.

The Royal Navy established a patrol in the Indian Ocean in
1822 following the Moresby Treaty with the Sultan of Oman.

104

Although French and Brazilian merchants drew slaves from this
area, the principal demand was generated by the growth of plan-
tation economies in Zanzibar and the Pemba Islands, as well as
the Omani commercial empire in the northwest Indian Ocean.
When, in 1840, the Omani capital was moved from Muscat to Zanzi-
bar, the task of the naval patrols became almost impossible.
Slave ships now proceeded along coastal routes controlled by
sympathetic rulers and needed only to put ashore whenever a
warship hove into sight.

The trade was at its height in 1873 when a threatened
British blockade against the Sultan of Zanzibar forced the Anglo-
Zanzibar Treaty. This forbade the exportation of slaves and
included a promise from the Sultan to close his slave markets.
By 1880 the overt trade had virtually disappeared, although it
was reported to have persisted in less obvious forms well into
this century and even today.

Summary

Several conclusions may be drawn from these examples.
Among them are:

(1) That naval power, by itself, rarely is decisive. The inter-
vention of troops, either army, marines, or shore parties, or the
conclusion of political agreements nearly always was necessary to
achieve a permanent settlement. To cite an example from a
different setting, Trafalgar removed the invasion threat to
Britain, but it would not have done Napoleon very much harm had

105

no troops been available to pour into the Peninsula. A host of
studies and surveys since World War II make it possible to
extend this conclusion to the solitary exercise of air power
as well.

(2) That the freedom of the seas is a fragile concept, requiring
at least three elements for its establishment and maintenance,
(a) A community of interest among the maritime powers.
Note the rapidity which the Barbary Pirates dis-
appeared once Britain and France stopped using the
pirates to harass each other. G. S. Graham also
has argued that the lack of major conflict at sea

For instance, United States Strategic Bombing Survey

(European War), 208 vols., and (Pacific War), 108 vols. (Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946-48), and Raphael
Littauer and Norman Uphoff, eds., The Air War in Vietnam (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1972). The closest things to exceptions in the
Twentieth Century have been the submarine campaigns against
Britain and Japan. Had the U-Boats not been defeated, Britain
probably would have been unable to continue to play an active
part in the War. Whether or not surrender could have been
induced without invasion is not clear. By the same token,
although Japan was prostrate from the destruction of her trans-
portation and from naval and aerial bombardment, invasion would
have been necessary without the dual shocks of the atomic bombs
and the Soviet entry into the War. The U.S. Navy played an
important role in the Cuban Crisis, but without the nuclear
threat, it is hard to assert that the affair would have been
settled so neatly. Those who claim that the 1972 mining of
Haiphong and the Christmas bombing of Hanoi brought the Vietnam
war to a close neglect the intricate diplomatic arrangements
which preceded and accompanied these acts. In any case, until
the North Vietnamese archives are opened, such arguments are
circumstantial.

*G. S. Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy (Cambridge:
University Press, 1965).

106

during Pax Britannia depended as much, if not more
on the European equilibrium and the interests of
the Continental powers in free trade than on the
strength of the Royal Navy.

(b) The elimination of conflicting jurisdictions which
offer sanctuary to offenders. Key victories in
the suppression of the slave trade were the
abolition of havens south of "The Line" in West
Africa and along the East African coast after the
Treaty of Zanzibar. Chinese piracy was under con-
trol within four years after the elimination of
Hong Kong sanctuary and the granting to the inter-
national force of the right to pursue its quarry

1 A

anywhere along the coast.

(c) The presence of naval forces adequate to protect
shipping where necessary. Despite multi-national
assistance on occasion, the bulk of this task usually
has been borne by a single global naval power both
in Roman and recent days. In principle, however,
there is no reason why two or more navies could not

An interesting confirmation of these principles was pro-
vided by U.S. Coast Guard efforts against the rum runners during
prohibition. Key elements in the campaign were agreements with
Britain, Germany and Sweden extending the area where the U.S.
could carry out searches. Among the smugglers themselves,
piracy soon became commonplace. See Malcolm F. Willoughby, Rum
War at Sea (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964) >
pp. 21-59.

107

act jointly or separately in different geographical
areas. These points will be explored at length
below.

The Current Status of Maritime Politics

The concept of freedom of the seas is thus a fragile one.
All three of its basic elements are in danger today, and are
likely to remain so for some time. (1) In the law of the sea
negotiations many coastal states have indicated that the status
quo in ocean economic activities is not in their interest.
Regardless of the final treaty wording, such differences of

opinion will persist. At the same time, (2) a host of conflict-

1 5
ing jurisdictions is on the verge of appearing. Furthermore,

it is precisely within the areas bounded by such zones where

surface ships will be most vulnerable to SSMs or ASLls. Thus,

(j) the worldwide exercise of naval power is threatened by

extensive legal and political claims which are backed by a

newly- expanded coastal state ability to enforce them.

The Limitations on Global Naval Force

It must be reiterated that the present shackles on the
major naval powers are only partly technological. At least in

1 5

Proposals have included over 100 exclusive economic zones

of up to 200 miles, an equal number of territorial seas, mostly

of 12 miles but with broader exceptions, and various other

regimes of the deep seabed and continental margin whose form is

not yet clear.

108

the West, they stem more from electorates' unwillingness to sup-
port military campaigns against developing coastal states than
from an actual imbalance of power at sea. This is particularly
true if such an operation were likely to be costly or embarrassing.
The remoteness (to the man on the street) and complexity of most
law of the sea issues reduces the expected amount of support
still further. This does not make the shackles any less real,

although it does imply that they may only be temporary. As

1 6

Robert Osgood noted:

. . . the political costs of the United States
forcibly protecting American tuna fishers against
the claims of sovereignty by Peru always seemed
excessive compared to what could be gained by such
drastic measures and what would be lost without them.
But it is misleading to infer from this situation
that the United States would be equally passive in
the face of some threat to a more serious economic
interest or to a military security interest.

Many, of course, would not lament the demise of global
naval forces, for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The fact
remains, however, that only twice in recorded history has mari-
time commerce been able to move without widespread interference
by piracy or government- imposed tolls of one form or another.

"U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law," ODIL, II (Spring
1974) , p. 29. Professor Hedley Bull of the Australian National
University, put forth the interesting proposition that the
present European and American wariness over the use of forces
comes from having been on the wrong side in a recent series of
colonial wars. Similarly, the developing countries have had an
almost unbroken string of successes. Interview, June 19> 1974*
Presumably, such sentiment would be reversible if the tide of
battle changed.

109

The first period was from the Battle of Actium (31 BC) to the

middle of the 3rd century AD while the Roman Navy dominated the

17
Mediterranean. The second, from the mid 19th century onward

as the Royal Navy, in concert with those of other powers, com-

1 fl
pie ted the suppression of piracy world-wide.

The inability of naval (and air) power to achieve a final
conclusion is likely to continue, if not become even more pro-
nounced. All the convoy escorts in NATO would not help the
Indian Ocean sealanes if oil supplies were cut off at the well-
head. The full tactical aviation resources of the 7th Fleet and
the 7th Air Force could not halt the 1972 North Vietnamese
invasion of the South until the South Vietnamese ground forces
stood and fought. A submarine blockade might in principle be
able to bring Japan, or even the U.S. to her knees, but it is
unrealistic to think that such a campaign would remain strictly
at sea if the nations' survival were genuinely threatened. Even
the ultimate exercise of air (and sea) power, a nuclear exchange,

1 7

See John Van Duyn Southworth, The Ancient Fleets (New

York: Twayne Publishers, 1968), pp. 218-222, 297. Also William

L. Rodgers, Naval Warfare Under Oars (Annapolis: USNI, 1939)*

pp. 3-4 and Pella, _op. cit. (note 3-7) • In point of fact,

Pompey had conducted an extremely successful campaign against the

pirates in 67 BC, but they returned amidst the power struggles

which eventually led to Actium.

1 8

It is not true, of course, that piracy was totally eradi-
cated. The immediate effect of the Royal Navy's entry into
Chinese coastal waters was to discourage attacks only on European
merchantmen. The fate of local sailors had to await the arrival
of strong, anti-pirate local governments. In Southeast Asian
seas (and probably elsewhere), a similar situation prevails to
this day. Disorder, not tranquillity, is a natural condition on
an un-patrolled ocean.

11Q

could not prevent some groups of citizens on both sides from
re-establishing their governments and continuing the struggle
if they so chose.

None of this is to decry the utility of naval and air
forces. They are indispensable tools in a nation's military and
diplomatic arsenal. But their limitations must be remembered.
So long as the majority of people live on the land there can be
no ultimate weapon at sea or in the air alone. If communities
were located on the seabed, then control of the water column in
itself would be sufficient. Until that time, other elements of
persuasion also must be employed.

Extended Coastal State Claims

The variety of claims which have been made on the world's

oceans since 1945 has been the subject of an enormous volume

of literature. Still, some review is necessary for background.

The claims may be grouped into (1) territorial sea, (2) economic
zones on the seabed and in the water column, (3) anti-pollution
zones. It will be contended later that these are indicative of

The process was started by the two "Truman Declarations"

of September 23, 1945, by which the United States laid claim to

the "subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf" and to certain

historic fisheries. Peru responded with a 200 mile territorial

sea in 1947» and the process has accelerated ever since.

By September 1974, the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference

documents had run to over 13,000 pages.

111

a fundamental change in the nature of thinking about the oceans

themselves.

(1) The Territorial Sea

Territorial Sea olaims may themselves be subdivided into
three categories — the 12 mile limit, archipelegos, and broader
claims.

(a) The 12 mile limit. One likely outcome of the UN Law

of the Sea Conference will be a general extension of the histori-

cal, but outmoded, three mile limit to 12 miles. Even with a

treaty, however, some states probably will continue to claim

broader areas.

Under such limits some 116 straits between 6 and 24 miles
in width would fall entirely within the territorial waters of

9 A

their riparian states. Since the rules of innocent passage
apply within the territorial sea, the transit of these straits

See S. A. Swart ztrauber, The Three Mile Limit of the

Territorial Sea (Annapolis: USNI, 1972).

In October 1 974> & breakdown of territorial sea claims

was as follows:

Less than 12 J2 15 to 50 51 to 200 Other
46 52 8 11 4

Source: Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State.

The number varies, ranging from 105 to 121 depending on

the source. 116 is the figure used by the U.S. Department of
State.

^The basic conditions of innocent passage are that (1)
navigation shall not be "prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal state," (2) submarines must navigate on
the surface, and (}) there is no right of aircraft overflight
above territorial waters.

112

is exposed to the coastal state's definition of innocent. The
major naval powers contend that, since the straits historically
have been high seas, their accessibility cannot suddenly be
conditioned by such subjective judgments. Moreover, in an era
of strategic missile submarines and intercontinental airlift,
the provisions of innocent passage are inadequate for the pro-
tection of great power interests.

The security implications of straits transit have been the

subject of extensive debates, which need not be repeated here.

In any event, the issue will be re-examined later in connection
with Japan's particular needs (see page 246). Whatever the out-

The U.S. view, and the enunciation of the "Free Transit"

doctrine, was presented in Subcommittee II of the UN Seabed
Committee on July 30, 1971 (A/AC.138/SCIl/L.4; A/8421, pp. 241-
245)» The Soviet Union, which has been closely aligned with the
U.S. on this issue, announced its view on international straits
on July 25, 1972 (a/AC.133/SCII/L.7; A/8721, pp. 16 -163).
Typical coastal state objections and counter-proposals were made
by an interesting alliance of Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Morocco, Philippines, Spain and Yemen (a/AC.1 38/SCII/L.18 of
March 27, 1973). The People's Republic of China (PRC) consis-
tently has denounced the imperialistic ambitions of both super-
powers. At one time, the U.S. seemed ready to back off from the
overflight and submerged passage provisions of "Free Transit,"
but the denial of landing rights by European allies during the
Yora Kippur War airlift forced the aircraft to overfly the Straits
of Gibraltar (Aviation Week, December 12, 1973) and may have
hardened the U.S. position again. Within and without the U.S.
government a debate has continued over the advisability of risking
other American interests solely for the sake of free transit. For
a detailed analysis, and dissenting conclusions, see Robert E.
Osgood, "U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law," _op_. cit. (note
3 - 16), wnose publication was bitterly opposed by the Navy. In
an effort to make "Free Transit" more palatable, it recently has
been slightly re-defined and re-presented under the title
"unimpeded passage."

115

come of the 1975 meeting in Geneva or later conferences, the dis-
agreement is likely to persist. If the developing country
majority insists on a convention stipulating innocent passage,
the superpowers probably will not ratify it, thus destroying its
practical utility. If a convention with an acceptable guarantee
of transit is concluded it almost certainly will be challenged
by a future revolutionary government which can claim that it was
not represented, or by a present one which refuses to sign the

agreement. If no compromise is reached, the issue is likely to

be tested by force sooner or later.

Even without transit restrictions, there are a variety of

economic advantages which a coastal state could reap from its

newfound sovereignty. One such measure would be tolls. Others

are more subtle. For instance, Singapore's Foreign Minister

Rajartnam, offered the following comments about the Straits of

Malacca in a Japanese press interview:

I have no such idea [to collect tolls. But] for
providing facilities useful for correct and safe
navigation, mainly buoys, communication facilities

In a sense, it already has, with the blockade of the

Straits of Tiran in 1557 and again a decade later. Also, the

dispatch of the U.S. carrier Ticonderof.a. into the Red Sea in

early 1974* The fact that the major power warships have not

actually opened fire in straits recently does not remove the

threat inherent in their presence.

There are several reminders of past practices of this

sort. For instance, the town of Tarifa, on the Spanish side of

the Straits of Gibraltar, derives its name from its function as

a collection point during the Moorish occupation.

114

and light houses, and for dredging operations in
the strait, a huge amount of expenses [sic] is
required. We want those nations using the strait
to bear them proportionately. 28

(b) The Archipelago Doctrine. As first enunciated by the
World Court in 195% the basis for this doctrine is that straight
base lines longer than twice the width of the territorial seas

may be drawn between points in an archipelago in order to dis-

tinguish it as a single geographic entity. There are a number

of coastal and mid-ocean archipelagoes whose limits are in dispute,
but the principle areas of international concern are the five

archipelagic states: The Bahamas, Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius,

and the Philippines. The key to their claims lies in the

"intimate and inseparable combinations of land and sea" for an

archipelagic state. From the standpoint of the maritime powers
the principle objections have been (1) a lack of historical and
legal precedents, (2) the relatively small land-to-water ratio
in most of the archipelegos, (3) the implications for transit,
(4) the implications for marine resources.

%ainichi Shimbun (hereafter Mainichi), August 6, 1974-
Translation from U.S. Embassy, Daily Summary of the Japanese
Press (hereafter Press Summary) .

9ICJ Reports, 1951.

Papua-New Guinea is likely to claim similar status for

the Bismarck and Louisiade archipelagoes when it becomes inde-
pendent in 1975*

J Judge Jorge Coquia, quoted in "The National Territory,"

New Philippines (Manila), February 1974> P» 1»

115

In point of fact, most of the important international
straits which would be affected by the Archipelego Doctrine
(Lombok, Sunda, Ombai-Wetar, New Providence Channel) also would
be enclosed by a 12 mile territorial sea. The most important

difference is that the archipelagic states consider the waters

within their base lines as internal.

Archipelagoes also have been the subject of extended
debates, with the result that the concept has won steadily
increasing acceptance. Even the United States has indicated a
willingness to recognize the principle in exchange for some
agreement on transit rights.

Whether or not the Law of the Sea Conference resolves the
issue, the Archipelago Doctrine will not be dismantled. It pro-
vides exceptional potential for the political and economic
development of appropriately situated states. Moreover, it is
in keeping with the growing world-wide tendency to blur the dis-
tinction between land and sea. (See below, p. 1 35 • )

34
claimed territorial seas greater than 12 miles. Some of these

Internal waters are completely subject to coastal state

control, i.e. there is no right even of innocent passage.

It was reported by various sources in Indonesia and the

Philippines during interviews with the author in Llay and June

1974, that a U.S. negotiating team had brought up the subject

while visiting the area in the Spring of 1974*

* H[J.S. Department of State, Office of the Geographer
(includes archipelagic states). One of the four states listed
under "other" on page 111 has put forth no specific claim.

116

were subject to disclaimers about not infringing on the freedom
of navigation. Others probably will be converted to economic
zones if a 12 mile limit were universally agreed upon. Some
holdouts for extended claims probably will remain even if a
general convention were negotiated, but none of these is
strategically critical in the sense that such a stand would
infringe on a major waterway. There is, however, a danger of
territorial sea claims expanding again in the future, possibly
under the guise of increasingly strict controls over economic
or pollution zones. This will be discussed more fully in the
next chapter.
(2) Economic Zones

Economic Zones are designed to give coastal states prefer-

ential or exclusive rights to exploit the living and non-living

resources of the seabed, the subsoil thereof, and/or the super-
adjacent water column. The alternative proposals for such zones
have been bewildering, but it appears that some form of coastal

A preferential right allows a coastal state to exploit

the resources to the full extent of its capability, after which
it is open to the international community within the limits pre-
scribed by conservation. Exclusive rights, as the name implies,
leave the admission of foreigners totally at the discretion of
the coastal state.

No less than 29 sets of declarations or proposals,
falling into 9 major groups were put forward in the Law of the
Sea Conference preparations. See Tentative Comparative Table of
Proposals, Declarations, Working Fai>ers, etc. , Relating to
Subjects and Issues Allocated to Sub-Committee II (SC II/v7G/
Paper No. 4, with Revision 1 through July 1 9> 1 973) •

117

state primacy will be established within a 200 mile limit and

37
possibly further in some cases.

Table 3-1 summarized the ocean areas which would accrue to
each of the top 10 coastal states under four different regimes;
a 40 mile limit, 200 miles, the 200 meter isobath, and the edge
of the continental margin. Note that, in most cases, the 200
mile limit also includes the edge of the margin. Not surprising-
ly, the major beneficiaries usually are the developed countries.
What is more important, however, is the potential ocean contri-
bution to the national resource base under the exclusive economic
zone. Table 3-2 presents some of the likely allocations of off-
shore minerals, petroleum and natural gas within a 200 mile zone.
For several countries, notably Mexico, Britain, Norway, Nigeria,
Angola, Indonesia and Malaysia, offshore petroleum deposits
represent a major expansion of the national resource base. It
goes without saying that every effort will be made to strengthen
the states' grip on these reserves. It also seems likely that
such claims will, in time, spread from the seabed to the water
column above it.

Despite the tremendous importance of minerals within the

Australia, for instance, has proposed a 200 mile limit

or the edge of the continental margin, whichever is further.

Moreover, in cases of overlap between a 200 mile zone and another

state's continental margin, "... The natural phenomenon of the

margin should always prevail over the artificial rule of 200

miles ..." See "Preventing a Scramble for the Seas," xerox

copy from an unidentified magazine, p. 653 i provided by the

Australian Foreign Office, Canberra.

118

Table 3-1
RANK ORDER OP SEABED AREAS ACCRUING TO
COASTAL STATES UNDER DIFFERENT CLAIMS

(in Sq. Nauti-

cal miles)

Rank

40 n.m.

200 n.m.

200 meters

Edge of Margin

Indonesia
(1,031,100)

U.S.
(2,222,000)

Canada
(846,500)

Australia
(1,445,400)

Canada
(963,000)

Australia
(2,043,300)

Indonesia
(809,600)

Canada
(1,240,000)

Soviet Union
(857,200)

Indonesia
(1,577,300)

Australia
(661,600)

Indonesia
(1,229,800)

U.S.
(731,900)

New Zealand
(1,409,500)

U.S.
(545,400)

U.S.
(862,600)

Australia
(408,600)

Canada
(1,370,000)

Soviet Union
(364,300)

Soviet Union
(735,900)

Mexico
(236,100)

Soviet Union
(1,309,500)

Argentina
(232,200)

New Zealand
(571,100)

Philippines
(230,200)

Japan
(1,126,000)

PRC
(230,100)

Argentina
(484,100)

Brazil
(189,700)

Brazil
(924,000)

Brazil
(224,100)

Norway
(463,700)

Japan
(180,100)

Mexico
(831,500)

U.K.
(143,500)

Japan
(440,900)

Norway
(178,000)

Chile
(667,300)

Japan
(140,100)

Brazil
(435,700)

Source

s: U.S. Departi

nent of State,

"Theoretical Areal Allocations

of Seabed to Coastal States ..." International
Boundary Study Series A, Limits in the Seas, No. 46,
August 12, 1972.

119

Table 3-2

OCEAN RESOURCE POTENTIALS

Distance to

Offshore

Nodule Concentration

Country

Oil

Natural Gas

(nautical miles)

N. America

Bahamas

■>■

50-200

Canada

III

Ill

50-200

Dominican

Republic

50-200

Haiti

50-200

Honduras

50-200

Mexico

0-50

USA

50-200

S. America

Argentina

III

Brazil

III

Chile

III

50-200

Columbia

III

Ecuador

III

Trinidad &

Tabago

III

Venezuela

Ill

—

Europe

Italy

III

Netherlands

III

Norway

Ill

III

Poland

0-50

Sweden

0-50

Ill

—

Africa

Angola

III

Egypt

Ill

III

Gabon

III

Libya

Nigeria

III

S. Africa

200-400

120

Country

Asia

Bangladesh
Burma
PRC
India
Indone sia
Iran

S. Korea
Kuwait
Malaysia
Philippines
Qatar

Saudi Arabia
USSR

Union Arab
Emirates

Offshore
Oil

III
III
III
III
III
III

III
II
II

III

Offshore

Natural Gas

III
III
.III
III
III
II
III

III

Distance to
Nodule Concentration

0-50

Oceania

Australia
New Zealand

III

II
III

200-400

III - 10 to 100 billion bbls of petroleum _or 10 to 100 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas
II - 100 to 1000 billion bbls of petroleum or 100 to 1000
trillion cubic feet of natural gas
I - Greater than 1000 billion bbls of petroleum _or 1000
trillion cubic feet of natural gas

Dash indicates fewer than 10 billion bbls or trillion cubic feet,
not that there are no reserves at all.

Potential reserves are estimates based on general geological
structure. They usually are a few orders of magnitude larger
than proved recoverable reserves, but have been used because
extensive investigation of offshore fields has only recently begun.

Distance to manganese nodule concentrations is the distance to
sites with moderate density or greater. Sparse density sites have
been disregarded.

Source: John P. Albers, _et al., Summary Petroleum and Selected
Mineral Statistics for 120 Countries, Including Offshore Areas,
Geological Survey Professional Paper 817 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1973) •

121

economic zone, disagreements over the living resources of the
sea are likely to be the most frequent and visible of ocean
controversies. Fisheries disputes always have been volatile.
However, with catches of traditional fish approaching physical
limits, they are bound to intensify. The initial impact of
this technological progress has been two-fold. Coastal fishermen
in developing and developed countries alike have demanded
increased national protection. An offshoot has been the spread
of the South American view that fish are natural resources,
having a similar status to the mineral deposits of the continen-
tal shelf.

At the same time, many distant water operators have come
to approach national claims more with an attitude of compromise
than of defiance. Joint ventures and foreign subsidiaries, in
particular, have become popular means of getting at least some
of the fruits from catches in foreign coastal waters.

Bote the disputes which led to the Anglo-French Agree-
ment of 1839, and the North Sea Convention of 1882. Practically
the entire history of U.S. -Canadian relations along the Atlantic
coast has been marked by one fishery problem or another. Cable,
op. cit. , (note 1-5) lists 79 cases of naval intervention
between 1946 and 1969. Of these, 10 involved fisheries. But
this does not include the hundreds of fishing boats that are
taken every year, particularly in the Northwest Pacific. In
addition, since 1970, there have been the second Cod War between
Britain and Iceland, several incidents of shooting in the Gulf
of Thailand, continuing seizures of foreign tuna boats off South
America, the arrest of a fisheries research ship of an inter-
national organization by Burma, and other problems.

122

(3) Pollution Zones

Among the broadest restrictions which nations unilaterally
have placed on the uses of the ocean in recent years have been
anti-pollution zones. These have not been limited to developing
countries, as Canada has been among the leaders in its domestic
legislation. Efforts to control pollution represent a signifi-
cant step in the extension of land-based control over the seas,
although their full impact may not be felt for some time.

One major problem is the disparity of standards between
different nations. Even since the potential danger was high-
lighted by the 1967 Torrey Canyon sinking, various forms of

limitations on pollution in national waters have been imple-

mented, and international standards on ocean dumping codified.

Unfortunately, however, the approaches which different nations
have taken sometimes have been incompatible. The U.S., for
instance, requires certain safeguards in the construction of the

ship itself. Iran, on the other hand, has proposed that ships

41
entering the 50 mile zone must have adequate insurance coverage.

Mostert argues compellingly that even these efforts are

inadequate in view of the destructive potential of the VLCCs and

ULCCs.

See the proposed Coast Guard changes to the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (33 U.S.C., 1221 _et seq.) in
Federal Register, June 28, 1974. Parts of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of December 21, 1972 also apply.

4 Robert Osgood, "U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law,"
op. cit. , p. 27.

123

Japan's laws, despite severe local pollution problems, are

relatively mild.

Preliminary results from Caracas point to a future effort
to set international standards while leaving coastal states free
to establish more restrictive laws in their own waters. The
difficulties lie in the authority assigned for enforcement of
these standards. Some claim that the coastal state should have
full powers to arrest vessels polluting in its territorial sea.
Others want minimum coastal state control to avoid the possi-
bility that exaggerated pollution claims may be used to restrain

43
or fine foreign vessels. The U.S. Navy, for one, has gone to

great lengths to minimize vessel-source pollution. This is not

only because of U.S. regulations, but also to avoid future

restrictions on mobility through coastal state pollution

regulations.

The Regime of the Deep Seabed

One of the most publicized issues at the Law of the Sea
conference has been the mining of deep seabed manganese nodules.

4 The Marine Pollution Prevention Law (#1$6 of 1970) con-
tains no construction or insurance provisions and imposes a maxi-
mum fine of only 200,000 yen (about $670) for vessel discharge.

45The U.S. proposal (A/AC.1J8/SC IIl/L.40 of July 18, 1973)
distinguishes between flag state (state of registry), coastal
state, and port state duties and responsibilities. Although the
coastal state can take emergency measures to safeguard its
shores, under normal conditions, a complaint is to be filed and
the action delayed until the vessel reaches its next port of
call.

124

It already has suggested that the prospect of nodule exploitation

was partly responsible for the 1970 declaration that:

The Seabed and Ocean Floor, and the subsoil

thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction

. . ., as well as the resources of the area, are the
common heritage of mankind. 44

Consequently, a number of alternatives were proposed for

an international regime to ensure that the proceeds from seabed

operations will be adequately shared within the international

45
community. ^J The debates over this body have been long and con-
tentious, with no sign of resolution as of the end of the
Caracas session. Their content is beyond the scope of this
inquiry, but whatever form the seabed regime will take will mark
another departure from the freedom of action on the high seas.
Should no organization be created, operations conducted in its
absence will be the subject of contention, and possibly even
violence, for years to come.

Shipping

Not only the technology, but also the organization of
international shipping has undergone great changes in the last
few years. There are doubts (in early 1975) about the future
course of vrorld trade in general. Moreover, two historical

44General Assembly Resolution 2799 (XXV) of December 17,
1970.

45
^These have ranged from a licensing body for private

ventures to "The Enterprise" — a completely international organ

for exploitation and revenue distribution.

125

maritime freedoms — of the choice of shippers and of navigation —
have been subject to restrictions.

International shipping is organized into Liner, Tramp and
Tanker trades. Liners ply regularly scheduled routes, incorpo-
rating the latest available technology, such as containers.
They are regulated through about J60 "Conferences," which set
freight rates, assign routes, and determine cargo shares among
the vessels of the member shipping lines. Tramps are
unscheduled bottoms in search of cargoes of opportunity, often
carrying bulk materials, such as coal, ore and cereals. His-
torically, their only regulation has been through international
safety and sanitary conventions, and some port state limitations.
Tankers carry a variety of liquids, from LNG to palm oil. They
are divided into spot (short- term/ single voyage) and long-term
charter markets. For a number of reasons, the long-term pros-
pects for each of these markets are cloudy. This, in itself,

The history and economics of conferences in the British
trades through 1970 are examined in Brian M. Deakin and T.
Seward, Shipping; Conferences (Cambridge: University Press, 1973)

In addition to the political problems described in the
next few pages, long-range shipping plans are hampered by the
uncertain world economic outlook, and the general inflation.
Higher fuel costs mostly have been passed on to consumers, but
developed country vessels have the additional problem of
spiralling wages, which cannot be completely offset by labor-
saving technology. Tanker and liner operators both suffer in
an inflation because they cannot guarantee long-term rates,
which may be a condition of government subsidies or profitable
charters. Particularly in the former trade, the availability of
long-term charters has been a key to the structure of fleets

126

is not unusual — the shipping business always has been risky, and

a gloomy picture in one year often has been replaced by a bright

48
one in the next. However, the political climate in which

international shipping operates has been radically altered since

the 1950s, and particularly since the late 1960s.

The first significant change was the development of flags

of convenience, dating almost entirely from 1949 when Liberia

49
opened its registry to foreign ships. By 1973, nearly 3 1 percent of

the world's deadweight tonnage sailed under Liberian or
Panamanian colors. Aside from the limited ties on the Effective
U.S. Control (EUSC) fleet, these vessels are free from the con-
trols of their owner's governments. Although Lieutenant Emery

world-wide, since the number of ships actually owned by the oil
companies could be reduced accordingly. Additional problems of
the moment include an over-supply of tankers because of (1)
large building programs undertaken over the past several years,
(2) the reduced demand for petroleum products at current prices
and (3) the desire of producing states to shift refineries
closer to the well head. This, in turn, has shifted some tanker
bottoms to the tramp market, contributing to its slackness.
Liners, however, are doing fairly well, at least in the short
run. (Shipping and Trade News [TokyS], March 22, 1974; Nihon
Keizai, May 2, 1 974; KKJW, October 22~ 1974.) Further uncer-
tainty, particularly for tankers and bulk carriers, will be
introduced by the re-opening of the Suez Canal.

In 1970-71, for instance, the tanker market was

depressed. It rebounded in 1972-73 to reach the highest points

in history, and now is depressed again.

4°See S. W. Emery, "The United States Effective Control
Fleet," USNIP, XCVI (May 1970), pp. 158-177, and John D. Hayes,
"The Sea, 1967-72," op. cit. (note 2-20), pp. 303~305. Foreign
registry, however, was used as early as the 16th century when
British merchants sailed under the Spanish flag to gain access
to the West Indies.

127

concluded in 1968 that the EUSC ships, if requisitioned in an

50
emergency, could meet the needs of the U.S. civilian economy,

more recent studies have questioned their availability at such

times. In any case, flags of convenience, together with

intermodal (often international) transportation systems, and the

dispersal of the insurance markets have greatly reduced the

feasibility of, or indeed the justification for, sole reliance

on national assets for international commerce. In the words of

a high-ranking U.S. Maritime Administration official.

. . . Trading centers now are connected by a compli-
cated network of common carrier merchant fleets,
flying the flags of many nations, that provide
regular and reliable service .... it is difficult
to conceive of goods not moving across the North
Atlantic due to the lack of shipping under any
particular flag. 52

This declining perception of the utility of national

merchant marines, however, definitely has not applied in the

Third World, Shipping issues were raised at the First UN

Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1 9^4> a^d. have

53
grown in importance ever since. Developing country demands

J Emery, op. c i t . , p. 175* EUSC ships are registered

under foreign flags, but their American owners are obligated to

make them available for U.S. needs in times of crisis. One

problem, of course, is finding the ships in a port where U.S.

jurisdiction applies.

Kasputys, op_. cit. , p. 1 45 •

52Ibid., p. 136.

yySee UNCTAD, Review of International Trade and Development

1969 (TDB. 257, Rev. 1), Chapter V,

128

for a larger share of maritime commerce are not without justifi-
cation, for, as the following table illustrates, their share in
World trade has deteriorated:

Table 5-5
COMPOSITION OF WORLD TRADE

World

Developing
Countries

Centrally Planned
Economies

Developed
Countries

Percentage Share Compound Annual

Growth Rate of
Exports Imports Exports 1960-1970

1960 1970 1960 1970

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

21.3 17.1 23.7 18. 5

11.8 10.6 11.9 10.5

66.9 72.3 64.4 71.0

9.3

7.1

8.2

10.2

Source: OECD, Policy Perspectives For Inte mat i onal Trade and
Economic Relations (Paris: OECD, 1972), p. 140.

Accordingly, two conferences were held under UN auspices
(hereafter Liner Conferences) in 1973 and '74» From them
emerged a "Declaration of Principles," which was signed in April
1974* Some claimed that this destroyed the principle of the

%ote that the UN meetings about the liner conferences
are, themselves, called Liner Conferences. To minimize con-
fusion, the meetings will be capitalized, and the organizations
referred to as freight or shipping conferences.

129

55
freedom of shipping. In reality, of course, the freight

conferences themselves, tied aid provisions, and a host of other

devices had stifled free competition for years.

The declaration covered three principal areas: Cargo

sharing, freight rates, and dispute settlements.

(1) Cargo sharing. Cargoes should be shared equally
between importers and exporters. If parties of third countries
are involved, 20 percent of the cargoes may be carried in ships
not of the exporting or importing country, with 40 percent each

carried by ships of the trading partners. This is the so-called

40- 40-20 formula. (Obviously, if one party does not have the

shipping capacity to carry its 40 percent, someone else can make
up the difference . )

(2) An obligatory 150-day advance notice before

conferences can raise freight rates.

(3) Compulsory international mediation of disputes
between shippers and the conferences, with limited participation
of governments concerned.

Developing countries also demanded that trampers, and

J See, for instance, the Kyodo News dispatch from Geneva

in Mainichi Daily News, April 9, 1974*

J "Convention On a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences"
(Mimeo), Part I, Chapter II, Article 2, paragraphs 10-1 3.

57Ibid. , Article 49 •

58Ibid., Part II, Chapter VI, Article 6.

130

non-conference vessels be totally excluded from trade, but this
was not accepted. A number of them already have enacted dis-
criminatory legislation forcing the use of national ships or

requiring foreign ships work through the agents of national

59
lines. "

It is not clear how much advantage the developing countries
will be able to take of their newly- legitimized cause. National
shipping lines in the Third World have been notoriously
inefficient and unprofitable. In times of increasing containeri-
zation, their reliance on relatively unsophisticated general
cargo ships is not likely to improve their position.

Furthermore, the developed maritime states have begun to

take countermeasures. Japan is considering a "Foreign Ships

Control Law," and the U.S. and several European states have

legislation pending. More important than these national
responses, however, is the International Council of Containership
Operators (ICCO). Formed in 1972, the group still is informal,
but there are signs that it will grow more powerful. The
expansion of, and projections for containerized trade have been
noted in the previous chapter. The lack of growth of ICCO thus

(59
^See details of the Venezuelan law in Nihon Keizai,

April 16, 1974.

See R. 0. Gross, Studies in Maritime Economics (Cambridge!
University Press, 1968), Chapter 3 for a consideration of the
balance of payments issues in merchant marine expansion.

Nihon Keizai, April 16, 1974-

131

far is due mostly to European resistance to U.S. government

requirements that its talks be reported. ' But competition

among container ship operators and the current state of maritime
trade in general have become sufficiently restrictive that the
European shipowners now appear ready to proceed with ICCO even
if the U.S. Government listens in.

The likely result of such a drive would be to concentrate
high value trade between major ports in ICCO hands, relegating
conventional vessels to the less profitable feeder runs between
non-container ports and the containerization centers. This
would force developing countries to pool their resources and buy
container ships, cooperate in regional arrangements to handle the
feeder services for the container ports (i.e. an ASEAN merchant
marine), or become flags of convenience. There is, of course,
an option open to a wealthy few to take advantage of the high
wage rates and other costs on developed country ships to build
up their own merchant marines. " But the concept of a national
flag carrier for every flag is not economically viable, whatever

Gross, op. cit., Chapt. 2, has examined the impact of

U.S. anti-monopoly laws on foreign shipowners.

Far Eastern Economic Review (PEER), April 22, 1 974>

PP» 45-46.

^Several of the Persian Gulf States, for instance, are
building tanker fleets.

132

declarations of principle may be adopted.

In the face of this, Third World countries may either opt
for the cooperative ventures noted above, or seek the regulation
of shipping on a global basis, rather as utilities currently are
regulated nationally. They may, of course, continue to press
for national solutions, but this will not lead most of them very
far. On the other hand, it might be profitable for the maritime
states to encourage the development of the merchant marines of
strategic coastal states in order to give them enough of a stake
in the freedom of navigation to keep them from disrupting it.

Conclusion

If anything, the political demands for control over ocean
areas have outstripped the technological imperatives of the
previous chapter. Early prospects for enlightened international-
ism have been replaced by successively more self-interested
unilateral claims. Although some of these may be primarily
negotiating positions, the potential for disputes over marine
jurisdiction has been increased.

The disparity in the willingness of developing and
developed countries to use force may be only a temporary
phenomenon. It can equally be argued, however, that perceptions

^See Olav Knudsen, The Politics of International Shipping
(London: Lexington Books, 1973)*

133

of national interest in coastal waters almost always will be
more intense and easily justifiable than those far offshore.
This, coupled with expanded national jurisdiction is likely to
subject merchantmen to a variety of regimes in the course of
their voyages. Some of these, certainly, will be more restrictive
and disorderly than that of the high seas which we have come to
be used to.

Chapter Pour
THE OCEAN SETTING 1975-85

Several distinguished authors recently have examined the
future uses of military force in support of diplomacy and as a

reserve " . . . to which the public will turn in moments of

2
crisis." Aside from the general danger that the most serious

crises in the modern world may be so complex and subtle that the

public will not realize what is happening until it is too late

(momentary policies, environment modification by industrial

usage, etc.), there are signs which point to increasing disorder

at sea over the next few years. Although most of the incidents

are likely to be limited in scope and violence, their nature may

be such as to undermine the usefulness of naval forces in

diplomacy vis a vis coastal states. The indications of this

1
See, among others, Stanley Hoffmann, Laurence Martin, and

Ian Smart in Force in Modem Societies: Its Place in Inter-
national Politics, Adelphi Paper 102 (London: IISS, 1973), and
Samuel P. Huntington, "After Containment: The Function of the
Military Establishment," The Annals, Vol. 406 (March 1973),
pp. 1-16.

Martin's phrase, in "The Utility of Military Force,"
Adelphi 102, op_. cit., p. 21.

Somewhat paradoxically, however, this may have little
effect on the role of warships in U.S. -Soviet negotiations. See
below, p. 148.

134

135

stem from the accumulated impacts of the changes which have been
considered separately in the previous chapters.

Signs of Disorder

The Changing Character of the Oceans

The first sign is a fundamental change in the nature of
thinking about the oceans themselves — literally a blurring of
the distinction between the sea and the land. Its basis lies in
four factors, three technological and one political. They are:

(1) The ability to project power into a rival's heartland
from land bases. As noted in Chapter One, the advent of inter-
continental weapons means that the expansion of a land power into
the maritime dimension now poses only an incremental threat to
the security of a maritime state. A strong Soviet or Chinese
navy may bring great flexibility to its owner in dealing with
the U.S. or Japan, but it does not imply the same life-or-death
challenge as the fleets of Europe once did for England.

It has been suggested that the sea power-land poy/er schism
was the unre solvable dilemma of the European balance of power.
For reasons of her ovm security, England (and later the United
States) could not tolerate the maritime expansion of any state
with a lar^-e standing army. For a land power to achieve true
great power status, it was necessary for her to acquire some of
the wealth from overseas trade and colonies. This, plus the
utility of seapower in attracting allies, led to maritime
expansion by aspiring continental states, thus threatening
Britain. Furthermore, in the process of acquiring the strength
necessary for even a try at global leadership, France, and later
Germany, came to pose a direct and immediate menace in Europe
itself. This provided a succession of willing allies which
London wielded into coalitions. In turn these spurred attempts

136

(2) The development of inter-modal transportation systems.
Land-bridges, door-to-door freight rates and the standardization
brought by containers are in keeping with commercial trends
towards multi-nationalization and the elimination of trade
barriers, be they nationalistic or geographic. The political
implications of these changes are only beginning to be felt.
Even in the military, after years of partisan squabbling, there
is growing recognition that sealift and airlift offer comple-
mentary rather than competitive solutions to logistics problems.

(3) The current state of ocean development technology.
The increased value of marine resources has changed the image of
the seas from one of a neutral medium of communication and com-
merce to one in which portions of ocean space may be seen as
major additions to the national resource base. The future
development of floating nuclear power plants, offshore industrial
sites, airports and perhaps even cities will accentuate this
image. Failure to agree on an international regime for the deep
seabed would only expand the area open for division, not change
its basic nature.

(4) The expanded impact of near-shore marine issues on
domestic politics. Whatever the outcome at Geneva, Caracas, or
wherever future Law of the Sea Conferences may be held, the

by the land power to avoid encirclement through accelerated naval
development. In whatever sequence the cycle proceeded, the net
effect was to preclude the co-existence of maritime and continen-
tal powers.

137

combination of shortages, pollution and overcrowding will focus
even more attention on the adjacent seas as safety valves for
pressing national problems. Infringements on these areas will
be resisted accordingly. Also of interest is the tendency to
diplomatically link maritime activities with otherwise remote
events ashore. Thus the Cod War became tied to Iceland's
membership in NATO, while the blockade of Bab-el-Mandeb was
maintained until some relief was arranged for the Egyptian
Third Army encircled east of the Suez Canal.

The net result of these changes will be to reduce the
apparent importance of distant-water maritime activities —
commercial or military — while highlighting that of the coastal
region. Distant-water interests certainly will continue, but
their bargaining power will be diminished when they conflict
with coastal ones, either domestic or foreign. Moreover, near-
shore disputes probably will continue to be more visible and
sensitive in developing countries than in industrialized ones,
if only because of the fewer issues competing for the public's
attention.

Asymmetrical Acceptabilities of Force

The second indicator is the oft-noted asymmetry in the
acceptability of force between developed and developing states.
The U.S., Britain and France showed a surprisingly consistent
willingness to commit naval forces in support of major interests
between the end of World War II and 1967, particularly if

138

5
strategic waterways were involved. Nevertheless, one wonders

if the British concessions in the Cod War, and the U.S. restraint

in the South American tuna boat disputes may not be more typical

of future responses than the attack on Suez or the Gulf of

Tonkin reprisals. Even leaving aside the Pueblo and EC-121

incidents (where American options were limited by over- commitment

in Indo China and the decision to recover the Pueblo crew) and the

attack on USS Liberty (which might have been differently received

had it been made by an Arab state), the trend since the late

1960s has been toward Great Power forebearance. Hence there has

been little response to such heretofore unacceptable acts as the

1973 Libyan attack on a U.S. EC-130 in the Mediterranean, or the

Cuban seizure of two Miami- based Panamanian cargo ships in

December 1971* So long as these limitations on the use of force

remain political, they also are reversible, but it may become

-^Mediterranean (U.S.), 1946; Corfu Channel (Britain), 1946;
Taiwan Straits (U.S.), 1950; Gulf of Aqaba (Britain), 1951; Suez
(Britain), 1 951-52; Suez (France, Britain), 1956; Straits of
Tiran (U.S.), 1957; Makassar and Lombok Straits (U.S.), 1958;
Lebanon (U.S.), 1958; Quemoy (U.S.), 1958; Kuwait (Britain),
1961; Bizerte (France), 1961; Cuba (U.S.), 1962; Tanganyika
(Britain), 1964; Gulf of Tonkin (U.S.), 1964; Dominican Republic
(U.S.), 1964; Straits of Tiran (Britain, U.S.), 1967; Aden
(Britain), 1967. Data from Cable, op_. eft. (note 1-5), PP» 206-
229. This list is not complete, but it indicates a certain con-
sistency of behavior. See also the list of 73 "Wars and Near
Wars" in which U.S. naval forces were involved (18 of them
[deleted]) in CVAN-70 Hearings, op. cit. (note 1-4), pp. 163-165.

Luttwak, op_. cit. (note 1-5), has suggested that the key
to this moderation is detente, and that, should one superpower
actually use force unilaterally it not only would invalidate the
principle of asymmetrical acceptability, but also the structure

139

more and more difficult as precedents of coastal state authority
accumulate.

Current Weapons Technology

The net effect of the sophisticated weapons now finding
their way into coastal state hands will be to increase their
freedom of action at the expense of the maritime powers. This
latitude vanishes, of course, should the latter choose to employ
all the means at their disposal, but at lower levels of conflict,
the new equipments can reduce some of the distant water navy's
advantages in training and maintenance. Moreover, the simple
knowledge of their possession may lead to an over- rating of the
developing country's power, and thus dissuade attempts to test

which supports it. Whether or not an American military inter-
vention in the Middle East would destroy detente is not clear,
but it certainly would re-establish the credibility of the use
of force by Western states (assuming, of course, that it was
successful).

7
The Persian Gulf States may be a current example.

Although it has been argued that homing weapons reduce the level
of operator proficiency needed to pose a serious threat, there
must be some skill there in the first place. A South American
nation with years of experience in propeller or elderly jet air-
craft could upgrade its capability almost immediately upon
receipt of some of the ordnance discussed in Chapter One.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, on the other hand, may buy the same,
or better, weapons and fit them on superior aircraft. In time
this will produce a much more credible force, but not until the
pilots and mechanics are trained to keep the launch platforms
flying. Given the quantum jump in technology involved, this
may be several years, unless mercenaries or "advisors" are
brought in.

140

Diminished Freedom of the Sea3

Finally, there is the erosion of the foundation of the
freedom of the seas, closely related to the points above and
discussed at length in Chapter Three.

The Use of Force at Sea

Prototypes of the most likely kinds of future maritime
disputes already have taken place. Among those which may be
expected are:

(a) Continued conflicts over fishing. Shooting has been

underway since the Spring of 1974 in the Gulf of Thailand, not
to mention the dozens of other controversies from Iceland to
New Zealand.

(b) Fights over ocean resource boundaries — notably those
involving petroleum. Not counting the PRC's claim to most of
the East Asian continental shelf, there are at least seven sea-
bed boundary disputes in that part of the world (Indonesia-
Vietnam, Vietnam-Malaysia, Thailand-Cambodia, Cambodia-Vietnam,
Japan-Korea, Japan-Taiwan, and the Philippine concessions west

South Vietnam extended its territorial sea to 62 miles
on April 5, 1974, thus touching off a series of incidents which
led to the killing of a Thai fishing boat captain. See The
Nation (Bangkok), April 26, 1974, The World (Bangkok), May 9,
1974, and FEER, May 13, 1974, p. 13. At one point the Thai Navy
was reportedly developing a contingency plan to protect the
fishermen. (The Nation, May 10, 1974).

141

of Palawan passage around the Spratly Islands). The Aegean and
Norwegian Seas also are sensitive.

The reported terrorist threat to North Sea oil rigs in 1974 may

only be a beginning. Another prospect, perhaps more serious in

the long run, is that of interference with merchantmen. In the
Spring of 1974 a lumber ship nearly was hijacked by rebels in the
southern Philippines. Naval responses to such actions may be

limited by the fact that politically-motivated seizures may not

1 1

be dealt with as piracy. Between July 1st, 1964 an(i June 1st,

9 /

Each issue of Petroleum News Southeast Asia (hereafter

PNSEA) , has a map of the Southeast Asian region showing national
claims, company leases, and existing wells. For more detail,
including Northeast Asia, Oceania and the Indian Ocean, see the
annual "Map and Contract Issue," most recently IV (#10, 1974)*

In 1970, R. Ota, a Japanese radical theoretician wrote

a piece entitled "Modern Systematic Methods of Destruction." In
it he proposed to:

Cut off crude oil transportation; hijack or destroy
J.A.L. (Japan Air Lines) Middle East routes and tankers
carrying oil from the Gulf of Persia in order for Japan
to change her policy towards Israel; attack Singapore,
make it the starting point in [sic] armed revolution
in Tokyo.

(Quoted in Patrick Low, "New Dimension to the Oil Crisis," PNSEA,
[February 1974], p» 30.) These words acquired new meaning late
in 1973> when a Palestinian terrorist group attacked the Shell
Pulau Bukom Refinery in Singapore. Although it did little
damage, and apparently was directed against supplies to Vietnam
rather than Japan, it was, in Low's words, "The first attempt
by a multinational revolutionary front to destroy a major
installation of an international oil company."

1 1

This was a factor limiting U.S. and British assistance

during the 1961 seizure of the Portuguese liner Santa Maria.

142

1965, there were 42 reported piracies in the Straits of Malacca.

Fourteen of these were not attributed to Indonesian units

operating under Konfrontasi. The spectre of coastal states

extracting payments in the guise of tolls for the maintenance of

navigation aids or pollution funds has been raised in the Law of

13
the Sea negotiations. Even guerrilla submarine attacks, often

discussed but not seen since the 1930s, were suggested by the

reported Libyan attempt to use an Egyptian submarine to sink the

British passenger liner Queen Elizabeth II enroute to Israel in

February 1973. 4

Professor Martin has suggested that disputes at sea will

1 5

be self-limiting on four accounts: (1) for most states, ocean

1 6
interests are important, but not vital, (2) both sides will

be trying to win legal acceptance of, or at least political

support for, their position, (3) warships can be effective

Malaysia, Ministry of External Affairs, Indonesian
Aggression Against Malaysia, Volume II (Kuala Lumpur, June 1965)>
pp. 18-24. "

^See above, p. 122.

Reported by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in a BBC
interview, July 16, 1974. Sadat did not name Libya directly,
but later accounts did.

1 5
^Laurence Martin, The Role of Force in the Ocean, paper

presented to the SAIS Conference on "Conflict and Order in Ocean

Relations," October 22, 1974, pp. 10-12.

Maritime commerce certainly is vital to most trading
states, but the disputes in question probably will not cut off
such services, though they may increase their costs.

143

without actually opening fire and without violating their
opponents sovereignty and (4) naval force, once applied, can be
readily tailored to maintain a balance between challenge and
response. These points are well taken, to the extent that ocean
issue conflicts, by themselves, are not likely to escalate to
another Vietnam War, or a super-power confrontation. However,
some states are likely to be more self-limiting than others, and
it may be that maritime problems could provide pretexts or
aggravate other grievances to create potentially expansive situ-
ations. Moreover, a series of low-level disorders in which the
imbalance of usable force was clearly displayed eventually could
undermine the utility of great power naval forces in diplomatic
roles.

Case studies of the mechanisms by which gunboat diplomacy
actually affects decision-making in a developing coastal state
are rare. During the summer of 1 974» however, a series of inter-
views were conducted in East Asia concerning local perceptions of

17
seapower. The net result was the not-very-surpris-

93 in Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singa-
pore and Indonesia, and 38 more in Australia, New Zealand and
Hawaii between May 6 and July 5, 1974* Although the content of
individual interviews varied, the overall purpose of the study
was to examine: (1) the prospects for Japanese contributions to
East Asian security, (2) the local perceptions of regional and
distant-water navies, and (3) the ocean development programs of
the countries concerned. Obviously, an average of 1 5 interviews
in each country is statistically tenuous and may even be mis-
leading. But, in the absence of alternative written sources, it
was useful as a first approximation. In any case, the responses
to the first two questions in different countries were sur-
prisingly consistent. They will be referred to again later.

144

ing conclusion that, while the force levels of adjacent or
nearby powers are watched with care, the influence of foreign
warships stems at least as much from memories of past actions as
from a detailed analysis of their current capabilities and limi-
tations.

Although the presence of great power warships off one's
coast is unlikely to lead to a bombardment or invasion, there is

some justification for coastal state fears. After all, since

1 ft
1956 the U.S. actually has intervened with its naval and marine

19 20

forces seven times. Britain has done so five times, France

21 22

twice, and the People's Republic of China once in the same

period. Note, however, that with the exception of the comic-
opera Anguila operation, there has been no Western naval inter-
vention for nearly ten years. (This assumes that the 1972 mining
of North Vietnamese waters and the bombardment of her coasts were
a continuation of an intervention begun much earlier.)

1 ft

Here considered to be the firing of shots, imposition of

a blockade, or the landing of troops. Not included are offshore

patrols or the evacuation of nationals.

Alexandria and other mid-East posts (1956), Lebanon
(1958), Thailand (1962), Cuba (1962), North Vietnam (1964), South
Vietnam ( 1 965) > the Dominican Republic ( 1 9^5) •

20Suez (1956), Kuwait (1961) , Tanganyika (1964), Beira
(1965-66), Anguila (1969).

Suez (1956), Tunisia (1961). In addition, during the

Algerian War, France stopped and searched the merchant ships of
at least ten countries.

22The Paracels (1974).

145

Given the destabilizing forces in the world today, it is
possible to imagine that some future incident will involve a
major power warship and a coastal state. If the warship is fired
upon, the maritime power has two choices — to respond with force,
or to respond diplomatically. At present, it is unlikely that
Western electorates will support military campaigns in the Third
World, particularly if they promise to be costly. In any case,
there will be many who will argue (with some justification) that
U.S., British or French interests are not sufficiently threatened
by any one incident to justify a forcible response. At the same
time, however, diplomatic redress, however complete, will be much
less dramatic (and hence less impressive) than the original
challenge. If the above comments on the nature of warships'
influence are correct, then it would not take many such incidents
to cast doubt on the credibility of any use of force by Western
naval powers, and hence on the diplomatic usefulness of their
fleets.25

One analysis might lead to the conclusion that only three
choices are open to the maritime state. A relatively small amount
of force in response to early challenges, a larger amount later
to re-establish it as a viable policy option, or acceptance of a

27)

'This discussion mostly has involved the ability of war-
ships to directly influence a coastal state on a particular issue—
what Luttwak has called "active suasion." Presumably this also
would effect the more general case where the mere presence of
one's forces in a region equates to influence ("latent suasion"),
but the linkage is less clear.

146

radical transformation of the marine environment. In point of
fact, there may be other alternatives as well. For instance, if
a particular state, organization of states, or non-national
group frequently and consistently acts in ways unacceptable to
the majority of interested parties, it will become easier to
respond more firmly as time goes on. The diminished willingness

of governments to agree to hijackers' or terrorists' demands is

• + 24
a case m point.

Perhaps some radical transformation is inevitable. Although

declarations of ocean areas as zones of peace, neutrality, etc.

are unlikely to have much effect, extended jurisdiction eventually

may lead to the exclusion of non-littoral power warships from

semi-enclosed seas, either by convention or by physical control

of access points. Well before such situations develop, the
superpowers, at least, will begin to nurture middle power surro-
gates within the region itself. This is not a new approach. The
British devolution of power to the United States in the Caribbean
and Japan in the Far East foreshadowed the consolidation of the

Admittedly there is little evidence for coordinated,
hardened responses by the international community. Within many
individual states, however, more stringent security measures and
the use of force against skyjackers became more acceptable as
the number of incidents mounted. See "Aerial Piracy" in
Strategic Survey 1975 (London: IISS, 1974), pp. 82-83-

25
^Such as the Mediterranean, Baltic or the Persian Gulf.

The Black Sea already is controlled by the Montreux Convention.

See Lewis M. Alexander, "Special Circumstances: Semi-enclosed

Seas," in Gamble and Pontecorvo, op_. cit. (note 2-3), pp- 201-

216.

147

Royal Navy in European waters in 1904. More recently, Iran's

development as a major force in the Persian Gulf and Northwest
Indian Ocean has made her a plausible candidate for such a role
since Britain's withdrawal east of Suez. Suggestions that Japan
should he groomed for a similar part in the We stern Pacific will
be treated at length in later chapters.

Whether or not one wishes to entrust the primary responsi-
bility for regional peacekeeping to a surrogate must hinge on
factors beyond the scope of this study. Even if one does not,
such allies still can be useful. British fleet movements, for
instance, were of considerable importance to the United States

during both the Lebanon operation of 1958 and the 1967 Middle

East war. Although a comparable degree of trust, coordination

and capability will be hard to find elsewhere, a regional,
middle power navy dedicated to keeping a certain amount of order
could free one's own diminishing assets for higher priority tasks,

It is recognized that the price that might have to be paid
for such stability would be infringements on maritime activities
by the middle power itself — perhaps Iranian tolls on shipping
entering the Straits of Hormuz, or an Indian Oceanwise pollution
zone. Still, such penalties might be preferable to turmoil, and
can be partly countered by ensuring that the strategic states in

2f>

See Harder, op. cit. (note 1-2), pp. 427-450,

See Howe, op. cit. (note 1-5) > passim.

148

question have enough of a stake in the freedom of the seas
(possibly by encouraging them to build large merchant fleets
along with their navies) that totally unreasonable demands could
be met with counter pressures. Such leverage, of course, also
could be exerted through non-maritime issues.

Should the seas be divided, merchant shipping may find
adequate freedom under flags of convenience and multi-national
control. This is not unreasonable, commercial aircraft have
operated across sovereign airspace since their inception.
Already some ocean policy studies are examining parallels between
air law and an emerging law of the sea.

Despite these factors, however, visions of the imminent
relegation of aircraft carriers to the protection of oil rigs,
floating cities and fisheries zones are premature. For all the
restrictions on their activities, naval vessels still are a
useful (if expensive) way for the superpowers to signal to each
other. Although other governments may not be cowed in the way
they once might have been, neither would a major shift in deploy-
ments go unnoticed. Moreover, in those situations where critical
interests truly are threatened, the presence of a few symbolic
ships can be significant. In the words of one commentator:

When naval forces are introduced in order to affirm
the commitment of national power in all its dimensions,
their actual tactical capabilities do not delimit their
political effectiveness. ^Q

Luttwak, op_. cit. , p. 52.

149

Even the restriction of movement will come slowly, for
there will continue to be enough insecure states to practically
guarantee bi-lateral access agreements (with which the Air Force
has always operated) under the most pessimistic Law of the Sea
Conference outcome.

Nevertheless, trends do seem to point to an eventual demise
of the freedom of naval mobility, with consequences well beyond
unemployment for those skilled in such arts. This is not
unprecedented. The spread of civilization to the European
steppes impeded the movements of the Cossacks and Tartars just
as surely as ocean economic activities and extended national
jurisdictions (and the ability to enforce them) will limit the
military mariner.

The consequences of this may not be entirely bad. Regional
hegemonies may arise in some areas, but cooperative solutions may
be found in others. If fisheries and pollution could be managed
on a regional basis, it certainly would be an improvement over
current practices. The superpowers also may be discouraged from
intervening in disputes which are not really in their national
interests. (For those that are, it will be many years before
the sanctity of ocean boundaries v/ill be a binding constraint.)

In any case, it is against this changing background that
Japan must examine her ocean programs, even to the point of
relinquishing some of the traditional concepts which have served
her so well to date.

PART II

THE SETTING OP JAPAN'S SEAPOWER:
PURPOSES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Chapter Five . . . Japanese Interests and Strategic Thinking 1974
Chapter Six . . . The Status of the MSDF and Its Constraints
Chapter Seven . . . The Evolution of the Constraints

Chapter Five
JAPANESE INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC THINKING 1974

It always is risky, if not presumptious, to comment on
such a value-laden and variable subject as the national interest.
This is particularly true for an American writing of a land as
foreign to his own as Japan. Nevertheless, certain elements of
Japanese national interests are relatively fixed by geography,
population and natural resources. Others, involving industrial
structures, dietary habits, the cultural heritage, etc., may be
variable, but will not change very quickly. Those interests
most volatile and difficult to assess result from the interplay
of domestic pressure groups or from the need to satisfy some
national cultural or psychological demand. Typically, they
really are strategies for the protection of more permanent con-
cerns. For instance, one way of preserving the social and

political structure would be through the containment of Communism.

1
John M. Collins, in his Grand Strategy (Annapolis: USNI,

1973), states that "National Survival is the only abiding
interest." (p. 3). He does, however, define national interests

S.S *

A highly generalized concept of elements that consti-
tute a state's compelling needs, including self-
preservation, independence, national integrity,
military security, and economic well-being, (p. 273)

He further distinguishes them as being of long, short or medium
term.

151

152

Alternatives could be neutrality or an anti-imperialist stance.
Another example would be to support domestic fisheries (and
fishermen) by declaring a 200 mile economic zone (instead of a
more internationalist approach, or by increasing the competitive-
ness of one's own fleets).

With these caveats in mind, some of the interests which

currently are of major importance to Japan are outlined below.

Obviously all are not related to seapower, and some choices may
be open to dispute. Still, a listing of this sort may provide a
background for later chapters and clarify the author's biases
and shortcomings.

A. The Physical Security of the Japanese People (fixed)
1 . Protection of the home islands (fixed)

(a) Diplomatic: avoidance of war/isolation (interest
fixed, arrangements variable)

(1) Ties with U.S. and West

(2) Improved relations with PRC

(3) Improved relations with USSR

(4) Shedding of neo-imperialist image in Third
World (to reduce terrorist targets)

(5) Membership in international organizations

(b) Military

(1) Maintenance or modification of Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty

(2) Other arrangements

(3) Level of Self- Defense Forces' unilateral
capabilities

(4) Nuclear/non-nuclear stance

Insofar as possible, the issues have been approached from

the Japanese point of view. All these points have been discussed
by Japanese officials or commentators over the last two years.

153

2. Disaster relief program (fixed)

a} Domestic relief capability

b) Reliance on international agencies

B. Maintenance of Economic Weil-Being (basically fixed,
but definitions of "well-being" vary)

1 . International measures

(a) Protection against resources nationalism and
cartelization (including food)

(1) Diversification of suppliers

(2) Flexible diplomacy

(3) Provisions to transport raw materials
and finished goods

(4) Development of effective countermeasures
if possible, and a willingness to use them
if necessary

(b) Maintenance of existing markets/opening of new ones

(1) Joint ventures

2) Measures to increase competitiveness

3) Improvements of the image of Japanese
businessmen

1) Minimization of trade barriers
2; Formation of alliances, resource-sharing
programs, improved financial associations
(3) Promotion of interdependence

2. Domestic measures

a) Inflation/recession countermeasures

b) Appropriate restructuring of the economic structure

(d) Increased stockpiles and food buffers

(e) Improvement of the social capital structure

Preservation of Political Autonomy/independence (fixed)

1 . Closely related to A. and B. above

2. In Japan's case avoidance of isolation is especially
important

154

D. Contributions to the Development of the International System
(variable)

1 . Demonstration effect of Japan as an economic power
without military power

2. Projects for the integration of developing countries
into the international system

3. Projects for promoting interdependence

E. Maintenance of Psychological Well-Being (interest fixed,
needs variable)

1 . Preservation of social cohesion

2. Determination of Japan's world role
(a) Must be greater than Japan, Inc.

3. Search for international acceptance

This list, of course, is not all-inclusive, but it is
indicative of the breadth of the problems which Japan faces today.
There is a general consensus on the interests themselves, but much
less of one on the strategies for protecting them. The balance of
this chapter briefly will summarize the thinking and debates on
these issues as of late 1974*

The Physical Security of the Japanese People

The Setting

The dominant fact of Japanese life is overcrowding. In
early 1975, more than 110 million people lived on the four main
islands, an area slightly smaller than California. Although this
already creates one of the highest population densities in the

155

world, the problem is compounded by unequal distribution. In

1970, 51 • 4$ of the nation lived in the so-called "Tokaido
Megalopolis" (along the eastern seaboard from Tokyo to Kobe),
which accounts for only 18.8% of the land area. Thus the region
around Tokyo supports over 5300 persons per square kilometer
while the Northern Island of Hokkaido has only 66. (Lest this
seem too sparse, however, it should be noted that Hokkaido is
more crowded than 40 of the 50 United States.) Although the
population growth rate has been stabilized at about 1 percent,
this still means an increase of over a million persons per year.
Threats to Japan's physical security may be either natural
or man-made. The former are quite important psychologically,
although their hazards have been reduced in recent times. For
instance, the life and property damage from earthquakes in an
average year is fairly light, but the threat of another major
disaster like the one in 1 923 is not far from anyone's mind. An
average of six or seven typhoons strike the country each year,
beginning in Okinawa about August, and gradually moving northward
through October. Although improved weather forecasts and

5287 people/km2 (1972), vs 22/km for the U.S. (A similar
U.S. density would equate to a population of over 2,600 million.)
On a world-wide basis, Japan's population density is between that
of Belgium (318) and West Germany (248). Data from Sorifu Tokei
Kyoku (Statistics Bureau, Prime Minister's Office), Kokusai Tokei
Yoran (international Statistics Handbook), Tokyo: March 1974-

4Statistics Bureau, Prime Minister's Office, Statistical
Handbook of Japan 1 97 1 (Tokyo: June 1971), P- 20.

156

Figure JM

^cS^v^i^v^--^ ■

JAPAN IN ASIA

157

construction techniques have lessened the dangers from these
storms, they cannot help but have a major impact on those in
their paths. Some 60 volcanoes also are active, but these rarely
pose problems.

By contrast, except for terrorism, which will be discussed
later, few Japanese can envision a credible military threat to
the homeland itself. An invasion of Japan would hardly be justi-
fied by someone else's need for living space or raw materials.
She has few boundary or territorial disputes, although the search
for ocean resources will add new ones and may intensify others.
Except for limiting the Soviet navy's access to the Pacific, she
does not stand in the way of any great power's line of advance.
Japan's strategic value, on the other hand, lies in her industrial
potential (which probably would be severely damaged in the
fighting), her availability for U.S. bases in the Northeast Asia
(which seems to be declining) or for a Soviet window on the
Pacific, and the impact which her defection from the Western camp
might have on the psychological balance of power. Even should an
invasion succeed, it is argued, it would be difficult to ensure
that the efforts of such a closely-knit people could be directed
towards one's own ends. With the reduced tensions in the region
resulting from detente and the American withdrawal from Vietnam,
the direct threat from any of her neighbors appears to have
diminished even farther.

It is possible, of course, for these warming trends to be

158

reversed, and to be reversed rapidly. Therefore, classical mili-
tary doctrine holds that the capabilities of possible opponents,
rather than their intentions, should be the guide to one's
defenses. Most Japanese, however, do not subscribe to this
thesis, on four grounds: (1) the nuclear threshold is such that
much of the superpowers' capability is effectively unusable,
(2) Japan is sufficiently important that she could count on
foreign assistance if any great power deployed its forces against
her, (3) even if she could not count on such help, her geographi-
cal situation is such that she could not defend herself against,
or absorb, even a moderate nuclear attack, (4) whatever the
physical situation, the constitutional limitations and the
domestic political realities absolutely preclude the development
of military forces to compete with the superpowers. Therefore,
it becomes pointless to argue in terms of capabilities alone.
At the same time, the consideration of intentions shifts the
focus outside of the military plane. Indeed, it has been in the

5
Due to the concentration of cities and industrial areas

(70/o of the industry is located in 20;£ of the land area), it has

been estimated that as few as eight megaton-range weapons could

destroy virtually the entire productive capacity of the Tokaido

region and Northern Kyushu. Jack D. Salmon, "Japan as a Great

Power: The Military Context and Policy Options," Japan

Interpreter, VII (1972), pp. 396-408.

This is separate from the issue of Japanese nuclearization
itself. The domestic and international merits and demerits of
a few nuclear weapons could be argued endlessly. Almost no one,
however, considers that Japan could build a warfighting capa-
bility comparable to that of the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

159

realm of diplomacy and economics (which Tokyo has managed to
separate so skillfully) where Japan has pursued her primary quest

7
for security.

Diplomatic Security
(1) The United States.

At present, the United States is Japan's official guarantor,
both through the "nuclear umbrella" and the conventional forces
which might be activated under the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual

Cooperation and Security. Although relations between the two

q
countries in early 1975 were relatively tranquil, there are

several long-range problems which could cause frictions in the

future. Among these are: (1) U.S. bases in a Japan where land

is increasingly scarce and where their use in support of Japan's

interests (as opposed to America's) is seen to be more and more

See Okumiya Masatake, "Proposal for a Weil-Balanced
National Security," Shin Boei lionshu, March 1974* Translation
in American Embassy, Tokyo, Summary of Selected Japanese Maga-
zines (hereafter Magazine Summary) , June 1974* Also F. C
Langdon, Japan' s Foreign Policy (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 1 973) .

Hereafter "Security Treaty."

^The column "Japan Currents" in Sekai, July 1974> suggests

that this may be because both sides are avoiding a real dialogue

in the hope of avoiding the exposure of differences.

1 0

Shiratori Rei, "U.S. -Japan Relations Headed Toward

Dangerous and Unstable Period," Economist, June 4> 1974* Trans-
lation in Magazine Summary, June 1 974-

160

1 1
unlikely. (2) Continued U.S. reminders that Japan should be

grateful for the security it receives when the Japanese have

1 2

begun to question the need for such protection. (3) Intensified

competition in a number of markets in which Japan recently has
lost many of the competitive advantages which it held for so
long. (4) Competition for scarce world-wide resources.

This question frequently was raised during Vietnam, and

in the debates over the homeporting of the U.S. aircraft carrier
Midway at Yokosuka. It surfaced again during the summer of 1974
when U.S. ICEM warning radars were found to be located in Japan.
American bases are permitted under Article VI of the Security
Treaty, which states:

For the purpose of contributing to the security of
Japan and the maintenance of international peace and
security in the Far East, the United States of America
is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces
of facilities and areas in Japan.

Taoka Shunji provides a number of cogent arguments for the abo-
lition of the formal U.S. base structure in the interests of
better overall relations. See "Japan's Strategic Situation and
the U.S. Military Presence." (Copy provided by author. Publica-
tion forthcoming.) These were strengthened by the release of
evidence from several sources during September and October 1974
which pointed to the presence of nuclear weapons aboard U.S.
ships in Japanese ports.

A frequently-heard criticism is that the nuclear umbrella

really is a by-product of the U.S. -Soviet balance and thus would
be equally effective whether or not Japan had formal security
arrangements with the U.S. Royama Michio made this point in an
interview on January J, 1973* See also Shiratori, _op_. cit.
There also is an interesting difference in perception in that
many Japanese feel that it is the U.S. which should be grateful
(for the base rights), rather than the other way around.

1 "5
^In Southeast Asia, for one, U.S. firms recently have been

making strong inroads. See the 3~part New York Times series,
"The United States and South Asia," June 24-26, 1974. For a
radical critique (and book review), which holds that the U.S.
always has been dominant, see T. A. Bisson, "The American-
Japanese 'Co-Prosperity Sphere,1" BCAS, VI ( January-March 1974) »

161

(5) The asymmetry between American and Japanese dependence on
foreign suppliers, which might make Japan vulnerable to counter-
measures for U.S. actions. 4 (6) Japanese reliance on the U.S.
for a number of crucial commodities, such as food. Should the
U.S. be unable to provide Japan with the materials it needs in

times of shortage, serious ramifications are possible, as

presaged by the 1973 soy bean embargo.

Relations with the United States are likely to remain as
the keystone of Japanese diplomacy. This certainly will be true
so long as conservative governments are in power, and probably

would be even for a coalition. Nevertheless, Tokyo also will

continue to seek greater independence from Washington.

pp. 52-64. A good summary of Japanese competitive problems was
provided in Asahi Shimbun (hereafter Asahi), September 17, 1974,
p. 9.

Since before the oil embargo, Japan consistently has
rejected U.S. proposals for agreements among oil consumers which
might lead to confrontations with producing countries. Japan's
contradictory allegiances are outlined in Mainichi's September JO,
1974 summary of Foreign Minister Kimura's U.S. visit.

1 5

Although the September 21, 1974 communique between

President Ford and Prime Minister Tanaka included a denial of

U.S. intent to restrict the export of foodstuffs, the imposition

of de-facto controls on grain shipments to the Soviet Union less

than three weeks later was highly disturbing. Thus far,

Japanese demand for U.S. cereals is not large enough to fall

under the regulations, but the future is uncertain. See, inter

alia, Sankei, October 11, 1974 (editorial).

1 6

For instance, Eto Shinkichi and Miyoshi Osamu, 'What is

the Axis of Japanese Diplomacy?" Keizai Orai, December 1973*

Translation in Magazine Summary, April 1974*

162

A Japanese Foreign Minister stated in September 1974 that;

Japanese diplomacy, from now on, must be a diplomacy
in which the centripetal force and the centrifugal
force are balanced. "Centripetal force" means, in
other words, efforts to make the U.S. -Japan cooperation
policy line, which has been the axis of post-war
Japanese diplomacy, still more solid. By "centrifugal
force," I mean the steady establishment of friendly
and good-will relations with countries with which our 17
country did not have such close political ties so far.

This trend has become stronger and more visible since the Nixon
shocks of 1971 » but it really began earlier as an offshoot of the
economic recovery. It has been evidenced by the increasingly far-
ranging trips of high government officials, from Peking to Moscow
to Europe on the one hand, and to Latin America, the Middle East
and Africa on the other.

All of these moves have been designed to increase Japan's
flexibility. But they also are contingent on the continued
relaxation of tensions in the Western Pacific. Eventually, Japan
may achieve enough of a balance in her multi- lateral relations to
safeguard an independent course even if the political climate in
Northeast Asia worsened. For the time being, however, such a
trend almost certainly would drive her back towards Washington.

(2) The Soviet Union

Relations with the Soviet Union are burdened with a long
history of distrust and conflict, not to mention ideological
differences and a territorial dispute. Although there are strong

1 "^Quoted in Mainichi, September 10, 1974, P- 2. Trans-
lation from Press Summary , September 19, 1974, P» 9«

163

anti- communist factions within the Japanese government, the ideo-
logical fervor of the Cold War has eased in Tokyo, as elsewhere,
in recent years. Moscow's principal offerings, besides a general

reduction in tensions, are resources, fish, and the northern

1 ft
islands. ' Siberian development projects provided the initial

basis for Japanese commercial interest, but recent circumstances,

especially the growing availability of Chinese oil, increasingly

severe Soviet terms, and a lack of U.S. co-participation have

reduced their attractiveness. Fisheries disputes are an on-
going source of irritation for Tokyo, since several thousand of
her seamen have been seized since 1945 and a Soviet 200 mile
economic zone is seen as a serious threat to the pelagic catch.
The northern islands issue remains the stumbling block to a
formal World War II peace treaty. Relations were normalized,

1 fl

Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu, which the

Soviets acquired at the end of World War II. Japan maintains
(and the USSR agrees) that the former pair are related to Hokkaido,
rather than to the Soviet-ovmed Kuriles. The latter pair, it is
claimed, belong to the Southern Kuriles, which are said to be a
distinct island group. Moreover, since all of the islands were
settled peacefully and belonged to Japan before she began her
imperial expansion (a fact recognized by 19th century Russo-
Japanese treaties), they are not covered by the Potsdam declara-
tion. Moscow has offered to return the first two as part of a
peace treaty, but holds that the others are not negotiable since
war-related boundary issues cannot be re-opened. The Japanese
arguments are given in the Foreign Ministry publication, The
Northern Territorial Issue (Tokyo, 1970).

19Tokyo Shimbun, September JO, 1974, P« 3» A key factor
was the Soviet decision to build a new track for the Trans-
Siberian railway rather than a pipeline as originally discussed.
The strategic implications of this choice, plus a reduction in
the guaranteed amount from 40 to 25 million kiloliters, raised
doubts not only in Tokyo, but also in Washington and Peking.

164

however, by a joint agreement in 1956.

The Soviet Union has headed the list of "disliked countries"

20
in Japanese opinion polls for years. Nevertheless, both sides

can profit from increased cooperation and it appears that this
will be the governing factor in the near future. Such cooperation
is possible under the correct, if lukewarm relations now prevail-
ing. Some further warming may be expected, but the deep-seated
anti- communism of most Japanese leaders, and their probable
successors, will continue to discourage very close ties.

(3) The People's Republic of China

Despite more than 75 years of often violent hostility,
Japan' s basic relationship with China is much closer than with
the Soviet Union. In addition to a long history of cultural
borrowing, there still is some Japanese guilt about the wartime
experiences. While it is recognized that the economic potential
of the "China Market" will not be realized for years, the PRC
recently has become a supplier of petroleum. Though initial
shipments have been fairly small, the expansion potential and

lack of strings have distracted attention from Siberian develop-

ment. In the next few years, China's importance as a determi-

nant of Japan's course will grow. Specific predictions are

For instance, Sankei, September 17, 1964, P« 6. Part of

the distrust stems from Moscow's attack on Japan in the last
days of World War II in violation of a non-aggression pact, and
her slowness in repatriating prisoners of war.

Sankei, August 16, 1974, P» 9»

165

impossible, given the ■uncertainties of the post-Maoist period,
but some alternatives and Japan's possible reactions to them will
be offered in Chapter Seven.

(4) Taiwan and Korea

Taiwan and Korea are the other two areas of immediate con-
cern to Japan's security. With the decline of East-West tensions,
the likelihood that Japan will be drawn into a conflict over
either area also has diminished. This probably is more true of

Taiwan than of Korea. Once declared "important" to the security

22 - -

of Japan, the ties between Tokyo and Taipei have been cool

since the former established diplomatic relations with Peking.
The abortive 1974 negotiations over the Japan-China air route
made matters even worse. This has not prevented the growth of
economic links, but Japan now has little ideological reason to
become directly involved in a conflict between the two Chinas.

Korea, on the other hand, remains of primary importance.

Traditionally the "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan," there

has been a history of mutual animosity at least since Hideyoshi's
invasion of the peninsula at the end of the 16th century. Recent

Nixon-Sato communique, November 21, 1 9^9-

*The two invasions by Kublai Khan in the 13th century were
launched from Korea. Some reports even credit an attempted
Chinese invasion in the 7th century. Fear of foreign possession
of Korea played a particularly important role in Japanese foreign
policy in the late 19th-early 20th centuries. Japan's perspec-
tive on Korea is similar to Britain's historical view of the
Netherlands.

166

problems have included fishing disputes, sometimes involving
violence, continental shelf boundary issues, and the Korean
occupation of Takeshima, an island in the Sea of Japan. The
1969 Nixon-Sato communique affirmed that the security of South
Korea (ROK) was "essential" to that of Japan, but the Kim Dae
Jung kidnapping and the assassination attempt on President Park
have brought relations between the two countries to a post-World
War II low. In fact, a Japanese Foreign Minister recently made
the highly controversial remark that the essential element for
Japan now was "stability on the Korean Peninsula," rather than
the ROK's security. At the same time he decried President Park's

9 A

warnings of the threat from the North." Whether or not Korean
instability results from internal or external pressures, it is
likely to be of more direct interest to Japan than almost any
other single issue.

(5) Other States

Diplomatic relations with the rest of the world have varied
in direct proportion to Japan's economic interest therein. Some
measure of this interest may be indicated by Tables 5~1 through
5-3 • Note the truly world-wide nature of her resource dependence,
the importance of the North American and Southeast Asian markets,
and the growing level of investment in Europe.

The economic basis of this interest has been well described

^omiuri Shimbun (hereafter Yomiuri), October 10, 1974,
p. 7.

167

Table 5-1

JAPANESE STRATEGIC REGIONS

FY 1972 RESOURCES SUPPLY

North America (11.5$)

Soy Beans

Wheat

Lead Ore

Coal

Copper Ore

Forestry Products

Central and South America (6.7$)

Sugar

Raw Cotton

Iron Ore

East and Southeast Asia (11.7%)

Crude

Forestry Products

Bauxite

Copper Ore

Rubber

Africa (3«7%)

West Asia and Middle East (40.9%)

Crude Oil
Iron Ore

Oceania (16.7%)

Wool

Nickel Ore
Bauxi te
Iron Ore
Coal

% of

% Total

Imports

Dependency

Demand

100

99.8

100

99.8

100

Source: MITI

168

Table 5-2
JAPANESE STRATEGIC REGIONS
TRADE

Exports (percent of

value)

I9601

19702

19735

19804

19854

N. America

32.8

33-7

28.3

Central & S. America

4.4

6.1

7.5

rH
rH

W. Europe
Southeast Asia

11.7
23.3

15.0
25.4

17.4
24.2

•a

Africa

8.7

7.4

8.5

-P
O

W. Asia and Middle East
Oceania

12.4
4.9

2.8
4.2

4.4
4.4

Communist

1.8
4,055

5-4
19,318

36,930

TOTAL (8x10 )

43,419

61,039

a/o of GNP

9.4

9.5

9.2

9.6

9.9

Imports (percent of

value)

I9601

19702

19735

19804

19854

N. America

42.8

34.1

29.5

Central & S. America
W . Europe

3.2

8.8

7.2

10.2

5.1

10.5

■3

East and Southeast Asia

Africa

W. Asia and Middle East

Oceania

14.0
3.7

15.7
9.0

16.0
5.8

12.0
9.6

20.8

4-6

12.6

11.1

•H

-p
0

rH
•H

Communist

2.8

4,491

.Ail

18,881

6.0
38,314

TOTAL ($x106)

39,879

57,046

°/o of GNP

10.4

9.3

9.6

8.8

9.2

Sources:

1MITI

IJKIW Industrial Review 74, P«

"TfllTI, International Trade White Paper 1974,Data Summary, pp. 18-19
TCETI. Computed in real terms in Yen; converted at $1 = ¥ 300

169

Table

5-5

JAPANESE STRATEGIC REGIONS

INVESTMENT

a. Cumulative Direct

Investments by Japanese Pj

.rms (pe

rcent)

1968

1970

1972

1980

1985

N. America

29.5

25.5

22.9

Central and S. America

21.0

15.9

14.6

crj

€

Europe

10.6

17.9

24.5

■H

Asia

19.3

21.0

20.5

crj

Africa

3.0

2.6

2.2

Middle East

130

9-3

8.9

-p
0

-P
O

Oceania

3.4

7.8

6.4

TOTAL ($x10 )

2,008

3,577

6,773

45,000

93,500

io of World Inv. 9.3 12.0

b._ Investment by Foreign States in Japan (percent)

1968 1970 1972 1980 1985

N. America 69. 1 64.6 67.8 Q « Q d

Europe 21.7 21.8 17*5 rt ^ c %

TOTAL ($x106) 411 596 1,012

Source: Bank of Japan

170

by the term "Resources Diplomacy" (shigen gaiko) (discussed more
fully below) and by the rash of Foreign Ministry interest in
Arabia since the Yom Kippur War. Nevertheless, as noted above

(p. 162), there are signs that a broader-based policy may be in

the making, especially with regard to Africa and Latin America.

Despite formation of such groups as the Trilateral Commission,
interest in Europe mostly seems limited to possible EEC restric-
tions on Japanese products and the availability of petrodollars

through the Eurodollar market.

There is little feeling that Japan should try to play the

role of a major power. Indeed, almost all such visions of her

have come from abroad. Domestic views usually have stressed

28
Japan's weaknesses rather than her strengths. In this sense,

25,

vVitness Prime Minister Tanaka's September 1974 visits to

Brazil, Canada and Mexico, plus Foreign Minister Kimura's Septem-
ber 24, 1974 speech to the UN and his October-November 1974 trip
to five Black African states. It may be that these moves are
more superficial than substantive, but they also are consistent
with Japan's tendency to retain as many options as possible.

A broader view was taken in Curt Gasteyger (ed.), Japan
and the Atlantic Y/orld (Atlantic Papers 3) (Westmead: Saxon
Hill, 1972), but this has not been representative.

Most conspicuously, Herman Kahn's The Emerging Japanese

")).

Superstate (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970). Many
Marxist writings also have stressed the imperialist nature of
Japan's economic influence and the potential for a revival of
militarism. One of the most recent is Jon Halliday and Gavin
McCormack, Japanese Imperialism Today (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1973).

Zbigniew Brzezinski's The Fragile Blossom (New York:

Harper and Row, 1972) seems to have been closer to the thinking

of most Japanese than Kahn's work.

171

the energy crisis and oil embargo may have been useful in
bringing foreign expectations of Japan more in line with reality.

(6) Some Alternatives

This leaves several options in the search for security
through diplomacy: (a) continued alliance with a major power in
the Northwest Pacific; (b) adoption of an equidistant posture
within the Northeast Asian balance of power; (c) participation
in an Asian Collective Security System; (d) realignment as a
champion of the Third World (especially that part which is rich
in resources); (e) a search for allies among countries with
previously unexploited common interests. This might include a

Pacific Regional grouping, or the promotion of ties among

29
emerging oceanic states.

So far the first has been chosen. A departure from it will
depend on such diverse but inter-related factors as the progress
of detente, the state of U.S. -China relations and the health of
the world economy, among others. Space does not permit an ade-
quate analysis of any of the alternatives, but it must be remem-
bered that Japan is not completely free to choose among them. A
stable equidistant posture is attractive, but it will be many
years before such non-alignment would be respected in times of
stress. Similarly, an Asian collective security pact has

Ambassador Arvid Pardo's term, referring to those nations

which would be particularly advantaged by broad extensions of

national jurisdiction at sea. (See below, Chapter Seven.)

172

theoretical advantages, "but the only current proposal was put
forth by the Soviet Union in 1954 and revived in 1972. This
automatically makes it suspect in Tokyo's eyes. By the same
token, though Japan may he able to dilute the suspicions of many
developing countries, there is little prospect that they will
accept her as their champion. The fifth option may bear fruit
one day, but any broad-based cooperation among the Pacific Basin
states is out of the question for the near future. Similarly,
oceanic states may support each other in law of the sea negoti-
ations or related disputes, but this is not enough of a founda-
tion for an entire foreign policy.

Thus, although there are pressures to modify the present
Japanese diplomatic approach, there are not many options immedi-
ately available. The most consistently cited, and easily remedied
weakness is the inadequacy of her intelligence. This was particu-
larly criticized in the aftermath of the oil boycott, which
almost no one had foreseen. The Self Defense Forces recently
have reorganized their intelligence structure, and it is assumed
that the Foreign Ministry also has taken this to heart.

Revision of the Security Treaty is another possibility.

See the essays by Kotani Hidejiro and Gennady V. Astafiev

in Council on National Security Problems (CNSP), Peace in A3ia

(Toky5: CNSP, August 1975), pp. 27-44.

y This is not to say that awareness of an approaching energy

crisis did not pre-date the Yom Kippur War. The coming supply

shortage officially had been recognized at least by the Spring of

1973. NOT, April 3, 1973, P. 1.

173

Though it has served Japan well over the years, there is increas-
ing talk that it has outlived its usefulness. In view of the
uncertainties of the next few years, Tokyo's diplomats probably
would prefer to de-emphasize the Treaty quietly rather than
abandon one of the more constant elements of their foreign
policy. They may, however, be overpowered by domestic pressures
on this point.

Mil i tar:/ Security

At the heart of military security issues in Japan is

Article IX of the Constitution, which states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based
on justice and order the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat of force as a means of settling inter-
national disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other
war potential, will never be maintained. The right
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The Japanese Government has maintained ever since 194& that

" . . • the renunciation of war does not directly deny the right

33
of self-defense." Accordingly, despite a relatively low

priority and often severe domestic opposition, defense capabili-
ties have been systematically developed under a variety of names

^ For instance, the Gaimusho (Foreign Ministry) has favored
the ratification of the Ilon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as
an internationalist position in the Law of the Sea negotiations.
It has been overruled on both occasions.

■^Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, June 26, 1946, quoted in
John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen and Power (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle,
1972), p. 53.

174

(some of them American- imposed) , culminating in the present Air,

Ground and Maritime Self-Defense Forces (SDF).

The basic Japanese defense policies were outlined by the

Cabinet and National Defense Council in 1 957 • They are:

(1) Basic Policies for National Defense

The objective of National Defense is to prevent
direct and indirect aggression, and once invaded, to
repel such aggression, thereby preserving the inde-
pendence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic
principles.

To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan
hereby establishes the following principles:

A. To support the activities of the United Nations,
and promote international cooperation, thereby
contributing to the realization of world peace.

B. To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the
people's love for country, thereby establishing
the sound basis essential for Japan's security.

C. To develop progressively the effective defense
capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due
regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing
domestic situation.

D. To deal with external aggression on the basis of
the Japan-U.S. security arrangements pending more
effective functioning of the United Nations in the
future in deterring and repelling such aggression.

See James E. Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japan's
Maritime Forces (New York: Praeger, 1 97 3 ) » iisnerson, cp_. cit.,
Michael Hughes, "Japan's Airpower Options" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1972),
Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1 971 ), and James H. Buck,
"Japan's Defense Policy," Asian Affairs 3 (January/February
1974), PP. 136-150.

-^ Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1973, p. !•

175

In order to win public acceptance for the Self-Defense
Forces, the official literature has placed particular emphasis
on their non-combat roles such as disaster relief, civil engi-
neering and educational training.

As noted earlier, the nature of the direct military threat
is obscure. The Fourth Defense Build-up Plan (1972-76) is
designed to produce: "An efficient defense force capable of

dealing effectively with aggression on a scale not greater than

a localized war in which conventional weapons are used." In

the face of more serious threats, the SDF are to resist until
U.S. forces can be deployed to defeat the attack. Renewed
fighting in Korea is a potential problem, but the most frequently
discussed direct threat to Japan itself would come from Sakhalin

and the Soviet Far East. Certainly the concentration of the
Air (ASDF) and Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) in Hokkaido and
Northern Honshu reflects this view.

It has been suggested that the limited range of Soviet
tactical aircraft, the geographic obstacles of the Tsugaru

■* Japan Defense Agency, The Defense of Japan (Defense White
Paper), October 1970, pp. 46-56.

Japan Defense Agency, Japan' s Fourth Five -Year Defense
Plan (TokyS, 1972).

^ In 1973, it wa3 reported that Japan planned to hold out
as long as possible against a Soviet invasion and then surrender
if no U.S. help was forthcoming. The principal Chinese threat
was considered to be infiltration, which Japan could mostly
handle alone. (Richard Halloran, Herald Tribune (international),
March 5, 1973.)

176

Strait and the mountainous terrain in Northern Honshu, the rela-
tively small amphibious capability of the Soviet Pacific Fleet,
and the need to operate at the end of the Trans-Siberian railroad
with a hostile China on her flank would restrict the ability of

the USSR to achieve a quick decision over Japan with conventional

weapons* Others have emphasized Japan's vulnerability to air

strikes and the restricted mobility of the Ground Self-Defense
Forces* Whichever view prevails, the ASDF and GSDF at least
have a threat axis on which to base their planning.

This is not the case with the Maritime Self-Defense Force
(MSDF). Torn between theoreticians who argue for a coastal
defense fleet to repel invasions, or for a "blue water navy" to

protect the sea lanes, its assignment never has been clarified

41
officially. Consequently, it is mainly deployed along the

Pacific Coast, towards the sea lanes which it can only partly

defend and away from the direction faced by its sister services.

The future make-up and employment of the MSDF will be examined

in later chapters, but it is worth noting that some observers

have suggested that the greatest dangers to the physical security

of the Japanese people are earthquakes, typhoons, and traffic

Taoka, cp_. cit. (note ^-^\) .

^ Kaihara Osamu, "Study on Realistic National Defense," 7
parts, Mainichi Daily News (hereafter MDN) , January 30-February
5, 1973-

41See Auer, op_. cit., pp. 128-153, for a review of these

arguments .

177

accidents. Therefore, it can be argued, the SDF training and
organization should be oriented towards disaster relief and
safety measures, rather than external aggression.

In any case, whatever their capabilities, the most impor-
tant function of the SDF may be performed by their very existence.
Without any self-defense effort of her own, Japan would have much
less claim to great power protection. Moreover, in the absence
of any forces at all, a decision to develop a defense capability
would be a qualitative policy shift of possibly destabilizing
proportions. As it is, the levels of the SDF can be adjusted to
the international environment.

The Maintenance of Economic Well-Being

International Measures
(1) Food

Physical security has little meaning without enough to eat.
Since domestic production provides for less than half of Japan' 3
caloric intake, even in peacetime she is vulnerable to changes
in the delicate balance of world food distribution.

In monetary terms, self-sufficiency in food declined from

43
over 90 percent to 73 percent between 1960 and 1972. The

reasons are manifold. One is the fact that less than 20 percent

4 Ii\ikushima Yasuto, interview, March 20, 1974*

^Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, White Paper on
Agriculture, 1973. Reported in Japan Times, April 19, 1974*

178

of the mountainous country is arable. In the years following
World War II agricultural productivity reached remarkable
levels. Nevertheless, with restricted space there is a limit

to the ability of technology to meet the added demand generated

by affluence and population growth.

A second, and possibly even more important reason has been
the changes in the Japanese diet. Meat and dairy products have
become more popular in recent years, partially replacing pre-war
staples such as fish and rice (see Table 5-4) •

Table 5~4
LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTERED (1,000 MT)

1967 1970 1972
Adult Cattle 154 269 313

Pigs 103 734 885

Source: Agriculture and Forestry Ministry, Abstract
of Statistics 1973*

^hiice - 5.85 metric tons/hectare, second only to Australia;
White Potatoes - 24.33 M.T. /hectare, 6th in the world; Wheat -
2.31 M.T. /hectare, greater than the U.S., but less than most
European producers.

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Abstract of
Statistics on Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 1 973 (Tokyo,
1973), Table IV.

^Despite a relatively low growth rate of 1.3$> Japan added
nearly 1,400,000 people during fiscal 1973* This is equivalent
to almost 100,000 additional hectares of rice fields. NKIW,
July 30, 1974, p. 2.

179

The difficulty with meat is that it is an inefficient way
of providing nourishment. It has been estimated that 7 calories
of feed grains are needed for each calorie of beef consumed.
A more important measure than per capita calorie consumption is
thus "original calories," i.e. including the amount needed to
feed the livestock and poultry which later went for human con-
sumption. The differences can be startling. In 1971 , the
average Japanese consumed 2,840 calories per day, 230 of which
came from meat. This, however, was equivalent to 3,860 original
calories. For the average American, 11,000 original calories
were needed to generate a daily per capita consumption of 3200.

It is in terms of original calories that Japan's dependence

on imported food is most evident. By this measure she is less

Aft
than 50 percent self-sufficient. Some 80 to 90 percent of

meat, milk, and dairy products are produced domestically, but

49
fully two-thirds of the feed grains must be imported. Indeed,

See the excellent Asahi Evening News series, "Food and
Feople" (30 installments, July 7, 1973 to August 21, 1973),
especially installment VI, "The Shadow Islands," July 13, 1973.
Other estimates put the ratio as high as 10:1.

4'2480-230+( 230x7) = 3860. The Japanese consumption of
2840 calories is equal to the 1971 world nutritional standard.
Food and Feople V, "Earth's Capacity to Feed Mankind."

4 Published figures vary from 4O70 (Agriculture and Forestry
Minister Kuraishi, March 14, 1974) to 49$ (Food and People VI) .
Along with Great Britain, this is one of the lowest rates in the
world. Even Italy and West Germany are nearly 8O/0 self-sufficient
in original calories.

49 Japan Times, April 19, 1974-

180

nearly twice the total amount of arable land would be needed to

50
grow all the foodstuffs now imported.

Should all imports of food cease, domestic production

initially could provide about 1,530 calories per day — enough to

sustain life, but little else. In a year or so, some 2,100

calories could be produced by replanting paddies now set aside,

and by such emergency measures as converting two- thirds of the

nation's golf courses into sweet potato farms. Such a drastic

event seems unlikely. The Japanese also have endured austere
diets before — most recently in the mid 1940s. The fact remains,
however, that this aspect of her prosperity is a fragile one,

particularly if some of the projected world-wide food shortages

appear.

Government countermeasures were promulgated in 1974 with

the goal of raising the level of self-sufficiency to 70 percent

53
by 1 985 • A revision of farm policy to reduce inefficiencies

is planned. Efforts will be intensified to halt the pollution

which has diminished yields per hectare and caused the stagnation

5°Pood and People VI, July 13, 1973-

51NKIW, October 22, 1974, p. 5 and Mainichi, September 19,
1974.

J See, for instance, Lester R. Brown, "The Next Crisis?"

Foreign Policy #13 (Winter 1973-74) » PP» 3~33- The Agriculture
and Forestry Ministry has forecast shortages of rice, beef and
milk by 1980, and of wheat, feed grains and soybeans by 1985*
Asahi, August 19, 1974* P« 2.

-^ Japan Times, April 19, 1974; Sankei, March 28, 1974-

181

54
of coastal fisheries. ^ Aquaculture will be stressed.

In the international arena, efforts are under way to

solidify ties with agriculture producers and states with rich

coastal fisheries. Although this has received less publicity

than "resources diplomacy," it is no less important. Indeed,

the potential volatility of the issue can be gauged by the

Japanese reaction to the 1973 American soy bean embargo. Japan

already takes 20 percent of the world's corn exports and 30 per-

55
cent of those of soy beans. Such imports cost her nearly

$6 billion in 1973 t an increase of 66 percent in one year.'

It may be that the food problem is the most serious, long
term threat to U.S. -Japan relations, especially if supply cuts
are made in response to future crises. The impact can be reduced
by the restraint of both governments and Tokyo's success at
altering Japan's environment, farm patterns, eating habits and
other measures to increase self-sufficiency. But it also will
hinge on factors beyond the control of either nation, and will
remain a source of friction for years to come.

%!he potential impact of continued pollution on Japan's
agriculture and indeed on the health of the nation as a whole
is very serious. Pesticide poisoning, in particular, is a
problem. See Japan, Environment Agency, The Quality of the
Environment in Japan (Tokyo, December 1972).

-^Nihon Keizai (editorial), June 3, 1974*

Japan Economic Yearbook 1 974> P» 49*

182

(2) Resources Diplomacy

Lacking natural resources, Japan imports enormous quantities

of raw materials. Some projections hold that, by 1980, the

Japanese steel industry alone will generate nearly three-fourths
of the world-wide demand for seaborne trade in iron ore and

coal. While they are valued at only 34 percent of her total

/ \59

imports (and 3*3 percent of GNP; these fuel and ore supplies

clearly are crucial to the maintenance of the economy.

Well before the oil embargo, Japan recognized her vulnera-
bility to the actions of raw material suppliers. Accordingly,
Tokyo adopted a policy of "Resources Diplomacy" which was
designed to provide maximum diversity and long term stability
of supply, while bringing as much of it as possible under
Japanese control. This has led her to remarkable lengths to

See Table 5-1 for the degree of dependence on foreign

supplies.

Fa-r Eastern Economic Review, May 20, 1972, p. 39 • This

probably will not be realized, however, since it was based on an
assumption of continued rapid growth.

Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Statistical Survey of Japan's Economy, 1972. Table 38.

One of the foremost proponents of such wide-ranging
relationships has been economist Okita Saburo. See his "Natural
Resource Dependency and Japan's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs
LII (July 1974), pp. 714-724. The limits to Japan's choices are
summed up in John Surrey, "Japan's Uncertain Energy Prospects:
The Problem of Import Dependence," Energy Policy, II (September
1974), pp. 204-230.

fi1

Miyoshi Shuichi, "Japan's Resource Policy at a Turning

Point," Japan Quarterly XVIII (July-September 1971), pp. 281-

183

accommodate resource rich states — some say to the point of
servility. Nowhere is this better illustrated than by her
reaction to issues involving petroleum. In May 1 973» ITI
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro refused to join a "common front"

against OPEC, calling instead for an "understanding" between

62
the oil consuming and oil producing states. Six months later,

in the face of reduced Arab production, Tokyo altered its stand
on the 1967 UN Mid-East Peace Resolution (242) from a call for
mere implementation, to support of the Arab view that the terms
require a return to Israel's 19&7 borders. At the same time,
much effort has been devoted to joint ventures and industrializa-
tion plans to enhance Japan's image among the suppliers of this
crucial commodity. Even though the increase in oil prices has
hurt deeply, she has shown little interest in policy coordination
with other consumers.

Resource supply, however, has two parts. The first is
getting the materials out of the ground (or out of the sea). The
second is getting them to Japan. The latter problem, of course,
requires ships. The Japanese, therefore, have become wary of the
growing Arab control over tanker fleets, although they are

287. An example of this policy was the purchase, early in 1973,
of some 30;o of British Petroleum's holdings in the Abu Dhabi
Marine Areas (ADMA) by a group of Japanese firms. The target is
that 30$ of domestic oil consumption should be under Japanese
control. The scope of foreign drilling operations is outlined
in Figure 5-2 and in MM, July 31, 1974, P» 13.

The Washington Post, May 9, 1973, P- A27.

184

contributing to it by building ships and training seamen. During
the Mid-East embargo, Western control of most tankers enabled
them to re-route shipments in such a way to minimize the impact
of the sanctions on the United States and Holland. As the Arabs

gain more influence over the transport facilities such diversions

will become proportionately more difficult.

In addition to food, already noted, timber also may be
coming into short supply through a combination of commercial
efforts and resources nationalism. The implications for Japan
are particularly serious in light of widespread use of wood in
the housing industry. Cartels in other materials, such as

copper or bauxite, are cause for concern, but will not be as

65
serious as OPEC.

(3) Avoidance of Isolation

One of Japan's greatest fears is economic isolation through
the erection of tariff barriers, nationalism, cartels, or other
measures. The increasing trade liberalization within Japan
itself offers some potential for counter-leverage, but she can
hardly afford to exercise it vigorously. More characteristic is

G7)

^Robert L. Johnson, Mobil Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha, inter-
view, July 23, 1974.

^Forestry White Paper, 1974* Reported in Yomiuri, April
13, 1974.

-^See the debate begun by C. Fred Bergsten's "The Threat
from the Third World," Forei/yn Policy, 11 (Summer 1973) and
continued over several issues of that journal.

185

C\J

•H

36 PETROLEUM NEWS SEA.. DECEM3ER 1973

186

the diversification of resource suppliers and recent overtures
towards the Third World. While this may reduce the risk of over-
dependence on any one region, it also may bring Japan into con-
flicting relationships, particularly if she maintains her
security ties with the U.S. For example, TSkyC's continued
reluctance to commit herself to cooperative oil consumption plans
eventually may force her into the choice between restricted
energy supplies or restricted access to U.S. or European markets.

( 4) Maintenance of Markets

Other measures for the maintenance of markets (see Tables
5-2 and 5-3) require both foreign and domestic efforts.
Japanese competitiveness has been hurt by her own inflation and
the 1974 round of wage hikes which averaged 30 percent. The
damage has been particularly evident in the sale of industrial
plants which was one of the keys to the future restructuring of
the economy. Especially since mid-1 97 4 > U.S. and European firms
have won contracts over Japanese firms from Southeast Asia to the
Middle East. It is likely that the future will see more efforts
to concentrate in technologically- intensive industries to maxi-
mize competitiveness, but the experience gained in petrochemicals,
steel and other heavy industries cannot be redirected easily.
Most recent studies have been quite pessimistic, especially for
the next two to three years.

See Naraiki Nobuyoshi, "Japanese Industry's Competitive
Power Examined," Economist, July 2, 1974* (Translation in

187

Joint ventures have been an important means of securing
host country cooperation. Recently, however, even this approach
has been challenged. One factor has been a general increase in
nationalism, but the aggressive tactics of Japanese businessmen
also have brought ill-will and charges of exploitation. It has
been widely recognized that such concentration on short- run
profits and their rapid repatriation is completely antithetical
to Japan's broader interests. Nevertheless, the changes to date
have been more cosmetic than substantive.

In the long term, Japan's exports and investments will have
to satisfy increasingly strict criteria of benefit to the
recipients. Technological assistance, or the programmed phase-
out of Japan's participation in joint ventures may become pre-
requisites for entrance into future markets, at least in those
states with enough resources to be able to bargain.

Domestic Measures

( 1 ) Inflation Countermeasures, Industrial Restructuring
and Pollution Control

International measures alone will not suffice if present
domestic trends continue in Japan. The 1 975— 74 inflation rate
of 24 percent was one of the highest in the industrialized world,
and it certainly was not helped by the Spring 1974 round of wage

Magazine Summary, July 1 974) • Also Asahi, September 17, 1 974>
p. 9, and the report by the Mitsubish General Research Institute,
"Rise in Costs and Prospects for International Competitive
Power," August 15, 1974.

188

increases. Opinion polls have shown this to be the primary issue
in the public's mind. Another problem concerns the social

capital structure, which is inadequate — only 21 percent of the

67
roads are paved, for instance. Pollution is among the worst

in the world. Buffers against food and resource shortages will
be needed. Finally, the economy must be restructured to take
into account not only the physical limits of present day Japan,
but also the future international climate.

Recognition of these problems led to sporadic demands for
a modification of the goal of unimpeded economic growth in the
late 1960s and early 70s. The need for a revision of the indus-
trial structure itself finally was acknowledged in 1971 » when
the Industrial Structure Deliberation Committee produced a docu-
ment entitled "Trade and Industrial Policies in the 1970' s."
This proposed a concentration on knowledge-intensive industries
and marked a drastic shift away from the heavy and chemical
industries which had formed the basis of the "Economic Miracle"
of the 1960s. It was on the crest of this new wave of thinking

that Prime Minister Tanaka launched his vaunted proposal for

69
remodeling the Japanese Archipelago.

'Hational Police Agency, 1973 White Paper. By comparison,
the U.S. figure is about 43/o. Similarly, only about 9.2/o of
Japanese houses have flush toilets — roughly on a par with Jordan
and Nepal .

68Toky5, May 1971.

"Note that the heart of Tanaka' s plan— regional

189

Little progress was made in this direction, however, until
the oil crisis refocused attention on the impossibility of main-
taining the status quo. Accordingly, in July 1 974> MITI sub-
mitted a more comprehensive report which called for emphasis on
the aircraft and computer indus tries, somewhat reduced economic
growth and diversification of secondary industrial sites. The
net result was to be a reduction in resource imports, improve-
ments in the social capital structure, an easing of pollution
and population dispersal. It remains to be seen how workable
this particular plan is, but the general direction is one in
which Japan will have to move.

(2) Stockpiles

In the wake of the oil crisis, the decision was made to
build up petroleum stocks from 60 to 90 days by 1980. This will
entail tremendous capital investments. In addition to storage
facilities, a three month supply of crude oil at $10.00 per

development — had been proposed ten years earlier in a MITI paper
entitled Industrial Location in Japan (Tokyo, 1962).

There have been several criticisms of the report, not the

least of which were that it predicted: (a) a 7 to 6 percent real

growth rate annually between 1975 and 1985, ( b) a $10 billion

balance of payments surplus by 1980 and (c) an average inflation

rate of 7-8/0 between 1873 and 1980 (the 1973~74 rate was about

2470). Furthermore, its vaunted reduction in petroleum as an

imported energy source is nearly matched by the rise in imported

LNG. (See, for instance, Sankei and TSkyg Shimbun editorials,

July 12, 1974. Kenneth R. Stunkel offers considerable evidence

that the Japanese environment could not support the plan even if

it was fulfilled. See below, Chapter Seven.

190

barrel is worth some $4,500,000,000. Furthermore, some 2000
additional hectares of land will be needed for storage. In
October 1974, MITT recommended ¥1,700 billion (about $5-7 billion)

for this program over a five year period. The measure must be

approved by the Diet.

Japan's effective reserves are, in fact, somewhat larger
than officially stated. For instance, the oil in tankers already
enroute from the Persian Gulf, on their 20 day voyage to Japan

may be considered part of her stockpile under some circum-

stances. In addition, the huge central terminal storage (CTS)

to be built in Indonesia (and perhaps in Thailand) will provide
a buffer against sudden supply interruptions. However, it is the
policy of the Japanese government only to consider as stockpiles
those supplies which are actually under national control. Even
during the 1974 oil shortage, in fact, they rejected a proposal
by western oil companies to set up so-called off-shore reserves

in foreign countries in order to alleviate the high cost of

establishing such facilities in Japan itself. Whether or not

they will be able to continue this policy in the face of the
local opposition to the Okinawa CTS (and presumably to those

Nihon KPfyo, September 5, 1974«

Moreover, the speed of the ships can be varied if neces-
sary to compensate for domestic supply-demand conditions. This
was done in September 1974, when the tankers were slowed down in
response to surplus stocks.

'^Robert L. Johnson, Mobil Sekiyu, interview, July 23, 1974*

\ihpn Keizai, September 27, 1974, P» 3»

191

storages associated with the 90 day reserves as well) remains to
be seen.

In late 1 974» decisions also were made to establish stock-

piles for lumber and non-ferrous metals.

Preservation of the Political Autonomy/independence

This is, of course, closely related to the degree of physi-
cal and economic security that Japan can muster. Some would
charge that, in fact, Japan already is so close to the United
States as to be unable to move independently. It is not clear,
however, that Tokyo could be more flexible should it disassociate
itself from Washington. Certainly there would not be much more
freedom in ties with Moscow. Some of the problems of alliances
with other states or neutrality will be discussed in later
chapters.

All Japanese feel the country's resource poverty and over-
population. Moreover, there is general recognition that these
cannot be overcome unilaterally. Thus the problem again becomes
one of avoiding isolation. This is a frequent press theme when-
ever international negotiations arise, for instance at the Caracas

76
Lav/ of the Sea Conference, or at the time of the oil crisis.

75Ibid., September 11, 1974, P» 3«

"Japan is now completely isolated" (in her opposition to
200 mile economic zones), Japan Times, July 24, 1974- This was
a very interesting position, and one which bodes ill for future
Japanese diplomatic efforts should it become commonplace.

192

Contributions to the Development of the International System

The first step in this process, obviously, is the determi-
nation of what Japan's role should be. It is widely felt that,
over the long run, something more satisfying than "Japan, Inc.,"
or the "economic animal" must be found. Proposals have ranged
from becoming a benevolent friend of developing countries to a
reassertion of Japan's prewar spirituality, but no consensus has
yet developed. A few of the alternatives will be examined in
Chapter Seven.

In the long run, the most likely threats to Japan's
security probably will come from the world-wide maldistribution
of resources and wealth. Japan is a status quo power, in a world
where the status quo rapidly is changing. Despite the fact that
she is Asian she also is industrialized power, and this image
will dominate. The December 1973 attack on Singapore's Pulau
Bunom refinery complex already has been noted as a part of a

global offensive by the Japanese Red Army and the PFLP against

77
"Japanese Imperialism." Such an approach may ha.ve only margi-

nal value in inducing "armed revolution in Tokyo," but it
certainly can have a major impact on governments and multi-
national corporations. Moreover, with the proliferation of
fissionable materials, the eventual likelihood of terrorism via

See above, note 4-10.

78—

Ota's phrase, ibid.

193

nuclear weapons in the developed countries themselves has
increased.

There is probably little that Japan can do alone to reduce
its status as a target for such groups. Defenses might be
bolstered around strategic installations, intelligence services
improved, and ports of entry checked more closely, but these will
neither deter nor detect truly determined adversaries. Despite
the fact that there always will be violently dissident minorities,
however, it still will be in the nation's long run interests to
promote the developing countries' stake in the international
system. The alternative would leave some of them in the position

where they could only gain by trying to bring it down. Already

79
there has been official recognition of this fact, but it

remains to be seen what the actual impact will be on Japan's

diplomatic and economic activities.

Several volumes could have been devoted to each of the

interests which this chapter has attempted to summarize. The

emphasis has been on existing conditions, however some possible

changes will be examined later in relation to Japan's seapower.

The next two chapters will return to the ocean setting with a

review of the Maritime Self- Defense Force and its possible future.

^For instance, Prime Minister Tanaka's September 28, 1974
press conference.

Chapter Six

THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
AND THE CONSTRAINTS ON ITS DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT

The Current Status of the MSDF

In mid-1974, the Maritime Self- Defense Force was composed
as follows:

Table 6-1

Fleet Strength

Type Ship

Number (Build:

ing)

Tonnage (Building)

Destroyers/Frigates

45 (5)
14 (2)

85,550 (12,960)
19,810 ( 5,700)

Submarines

Minecraft

50 (6)

18,789 ( 1,626)

Subchasers & Torpedo
Amphibious Ships

Boats 25 (1)
6 (2)

8,180 ( 100)
8,650 ( 3,480)

Service Forces

18 (0)
61 (0)

21,997 (0)

2,528 (0)

Misc. Small Craft

219 (16)

Fleet Air Arm

166,254 (21,866)

1 2 Anti-submarine Squadrons
5 Air Training Squadrons
1 Transport Squadron

Approximately 200 Aircraft

Source: Sobi Henkan '73, Jane ' s Fighting Ships 1974~75

In English, in addition to works already cited, see James
H. Buck, "The Japanese Self -Defense Force," Naval War College
Review, XXVI (January-February 1974), PP» 40-54; Sekino Hideo,
"Japan and Her Maritime Defense," PS NIP t XCVII (May 1971),

194

195

Each ship is assigned a homeport in one of the five
Regional District Commands (see Figures 6-1 and 6-2), which are
responsible for the personnel administration, repair and mainte-
nance of their ships, as well as logistics support to the fleet
in general. Although some units are permanently attached to the
Districts, the majority of combatant vessels and aircraft are
included in the organization of the Self -Defense Fleet. Roughly

45 percent of the MSDF's 38,325 personnel were assigned to these

ships. Another 26 percent were with the fleet air squadrons.

In time of emergency and when otherwise directed by the Director
General of the JDA, the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet will

assume operational control over all forces.

Japan's naval power lias been developed, since 1 957> through
a series of four Defense Power Consolidation Programs which are
summarized in Table 6-2. Although the current plan (the fourth)

pp. 93-121; and Uchida Kazutomi, "The Rearmament of the Japanese
Maritime Forces," Naval V/ar College Review, XXVI (November-
December 1 973) y PP« 41-48. An analysis which stresses strength,
rather than weakness, is contained in Herbert P. Bix, "Report on
Japan 1972. Part One: The Military Dimension," Bulletin of Con-
cerned Asian Scholars (hereafter BCAS), IV (7/2), pp. 22-32. The
writings in Japanese are voluminous. Note especially the on-
going debate between Sekino Hideo and Kaihara Osamu. The Jietai
Sobi Nenkan (Self-Defense Force Equipment Yearbook) (Tokyo:
Asagumo Shimbunsha, annual), is a convenient reference. The
excellent magazine Sekai no Kansen (Ships of the World) provides
particularly good coverage of the MSDF. It also is one of the
finest publications in any language on current naval developments
world-wide .

The combined complements of the MSDF ships listed in

Table 6-2 is slightly over 17,000. According to the JDA,
10,100 were assigned to the aircraft squadrons.

196

Figure 6-1

Organization of the Maritime Self-Defense Fore*
as of April 1, 1971

JDA Director General

of Mar ft! r

Chief

lme Staff

Maritime Staff Offlc*

Self

-Defense-
Fleet

— Self Defense Fleet Headquarters (Tokosuka)

Fleet Escort Force Headquarters
(YoVosuka)

- 1st Escort Flotilla
— Escort Divisions

Fleet ]- 2nd Escort Flotilla

— Escort --Escort Divisions

Force \~ 3rd Escort Flotilla

--Escort Divisions

- 4th Escort Flotilla
--Escort Divisions

- Other Units under Direct Command

- Fleet Air Force Headquarters (Shonan Town,
Higashi-Katsushika-Gun, Chiba Prefecture)

- 1st Air Wing (Kanoya City)

- 2nd Air Wing (Hachlnohe City)

- 3rd Air Wing (Tokushima City)

- 4th Air Wing (Shonan Town, Higashi-Katsushika-Gun, Chiba
Prefecture)

- 21st Air Wing (Tateyama City)

- 51st Flight Squadron (Shonan Town, Higashi-
Katsushika-Gun, Chiba Prefecture)

Fleet
-Air —
Force

— 1st Minesweeper FlotiUa

--Minesweeper Divisions

— 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla
--Minesweeper Divisions

— 1st Submarine Flotilla (Kure)

— Fleet Training Command (Yokosuka)
--Fleet Training Groups

—Other Units under Direct Command
Yokosuka Regional District

Typical Regional Districts

includes:
Headquarters
Escort Units
Patrol Units
Subchaser Units
Minesweeper Units
Torpedo Boat Units
Landing Craft Units
Local Bases
Air Stations

Kure Regional District
Sasebo Regional District
Maizuru Regional District
Omlnato Regional District

Source: Auer, p. 106.

196a

Figure 6-1 (c*mt)

Organlratlon of the Maritime Sell-Defense Fore*
a. o! April 1, 1971

JDA Director General

Chief of Maritime Stall "

Maritime Stili Olflc*

Alx

--Training-
Co mmand

Recruit Training Cenlei
Communications Station
Base Oper. and AcUy.
Base Aclly. Onlt
Base Oper. Onlt

I — Headijiiarters, Air Training Command (Uts-unornij-a)

Kanoya Air Training Group
— Utsunomlya Air Training Group
— OzuW Alx Training Group (ShlmODOSeld)

Other Units under Direct Command
- MSDF Staff College {Sh!njuku-Vu, Tokyo)

■ MSDF Officer Candidate Schcol (HTtaJima Town, Akl-Gun, Hiroshima

Prefecture)

■ MSDF 1st Service School (Etajlma Town, AJd-Ojn, Hiroshima Pre-

fecture)

■ MSDF 2nd Service School (Yokosuka)

• MSDF 3rd Service School (Shona_n Town, Hi£ashi-Katsushika-Giin, Chiba
Prefecture)
MSDF Youth Basic Service School (Etajlma Town, Aki-Cun, Hiroshima Prefec-
ture)
MSDF Yokosuka Hospital (Yokosuka)

MSDF Etajima Hospital (Etajlma Town, Aid-Gun, Hiroshima Prefecture)

MSDF Maizuru Hospital (Maizuru) '

MSDF Ominalo Hospital (Mutsu)

Other Units under the Director General's Direct Command

Miscellaneous Ur.its including;

Central Communications Center

Oceanographic Unit

Print Supply Unit

MSDF Intelligence Service Unit

Operational De\elopment Croup

MSDF Shore Folice Command

Supply Demand Control Point

MSDF Tokyo Band

MSDF Tokyo Service Activity

Source: Japan Defense Agency.

Auer, p. 107*

197

Figure 6-2

no.ooaooo

Satabo District »

Source: Auer, p. 1 38

MSDF BASES AND INSTALLATIONS

198

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has been severely undermined by inflation and several other

factors, the eventual target of a 280,000 ton fleet has not been

officially repudiated.

As noted in Chapter Five, the mission for which the MSDF

is to prepare itself remains imprecise. The maritime goal of

the Fourth Defense Plan however is:

To improve defense capabilities in the sea areas
around Japan and the ability to ensure the safety
of the sealines.3

In the "sea areas around Japan" the focus is on invasion
defense. Never officially defined, their width has been taken
to be about 200-300 nautical miles (kairi) in the Pacific, and
100-200 miles in the Sea of Japan. Sealane protection has con-
centrated on the southeast and southwest route zones. These
corridors, extending roughly 1,000 miles in each direction, run
south from Tokyo along the islands of the Nampo Shoto, Bonin and
Kazan Ret to on the one hand, and southwest from Osaka along the

"Japan's Fourth Five Year Defense Plan," _op_. cit. (note
5~37)> p« 5« There is some ambiguity in this statement. The
official translation reads:

to improve defense capabilities in the sea areas
around Japan and the ability to ensure the safety
of the sealines in those areas, [emphasis supplied]

The Japanese text is subject to both interpretations. Critics
of a blue water role for the MSDF choose the latter meaning, since
it admits only the protection of coastal shipping. MSDF
officials, however, steadfastly maintain that the "safety of the
sealine" mission extends beyond the "sea areas around Japan."

Tokyo Simbun, May 24, 1973, and Mainichi, September 20,
1973.

201

Ryukyus on the other. (See Figure 6-3.) Should fixed hydro-
phone arrays be developed for initial contacts, the protection
of convoys could be improved by coordinating acoustic data with
anti-submarine aircraft from the island bases. In this way an
effective escort might be extended at least as far as Taiwan and
the Marianas.

Aside from submarines and the few PT boats, little atten-
tion apparently has been given to the role of the MSDF in invasion
defense. This is understandable, given the improbability of the
event and the preference of naval officers for offshore operations.
Nonetheless, the ocean escorts which comprise the bulk of the
naval firepower are ill-suited to operations in restricted waters
in the face of an even moderate air threat.

One area in which the MSDF is well equipped, however, is
mine warfare, particularly mine sweeping. This is prudent, for
Japan is uniquely vulnerable to the interdiction of her water-
borne domestic transportation by minefields. This somewhat
uninspiring field of warfare consistently has received inadequate

attention, only to play a major part in most of the naval conflicts

of the century. Already returned to the "back burner" after the

•'ibid. Also Tokyo Shimbun, July 2, 1973* One of the
islands to be used as a base is Iwo Jima.

Indeed, minesweeping was central to the development of
postwar Japan's maritime forces. See Auer, _op_* cit. (note 5-34) >
passim, especially pp. 49-89 •

To cite but a few examples, the irreparable Russian loss

202

Figure 6-5

THE SOUTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST ROUTE ZONES

203

dramatic demonstration of their potential in Haiphong, mines are
certain to reassert their importance in connection with the
growing controversies over strategic straits.

Much of the peacetime work of protecting the safety of life
at sea is assigned to the 327 ships and 11,000 men of the Mari-
time Safety Agency (MSA — the Japanese Coast Guard).

Despite the lack of guidance, the leaders of the MSDF have
built up an impressive array of ships. Their "blue water" con-
ventional forces are exceeded only by the U.S. and USSR in Asia
and, on paper at least, may be sufficient to rank Japan behind
France and Britain as the world's fifth naval power. Such a
comparison is presented in Table 6-3« One purpose of this and
later chapters will be to illustrate that such macro- analyses of
military strength usually conceal more than they illuminate. But
the fact remains that the very size of Japan's fleet, and the
economic potential behind it, can be manipulated to her disadvan-
tage. This is particularly true among the still-suspicious

peoples of the 7/estern Pacific.

of Admiral Makarov when his flagship was mined in 1904> the
North Sea mine barrage of 1 918> the mining of Japanese home
waters from March 1945 which thereafter crippled the economy even
more effectively than the U.S. submarine campaign, the Corfu
Channel incident of 1946, North Korea's denial of control of the
seas to the U.S. Navy off Wonsan in October 1950, and the closure
of North Vietnam's ports and inland waterways in 1972.

8Halliday and LIcCormick, op_. cit. (note 5-27) » state: "By
1975, Japan will be the mightiest non-nuclear power in the world"
(p. 89). Bisson, in his review, op_. cit. (note 5-1 3) ? comments:
"that Japan is a weak military power is a widely accepted myth,
but the facts are otherwise."

204

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205

For all its apparent strength the Maritime Self- Defense
Force operates under a number of severe constraints, both domes-
tic and international. Some of these limit the freedom with
which existing ships can be employed, others hinder the develop-
ment of the SDF in general. In any case, in combination, they
are sufficient to offset many of the MSDF's apparent strengths.
The present constraints will be summarized below, and their
possible evolution examined in Chapter Nine. It should be noted,
however, that several are deeply- rooted, and will not be easily
changed (for better or for worse).

Domestic Constraints

Constitutional-Political

As noted in Chapter Five, Article 9 of the Constitution is
central to most debates over Japan's security. The controversy
has focused on two points: (1) are the Self -Defense Forces them-
selves "war potential" and hence unconstitutional, and (2) at
what level of capability do the SDF become "war potential"?
Since the courts so far have refused to rule on the first
question, the opposition arguments of inherent unconstitutionality

"The Supreme Court upheld Japan's sovereign right of self-
defense in the 1959 Sunakawa decision, but did not rule on the
constitutionality of the SDF themselves. In September 1975 a
Hokkaido Judge in the Naganuma case held that the SDF are land,
sea and air forces "in view of their scale, equipment and capaci-
ties," and are unconstitutional. This is being appealed to the
Supreme Court, where it probably will be overturned on the

206

have "been kept alive, although there are differences between
the parties. On the other hand, the absence of a definitive
interpretation on prohibition has permitted the Government to
preserve and expand the SDF.

The dispatch of forces overseas has been prohibited not
only on a constitutional basis, but also as a result of a House
of Councillors resolution at the time of the creation of the SDF
in 1954* In addition to limiting Japan's ability to comply with
collective security agreements, the restriction has precluded her
participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Though the oppo-
sition parties have been quick to question any statement which
might indicate a change on this position, the government has not
pressed the issue.

The net result has been to focus attention on the design
of specific weapons systems and, in recent years, the total pro-
curement levels. One debate centered on the mid-air refueling
system of the F-4 fighter. Charges were made that such a

grounds that the determination of SDF equipment is a political
decision outside of the competence of the judiciary. See Ninon
Keizai, September 8, 1973, and Tokyo Shimbun, September 8, 1 973 •
The government opinion was in Yomiuri, October 2, 1973*

U.S. hints for greater Japanese participation in Asian

security have been embarrassing in this regard, as was Lee Kuan

Yew's 1973 call for Japanese units in a multinational task force

in Southeast Asian waters. For a recent denial of overseas

dispatch intentions, see Defense Agency Director General

Yamanaka's Diet Remarks in Asagumo, May 30, 1 974- It should be

noted, however, that an IvISDF training squadron is permitted to

visit foreign ports every year.

207

capability would enable the aircraft to be used in offensive
roles since its range would be increased. The government, which

had plated over the fuel ducts prior to the controversy, now was

11
forced to remove the associated piping entirely. Another

objection was that a newly proposed anti-submarine escort group

' 12
should not be designated as a "hunter-killer unit" in peacetime.

Finally, there was the Diet member who questioned whether or not

a new conventional submarine could be converted into a nuclear

one simply by the insertion of a reactor.

This relatively low level of inquiry, however, still has

resulted in serious restrictions on the development of the SDF.

One of the most significant developments was the "limits to

defense power in peacetime" controversy in early 1973* Although

defense spending consistently has been less than one percent of

GNP, the tremendous growth of Japan's economy had given her the

tenth largest military budget in the world by 1971 > and could

have driven it to sixth or seventh place by the end of the Fourth

Defense Plan. Moreover, though the defense buildup was expected

11Mainichi, March 21, 1973; Sankei, (eve) April 10, 1973-

1 ?

Yasui Yoshinori, Japan Socialist Party (JSP), in Lower

House Budget Committee interpellations, February 5, 1973*

^Narazaki Yanosuke (JSP), in Lower House Budget Committee
interpellations, February 7, 1974. Reported in Asahi, February
8, 1974-

^Compared with 2.&/o in West Germany and 3.7$ in Sweden in
1971.

208

to be completed by 1981 with the conclusion of the Fifth Program,
the lack of specific planning guidance and seemingly limitless
economic expansion led to calls in the early 1970s for the
establishment of a firm upper limit on the size of the SDF.
This also, it should be recalled, came soon after a period of
widespread warnings of the revival of Japanese militarism and
a spate of predictions of Japan's future as a superpower. The
result was an effective freeze on the quantity of SDF equipment

at Fourth Defense Program targets (except for naval vessels) but

15
with few controls on future qualitative advances.

Closely related to the political climate is public opinion

which, at best, is ambiguous about the SDF. Although public

acceptance has grown since their formation, there is no strong

pressure for their expansion. Moreover, any attempt at overseas

deployments almost certainly would be vigorously

15 /

See the Defense Agency "view" (to avoid involvement of

the cabinet-level National Defense Council) of January 26, 1973>

and the succeeding debate through early February. The final '

Program was:

GSDF: 5 Area Armies; 13 divisions, 180,000 men

MSDF: 5 Regional Units; 4~5 escort Flotillas, 280,000

tons of ships (vs 4 Flotillas and 214,000 tons

under the 4th Defense Plan)
ASDF: 3 Regional Air Defense Forces (8 wings); 1 composite

air wing, about 800 aircraft (vs about 770 under the

4th Defense Plan)

Emmerson, op. cit. (note 5-33) » indicates that support

for the SDF rose from 58? in 1956 opinion polls to 75$ in 1969
(p. 118). A survey taken right after the Nagamuna verdict showed
a 58-1 Qfo margin for the SDF with 245S undecided. (Sankei, Septem-
ber 15, 1973).

209

17
opposed. In part, this stems from the generally homogeneous,

skeptical attitude of the media towards defense. A high literacy

1 8
rate, the huge circulations of the three major newspapers, and

a vast television audience makes the Japanese public particularly
susceptible to such pressures. The corollary, of course, is that
should the media's stance change, the public's could quickly
follow.

Another aspect of public opinion, which is particularly
difficult for the ASDF and GSDF, is local opposition to bases.
Such objections usually stem either from the nuisance effects
and peripheral dangers of military operations (aircraft noise,
unexploded shells, etc.) or from the feeling that the large land
areas could be better used in such a crowded country. Except for
the air squadrons, the MSDF is relatively immune to such pres-
sures, but it is affected insofar as such controversies reflect
negatively on the SDF (and the U.S. military presence) in general.

17
Taoka, _op_. cit. (note 5-1 1)i notes that Hideyoshi's

abortive Korean campaign, the subsequent 250 years of isolation

and domestic tranquillity, and the following era of imperial

expansion and foreign wars have meant that "in the Japanese

language 'war' is now almost synonymous to 'expedition' in

nuance." Thus the concept of defensive wars and overseas

deployments in stabilizing or peacekeeping roles is inconsistent

with their historical experience. Whether or not these qualms

also would apply to extensions of Japan's claims to heretofore

uncertain territories, such as broader ocean resource zones or

some of the East China Sea islets, is not clear.

1 ft

The Asahi, IJainichi and Yomiuri morning circulations each

exceed four and a half million, compared with 2-3 million for the

largest U.S. daily (The New York Daily News). Moreover, the

Japanese papers are nationally distributed, thus reducing the

influence of local journals.

210

Bureaucratic

The Defense Agency is hampered in the intra- governmental
power struggle by its bureaucratic weakness. As an agency
located within the Prime Minister's office, it is one level below
the twelve ministries on the organizational ladder. In itself,
this is not critical. The National Police Agency is very strong,
some ministries are weak. However, the Defense Agency has
acquired a reputation for a lack of political influence over the
years. Furthermore, many of its important functions are performed

by personnel on loan, notably from the Police Agency, MIT I and

19
the Finance Ministry. Since their loyalty is to their parent

organization rather than to the Agency, the latter' s autonomy is

undermined further.

Another problem is the fief-like nature of the Japanese

20
bureaucracy. In a recent example, centering on the Caracas

negotiations, the Transportation Ministry and Defense Agency

virtually stopped communications over the issue of free transit

1 Q

Hughes, op_. eft. (note 5~34) > contains a detailed

description of the way in which this has affected the Air Self
Defense Force.

In the weeks prior to the Caracas conference, a search

was made for a suitable ministry/cabinet level delegate. The
infighting became so intense that a Foreign Ministry spokesman
remarked: "Regardless of whoever is dispatched, it is hoped
that he will rise above the government office under his juris-
diction and that he will work as a state minister of Japan."
Ninon Keizai, June 19, 1974. This problem, of course, is not
unique to Japan.

211

through international straits. This lack of coordination is

further evidenced by the fact that no contingency plans for
naval control of shipping in war time have been developed —

despite the lessons of two World Wars that such authority is

essential to the survival of an island state. Finally, this

communications gap will seriously hamper efforts to develop,
much less install, containerized weapon and point defense systems
for merchantmen. (See Chapters Eight and Nine.)

Economic and Industrial

Soon after the limits of defense power debates, there was
talk of shifting the appropriations basis from a five-year pro-
gram to an annual "rolling budget" following the end of the

Fourth Consolidation Plan ( 1 97 7 ) - As price hikes and personnel

costs pushed the 4th Program's 4»630 billion year budget towards
6 trillion, fewer references to the Fifth Program were heard, if
only because announcements of year by year outlays would be less
provocative than that of a huge sum for a five year

21 - -

Tokyo Shimbun (eve), June 12, 1974 and Nihon Keizai, June

19» 1 974* In an interesting variation from the Pentagon's
stance, the Defense Agency called for a straits regime of inno-
cent passage, largely because it did not want to grant the
Soviets free access through Tsugaru Strait. The Transportation
Ministry, on the other hand, sought to avoid possible restric-
tions on supertankers.

See Eehrens, op. cit. (note 1-55) » P» 9» ?°r tne British

case in both wars, and USSBS, The War Against Japanese Transpor-
tation, 1941-1945, op. cit. (note 1-55) » -for the Japanese
experience .

^Nihon Keizai, June 16, 1973.

212

package. Throughout 1974, each successive month's inflation
brought further reduction in Fourth Defense Plan targets. "* At
the same time, the MSDF peacetime limits of 280,000 tons and the

use of military power itself as the basis of national security

policy also were called into question.

The current inflation, however, only compounded a number

^Pokyo Shimbun, March 14, 1974* Figures mentioned for the
5th plan were 10 trillion yen ($36 billion at March 1974 exchange
rates) — once again more than doubling the previous program. An
interesting sidelight is that, although the Japanese name of the
Defense Plan has not changed (Boei-Hyoku Seibi Keikaku) , the
Defense Agency^ English language publications referred to it as
a "Build-up Plan" in 1971, while the 1973 materials used the
less- suggestive term "consolidation plan."

First were douots about the fifth escort flotilla which

the MSDF might have acquired under the 280,000 ton peacetime
limits (Tokyo1 Shimbun, March 2, 1974)* Then a proposal was made
to reduce the quality of the equipment on the 10 ships programmed
for FY1974 (the Japanese fiscal year runs from April 1 to March
31), and construction of a landing ship (LST) had been deleted.
(The contracts still had not been signed by August.) Moreover,
the whole question of what constituted "necessary defense power"
was under review (Ninon Keizai, April 5, "1974) • The following
month the Defense Agency Director General admitted that he had
given up the idea of "achieving completely" the Fourth Defense
Plan (Sankei, May 5)« Finally, in September, he stated that
accomplishment of the plan now was "hopeless" ( Yomiuri , Septem-
ber 7)- The extent of this escalation is indicated by the
following cost estimates (JDA Data):

(million yen)
1974 1972 Percent Increase

Helicopter Destroyer (DDH) 44,372

Anti-Submarine Destroyer oc Q,n
(DDK) 25'83°

Submarine (SS) 26,789

26Asahi, May 7, 1974, and Yomiuri, October 10, 1974-

20,471

116.8

11,089

132.9

12,801

121.7

213

of long*- standing problems in the defense industry. ' For years,
military production in Japan has been relatively unprofitable.

In a 1972-73 study by Keidanren, it was found that only in 11 of

293 defense projects were builders1 costs below contract price.

Most warship construction in particular was 10 to 30 percent
above contract. In another study of 67 contractors, the busi-
nesses averaged 7 percent losses on defense work. When asked
why they accepted such orders and their likely unprofitability,
the answers given in Table 6-4 resulted.

In Fiscal 1972 (April 1972-March 1973), average costs were
17.4 percent over budget, with warships running 46.6 percent.
As noted above, the situation now has deteriorated even further.

Quite apart from issues of profit, the complexity of modern
warships also is a problem. The fact that they require construc-
tion techniques which are markedly different (more labor-
intensive) from those of the merchantmen in which Japanese

The 25-part series "Defense Industry in Japan," NKIW,

July 4- December 19, 1972, is a good introduction in English.
.Recent structural shifts were outlined on April 23, 1974, P» 12.
Also Auer, op_. cit. (note 5~34) , chapter 13* For critical views
(whose ominous predictions seem to have been premature), see
Herbert P. Bix, "The Security Treaty System and the Japanese
Military- Indus trial Complex," BCAS, II (January 1972), pp. 30-53
and Albert Axel bank, Black Star Over Japan (TOkyO: Charles E.
Tuttle, 1973), PP. 29-45.

Keidanren, Boei Seisan I-inkai Jimukyoku (Defense Pro-
duction Committee Secretariat), "Chotatsukaku no Jittai ni
Kansuru Chosa Kenkyu Hokokusho" (investigative Research Heport
Concerning the Realities of Procurement Costs) (So-called
Kurosawa 2nd Report), 1973, provided by Keidanren, p. 4« Here-
after Kurosawa Report.

214

Table 6-4
COMPANY REASONS FOR ACCEPTING UNPROFITABLE
DEFENSE CONTRACTS

1. To support the Company's
work scale

2. Expectations of Techno-
logical spin off

3. Cooperation with National
Defense Policy, not profit

4. Expectations of Improving
the Conditions for Receiving
Future (Government) Business

5. Had carried out preparation
for production prior to
(receipt of) contract

6. Thoughts of Publicity from
the equipment

7 . Other

Priority

Weighted
Average

0
5

5
0

8
0

130

14
15

Source: Kurosawa Report, p. 16

Note: 1st priority = 3 pts., 2nd = 2 pts., 3rd = 1 pt,

215

shipyards have specialized makes them inherently less attractive
to shipbuilders. The business incentives for defense production
might increase if the economy continues to weaken but, without
foreign sales, it is doubtful that such work could absorb more
than a small fraction of Japan's industrial capacity.

Closely related to the state of the defense industry is the
issue of domestic production itself. This has been most hotly
contested in the aircraft sector, and so has affected the MSDF
mostly in the case of the PXL (new anti-submarine patrol plane) .
The first post-war destroyers and frigates were completed by

Japanese yards in 1956, and all construction has been domestic

30
since. The structural quality of the ships has won high

31
praise, and dependence on the U.S. for shipboard, weapon,

In any case the firms themselves are not counting on it.

Medium and small manufacturers who have specialized in defense
sub-contracting now are seeking' to diversify. (Nihon Keizai,
July 31 2nd August 2, 1974)* There are not that many. Defense
production in Japan has accounted for about .4/° of industrial
output in recent years. One survey of 83 firms engaged in such
work showed that it accounted for less than 10$ of total business
in 52 cases (64^). (NKIW, December 19, 1972). Foreign arms
sales will be discussed in Chapter Nine but, in sum, the pros-
pects for Japanese defense production (with the possible
exception of the electronics sector) are not considered bright.
Fusano Natsuki, Defense Production Committee of Keidanren,
interview, August 6, 1974* See also Nihon Keizai, May 16, 1 974-
This is more a matter of policy and public opinion than of capa-
bility, but the fact remains nonetheless.

vVashington has transferred some U.S. -built ships and
funded two Japanese-built destroyers, however.

Although some regret that newer designs, such as the
helicopter destroyer (DDIl) Haruna, have not been more innovative.
Fukui Shizuo, interview, January 20, 1973*

216

sensor and communication systems has been steadily reduced.
Indeed, defense electronics is one area where there is a hopeful
outlook for expansion as an offshoot of the general economic
shift to technologically- intensive industry. Nevertheless,
given the interrelationship between air and sea power, the MSDF

cannot really be considered independent so long as the ASDF is

34
not. At the same time, the scale of projected SDF aircraft

demand hardly justifies domestic production, while the drain on
currency reserves mitigates against foreign procurement. Thus
the eventual decision could favor the curtailment of aircraft
acquisition (which probably would be accompanied by calls for
general defense spending limitations), an easing of the restric-
tion on foreign sales (see Chapter Nine), or a concentration on
missiles and technologically-advanced installable equipment.
There also is the possibility that defense contracts could be
used for economic "pump priming," but this does not seem likely.

Nearly all l.ISDF equipments now are home-made, though
they are compatible with American ammunition and, to a lesser
extent, with U.S. spare parts.

^NKIW, April 23, 1974, P- 12.

One example of the dangers of relying on foreign
weaponry was given in April 1 974, when the U.S. announced that
it was phasing out its Nike-Hercules SAM system. Since Japan
uses a similar missile there eventually will be difficulties in
obtaining spare parts. However, domestic production of spares
is unlikely since the missiles1 1950s-vintage electronics con-
tain vacuum tubes which are so outdated that Japanese firms are
unwilling to make them. Asahi, April 4» 1974*

217

A further impact of inflation on the MSDF, of course, has
been a reduction in operating time due to higher fuel costs.

Manpower

The Self-Defense Forces long have had recruiting and
retention problems. In the short run, this situation may ease
if the economy worsens. In the longer term, however, demographic
forecasts predict a reduction in the size of the 18-25 age group
from which the SDF (and industry) draw most of their recruits.
These problems are compounded by anti-military sentiment and the
low prestige of the Self-Defense Forces. Concern has been voiced
about the quality of recent officer candidates. Further diffi-
culties have been added by the restrictive measures placed on
voting permits for SDF personnel by some local governments in
the wake of the Naganuma decision.

The MSDF has achieved more than 95 percent of its overall
personnel target, but this figure is somewhat overstated since

the manning levels of some critical shipboard rates are only

56
about 80 percent. As a result, both maintenance and

operational proficiency have suffered. Shortages of fuel and

airspace for training have compounded the difficulties.

Asahi Evening News, November 8, 1 97 3 •

Figures cited by Kaihara Osamu, interview, March 24, 1974'
The manning level issue actually is quite complicated, involving
reserves, personnel away at schools or detached for new construc-
tion units, and many other factors. Moreover, it is a problem
faced by nearly all navies in one form or another. Nonetheless,
it has affected the MSDF's operational readiness.

218

Logistical

Despite the impressive hardware which the S elf-Defense
Forces operates, their logistics backup is woefully inadequate.
For instance, ASDF interceptors have as few as four anti-air
missiles per aircraft. The Ground Self Defense Forces have been
estimated to have only about 30 minutes of combat stores. The
MSDF surface-to-air missile inventory- consists of about 50
weapons — which can be expended at a rate of more than 10 per
minute. Moreover, there are few facilities in Japan capable of
producing relatively sophisticated ammunition. Most of the
missiles and artillery shells are supplied from the U.S.

It must be noted, however, that this has been the result
of a conscious decision on the part of SDF leaders. Since the
beginning of the defense build-up, the emphasis has been on long
lead-time items such as ships and aircraft. There would be
enough warning, it is argued, to upgrade the logistics structure
in the event of an increase in regional tensions or a divorce
from the United States. This approach has served Japan well to
date. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not the warning
time will be available, and whether or not her leaders will
respond to it in time.

""Mostly from Auer, op. cit., Chapter 14.

* A study of 20th century wars by the Australian Central
Studies Establishment concluded that the mean warning time has
been about four years, but that there have been large variances.
The Korean War, for instance, came with only about two days'

219

International Constraints

Among the international constraints on Japanese seapower
are the reactions of great powers and those of East Asian
developing countries. The Arab view also has become a consider-
ation since the oil crisis.

Great Power Reactions

Short of nuclearization it is difficult to see that the
United States would have any objection to an increased share of
the defense burden by Japan. The People's Republic of China,
which once accused the S elf-Defense Forces of being the reincar-
nation of Japanese militarism, now seems to view them as a
stabilizing force, so long as they remain within the framework
of the Security Treaty and confine themselves to local waters.
Within these limits, she probably would have little objection to
an expansion of Japanese naval forces. The Soviet Union is some-
thing of an enigma. In 1971 and 72 it was bitterly attacking,
along with the People's Republic, the prospect of renewed
Japanese militarism. These attacks abated dramatically in the
wake of the Nixon and Tanaka visits to Peking as Moscow sought
to improve relations with TokyC and attract capital for Siberian
development. Since increased Japanese naval power almost
certainly would be directed against the USSR in time of war,

notice to the West. Author's interview with CSE personnel,
June 20, 1974.

220

she probably would not encourage an SDF buildup. However, if
such a move were conducted in the framework of abolishing the
Security-Treaty and the establishment of an Asian collective
security system, it might be more welcome.

Developing Country Reactions

The results of the Southeast Asia interviews, noted in
Chapter Four, were not surprising. With the exception of Singa-
pore, which seeks security in a local balance between as many
great powers as possible, the reaction of observers in all
countries to a Japanese naval presence (even as part of a multi-
lateral force) was overwhelmingly negative. These _a priori
objections, however, do not imply an effective constraint.
Should Japan unilaterally decide to expand her naval forces, and
even the sphere of their employment, there would be very little
that they could do about it. In an actual engagement, however,
the SSMs of the coastal state patrol boats could be effective,
particularly since MSDF ships are mainly ASW configured.

Some Arab states have shown an interest in buying Japanese
weaponry, although they are not likely to get it. Japan's own
defense programs probably will have little influence on her
Middle East diplomacy so long as her forces remain outside of
the Indian Ocean.

221

Summary

The use of ship or aircraft rosters as measures of Japan's
military power and potential is misleading. For a host of
reasons the MSDF is truly a "Paper Tiger." Even should the
quantity and quality of its equipment expand markedly, the lack
of national inclination to use such force would undercut its
credibility, thus making attempts to use it even more dangerous.
Projections of Western naval forces being used in support of
diplomacy are difficult to extrapolate to present-day Japan.
Such leverage implies a linkage between military force, economic
power and political influence which is rarely voiced in TokyS.
In fact, the Japanese Government consistently has sought to
separate politics and economics in international negotiations.
This has brought her a number of spectacular successes, such as
the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking while
increasing her trade with Taiwan. It is not clear, however,
that this happy separation can be continued. Certainly it is
hard to insist that food and oil are not both political and
economic weapons.

The potential evolution of the above mentioned constraints
will be examined in the next chapter. For the present, however,
the political-economic dichotomy is incompatible with the active
use of seapower (or almost any power) to protect vital interests,
since nearly all of the interests which Japan perceives as vital
are economic.

Chapter Seven
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERESTS AND CONSTRAINTS

Intangible issues will be central to Japan's future mari-
time posture (indeed to her whole security problem). Among these
are (1) the possible emotional reaction to severe and prolonged
economic difficulties, (2) the development of a consensus con-
cerning Japan's future course, and (3) Japan's continued
acceptance of a passive international role. Her reactions to
the external environment also will be critical. This chapter
will examine some of the domestic and international changes which
may affect the acceptability and employment of the SDP in general
and the MSDF in particular in the next few years.

Domestic Issues

An Uncertain Future

So long as Japan's major political decisions involved the
domestic division of an ever-growing economic pie, there was
little incentive to change, or even to challenge the national
course. There were unwanted side effects to be sure. Worsening
pollution, urban overcrowding and a few clouds on the resource
horizon had been apparent since the late 1960s. Indeed, by 1971
or 72 there was widespread recognition that the economy would

222

223

have to be reoriented from unimpeded growth towards social

welfare goals. Though the two Nixon shocks had shown the rate

at which the world was changing, it always was felt that there
would be time enough to make the transition. This comfortable
vision was shattered in October 1973*

The Japanese overreacted to the oil embargo and later price
increases, as did most of the world. These sentiments moderated
once it was clear that the country would not grind to a halt for
lack of fuel or foreign currency. However, a more sober analysis
has revealed other serious, long-term weaknesses — notably a
combination of persistent inflation, a high debt- to- equity ratio
for most Japanese firms (which makes them vulnerable to inflation
countermeasures — even as they profited from the price rises

themselves), the disappearance of cheap energy and transportation

and an ever worsening pollution problem. These are coupled with

3
an industrial structure which limits conservation possibilities.

These difficulties are compounded by the weakened position of the

i
For instance, the 1971 report on "Trade and Industrial

Policies in the 1970s,*1 op_. cit. (note 5-68). It also is inter-
esting to compare the changing tone of Keidanren President Uemura
Kogoro's speeches as reprinted in Keidanren Review during this
period.

2
See Donald Keene, "The Short, Happy Life of Japan as a

Superpower," New York Times Magazine, March 3> 1 974» P» 19»

^Japan has resisted Secretary Kissinger's pressures for a
commitment to a Jilf/o energy consumption reduction on the grounds
that Japan's energy usage is much more industrial than America's,
thus there is less room for savings through consumer conservation
measures.

224

ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which will find it hard
to take the necessary strict, and thus unpopular, economic
measures.

In retrospect, the problems did not arise so suddenly.
Japanese prosperity, throughout the 1960s, had fed, indeed
thrived, on inflation. Thus, so long as real growth continued
at 9 to 11 percent per year, there was little incentive to con-
trol the inflation at an early stage. Even by early 1973, when
prices were rising at an annual rate of about 13 percent, no
effective measures were taken.

Japan also profited from the U.S. efforts in Korea and
Indochina, although they don't like to admit it. It is not yet
clear what impact the end of the Vietnam War and the U.S.
retrenchment will have on the future peace and stability of Asia.
It is fairly evident, however, that it already has resulted in a

The average annual increase of the consumer price index
in the late 1960s and early '70s was about Gfo. The real cost of
money thus was very cheap (a typical prime rate being around
7.5?°— NKIW, October 28, 1972).

5
See Bix, "The Security Treaty System and the Japanese

Military-Industrial Complex," op. cit. (note 6-27), pp. 49_50.

In 1950-53* U.S. special payments to Japan totalled #2, 374*000,

which was 50.3$ of her total exports for the same period. It

has been estimated that direct Vietnam procurement between 1965

and '67 was $450 million, and that indirect effects totalled

nearly a billion dollars, (indirect effects stem from exports

which satisfy war-generated excess demand either in the U.S. or

in Asia.) This figure Y/as supported by a Nihon Keizai estimate

that: "Realization of the peace in Vietnam is going to become a

factor in causing a maximum yearly deficit of around $1 billion

in Japan's balance of payments." (NKJW, November 21, 1973)* P» 2,

225

substantial financial loss to Japanese business. Farther
afield, the so-called North-South problem has been apparent ever
since the 1964 UNCTAD, if not before. The only really surprising
development was the ability of OAPEC to act in concert.

Whatever their origins, Japan's domestic weaknesses are
likely to be compounded by the international situation. There
are, for instance, signs that many countries may be adopting a
neo-mercantilist outlook in place of the free-trade liberalism
under which Japan has prospered. The most obvious effect is
resources nationalism, now finding its way to the industrialized
world as well.

Paradoxically, Japan's commitment to unrestricted trade
and inflation countermeasures may contribute to the world-wide
recession to which she is so vulnerable. Though her own 1974
export drive succeeded spectacularly in balancing the increased
costs of raw materials, it has accentuated the same problem in

The interpretation of this is left to the beholder. A
radical critique may point to the ties between Japan and American
imperialism. Others may see a welcome partnership in the pursuit
of common goals. Still others may visualize unwarranted Japanese
profits from the defense burdens of others. (A Republic of
China naval officer, who requested anonymity, made the last
observation in an interview, May 8, 1 974* ) In &h>r case, it is
an economic fact of life. Whether or not such monetary gains
alone would ensure Japan's support for future American military
activities is doubtful, especially if such actions might subject
her to resource cut-offs or terrorism. A billion dollars a
year, after all, is less than ,j/o of GNP or 2fo of 1974 exports.

226

many other countries. In the long run, this will be counter-
productive since it eventually will reduce the demand for
exports itself, or even stimulate trade barriers. By the same
token, the domestic success of Japanese inflation countermeasures
also will aggravate the balance of payments problems of those
countries which will be drawn to import from her.

The point is that Japan has become too important to the
world's economy to allow her the luxury of unilateral measures,
vulnerable though she may be in many ways. While she has no
organization like the EEC to support her in times of stress,
neither does she have such a body to encourage cooperative
solutions. It would indeed be ironic if Japan's success at, and
continued commitment to free trade once again brought her out of
phase with her times, just as her imperialism was anachronistic
in the 1930s and her isolation had grown untenable by the mid-
nineteenth century.

Signs which point to domestic disharmony and a lack of

This is a criticism of degree rather than of kind. Japan

must export to survive. She also had to cope with a massive
increase in oil payments. Thus a move to expand exports was
understandable. The problem has stemmed from the decision to
promote exports at the maximum possible level, rather than to
accept a more moderate income (and possible payments deficit of
her own) in consideration of the problems of her trading partners
Japan, of course, can legitimately complain that her diligence
and talent should not be penalized by the lack of others'
competitiveness, but the problem remains nonetheless.

Takane Masaaki, "Historical Structure of Japanese
Bureaucracy — Bureaucracy and Modernization in Japan," Chuo Koron,
September 1 974* Translation in Magazine Summary, October 1974*

227

self-discipline and group identity among the young are on a

different plane. Should these predictions be realized, they
would undermine the very conditions which lay at the heart of
the post-war prosperity. Another possibly significant develop-
ment is the growth of citizens' groups, which have especially
centered on environmental issues. Their importance lies in
the complications which they have introduced into regional
development and nuclear power plant plans.

Given any sort of direction, the inherent talent, loyalty
and homogeneity of the Japanese people will enable them to
succeed wherever they are led. It is this problem of leadership,
however, which is critical. There virtually is no group in
Tokyo now capable of innovative political guidance. This is not
a problem unique to Japan, but it may be more critical for her
than for some other industrialized states because of her
vulnerabi 1 i ty .

The LDP has been losing votes for years. The July 1974
elections were indicative of voter dissatisfaction, which only
was compounded by the personal scandals which later surrounded

9Morita Akira (President of Sony) in NKT.7, May 28, 1974.
Also, Prime Minister's Office, 1974 Y/hite Paper on Youths.
Reported in MM, December 7» 1974*

1 0

Some have argued that these were spawned by weaknesses

in the policy-making process and can be expected to increase in

the future. See B. L. Simcock, "Environmental Pollution and the

Citizen's Movements," Area Development in Japan _£ (T5ky3, 1972).

228

Prime Minister Tanaka. Whether or not future Prime Ministers
can regain public confidence remains to be seen. But their
success will depend on factors largely beyond their own control,
such as the health of the U.S. economy and the cooperation of
other faction leaders (who are also potential successors).

One solution might be some sort of party realignment to
permit the continuation of conservative government. Coalitions
among the present parties are possible, but probably would be
unstable. Though a revitalization of the LDP is doubtful without
sweeping (and improbable) leadership changes, neither is any
opposition party considered able to win a majority of its own.
At the same time, the latter seem totally incapable of acting in
concert. Thus several years of domestic political uncertainty
may result. Under these circumstances, the possibility of a
more authoritarian government must at least be considered. This

requires some explanation.

Consensus is important to nearly all Japanese evolutions.

The formation of such an outlook rarely is very rapid. In
general, it is an incremental process, almost imperceptible at
each step, but suddenly evident after seemingly endless wrangling
(or drifting, since important parts of the sequence often are
conducted out of the public view). In many cases, preparations
will have been made for a number of contingencies while awaiting

11See Nakane Chie, Japanese Society (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1972).

229

clarification of the situation. Once an appropriate policy

becomes apparent, control devolves to the group or faction best

1 2

suited to the circumstances, which then acts quickly. This is

one reason why Japanese policy sometimes seems prone to radical
shifts of direction. Such a consensus is not equivalent to
unanimous support, but it does mean that the views of all groups
at least have been considered.

In any case, the success of Japanese business and the LDP
(and conversely the failure of the opposition) has been the
ability to achieve inter- group coordination. This was not very
difficult when the parties concerned were competing for relatively
larger or smaller shares of an expanding economy. Today, however,
some vested interests are faced with the spectre of absolute
losses. Under such circumstances, the very group-orientation
which has been the strength of Japan's post-war recovery could
become a detriment should intra-organizational loyalty preclude
inter-organizational cooperation. This is especially true within
the bureaucracy.

This approach also is the key to Japanese business

practices. These usually are low-risk strategies, often pre-
ferring to pay additional money for foreign patents or to invest
in joint ventures rather than pioneer in new areas. The ocean
mining field, to be examined later, is a classic example.

1 5

^For instance, the i960 opposition to the Security Treaty

was directed more against Prime Minister Kishi's strong-arm tac-
tics in obtaining Diet approval than against the alliance itself.

^Takane, op. cit. This condition apparently prevailed in
the preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference negotiations.

230

Thus, although charismatic leadership rarely has been a
feature of Japanese politics, some sort of Oyabun (chief or boss)
may be needed to resolve conflicting interests. Without it,
extended delay, or even paralysis on important issues is possible,
indeed probable. That such circumstances might lead to an
authoritarian government is by no means certain. Indeed, it is
less likely than a party reshuffling, but it cannot be ruled out.
The prospects for renewed Japanese militarism, however, are
virtually nil. These will be noted in the next section.

Given these conditions, the Japanese are not optimistic
about the future. In a recent survey, a group of academic
experts was asked: "What image do you have about the Japanese
society in the latter half of the 1970s?" The answers, in order

of frequency, were: "upheaval, instability, disaster, crisis,

disruption and dispute."

In many respects, logic would so indicate. But Japan con-
sistently has shown herself more resilient and adaptable than
would seem possible on the basis of tangible assets alone. In
any struggle for economic survival, a nation's fate vri.ll hinge
on the performance of her average citizens, plus the resources
and the productive capacity available to them. Japan surely
excels in the first and third areas just as she is weak in the
second. Even under rampant nationalism, however, there will be
those who must sell their raw materials to survive. In such a
cutthroat scramble for resources, Japan's capital and intellectual

15NKJW, July 30, 1974.

231

stocks certainly can be traded for enough of a supply to ensure
a decent (if unspectacular) living for her people. In fact, the
pollution generated by continued production is likely to be more
of a threat than the curtailment of that production by external
factors.

The days of dramatic growth may be over, but Japan will
remain one of the world's major reservoirs of industrial
potential and technological skills. As such, she will continue
to have a significant influence on the global economy.

Japanese Militarism

Militarism is defined as:

Predominance of the military class or prevalence
of their ideals; subordination of the civil ideals

1 fc\

Kenneth R. Stunkel and John Copper argue persuasively in

a forthcoming book (Economic Superpowers and the Environment)
that Japan's industrialization alreaay has brought her to the
brink of irreversible environmental damage. Moreover, although
lip service is paid to emission control laws, conservation and
the need to clean up coastal waters, neither government nor
business has really recognized the magnitude of the problem. For
instance, the MITI plan noted earlier (note 5_70) has been criti-
cized for predicting 6-7 percent growth on the grounds of resource
unavailability. Stunkel suggests that the target of such growth
itself is out of touch with reality. No thought, apparently, has
been given to the impact of burning or refining 4,000,000,000
kiloliters of oil in Japan's already marginal atmosphere over the
next ten years. (This is, it should be noted, nearly two and a
half times the amount consumed in the quarter- century between
1947 and 1972.) Similarly, even the maintenance of present
levels of production may lead to major shortages of fresh water,
the disappearance of many fish from adjacent waters and reduced
agriculture. No doubt the Japanese would endure these hardships
stoically, but that is not equivalent to finding a solution for
them.

232

or policies of a government to the military; the
spirit which exalts military virtues and ideals;
the policy of aggressive military preparedness.

Webster's New International Dictionary — 2nd ed.

Warnings of the revival of Japanese militarism were heard

frequently in the early 1970s. ' Even moderate analysts argued

that the self-confidence bred of the post-war recovery and a

desire to play a political role commensurate with her economic

1 ft

power would lead Japan to a larger military commitment. Now,

with the limits to growth apparent, new warnings have arisen.

Bix, "Report on Japan 1972," part I, _op_. cit. (note 6-1),

saw Japan's conservative leadership pushing for a revision of the
Constitution and other changes which, if accomplished, would mean
that: "... the internal position and status of both military
and emperor in Japanese life are sure to be greatly enhanced . . .'
(p« 29). Axelbank, o_p_. cit. (note 6-27), was concerned that a
combination of industrialists, former Imperial Army and Navy
officers and right wing politicians were "vigorously backing
stepped-up rearmament" (p. 25) while "the people are showing in-
creasing apathy towards politics . . ." (p. 21). Other revision-
ist writings raised similar critiques. The last major attack in
the Chinese press was in September 1971 (Peking Review, September
17 and 24). See also James Reston's interview with Chou En-lai,
New York Times, August 10, 1971. In late 1972, however, Chou
reportedly told Prime Minister Tanaka that he "welcomed a 'reason-
able growth' of Japanese strength as a potential counterweight
to the Soviet Union's 'aggressive designs' in Asia." (New York
Times, December 13, 1972). The Soviet Press, whose view of
"reviving militarism" also seemed to depend on the broader state
of Moscow-Tokyo" relations, launched several attacks in January
1973, but has been quiet since. See Angus M. Praser, "Some
Thoughts of the Resurgence of Militarism in Japan," Pacific
Community (April 1 973) > PP» 437-451 •

1 fi

Herman Kahn, for instance, wrote: "I do not suggest

that Japan in the year 2000 will aspire to the role of world

policeman, at least not by itself. But the Japanese may well

wish — indeed feel obliged because of their pervasive worldwide

interests and capabilities — to take part in such a role . • ."

(p. 8).

235

It is said that the desperation borne of a coming economic crisis

may stimulate nationalism, an authoritarian government, nucleari-

zation, and a militarist foreign policy. Japan, it seems, is

forever suspect.

The possibility of a more authoritarian government was
admitted earlier in this chapter. Most emphatically, however,
this would not be equivalent to militarism in the pre-war sense.
Whatever similarities the international system may come to have
to the 1930s, Japan's domestic circumstances are sufficiently
different to invalidate the analogy.

For instance, (1) there is no divine symbol which radical
groups could use for leverage to control the government as the
Imperial Army and Navy once did. (2) No longer is the public
dazzled by the victories of 1895 and 1905* Indeed, the defeat
in 1945 thoroughly discredited the military in most people's
eyes. (3) Today's politicians, whatever their faults, are much

better educated and more experienced than were their 1930s

20
counterparts. At the same time, the SDF do not attract the

cream of Japan's youth as the Imperial armed forces did before

the war. (4) The principle of civilian control of the military

%iaxtin Weinstein, "Japan's Foreign Policy Options in the
Coming Decade." Paper prepared in September 1973 for a. forth-
coming book entitled Japan's Coming Decade, edited by Hugh
Patrick and Lewis Austin.

See Takane, op. cit. (note 7-8).

234

is firmly established. The Prime Minister also is in a much

stronger position with respect to his cabinet than in pre-war
days. The Defense Agency, on the other hand, is not even a
ministry. Finally, (5) the perceived gains of military action
have been much reduced. In the first place, the basic justifi-
cation for colonial wars has vanished. In the second, Japan's
economy has outgrown regional self-sufficiency. The prospect of
a self-contained Co-Prosperity Sphere at least had popular credi-
bility, whatever the realities might have been. In any present
or future international environment, from super-power condominium

to anarchy, Japan's use of military force to secure even a

fraction of the resources she requires is an impossibility.

As one writer has noted, in a slightly different context,

any clandestine planning to undermine this arrangement almost
certainly would bring forth an "Ellsberg-san" to leak the story.
See Monte R. Bullard, "Japan's Nuclear Choice," Asian Survey,
XIV (September 1974) » P« 852. An example of the outcry stirred
by a relatively innocuous contingency plan in the mid-1960s is
given in Matsueda Tsukasa and George Moore, "Japan's Shifting
Attitudes Towards the Military: Mitsuya Kenkyu and the S elf-
Defense Forces," Asian Survey, VIII (September 1965)1 PP» 61 4-625.

This would be true even if other powers acted successfully

to gain access to raw materials elsewhere. Japan's only options
would be Southeast Asia, Korea, and perhaps Taiwan, which could
not possibly make her self-sufficient. This is illustrated by
the following data.

Total Japanese

Material Production (A) Demand (B) A/B (1972 data)

Petroleum (m/t) 67,354,000 249,193,000 .27

Iron Ore (M/T) 1,969,000 111,521,000 .02

Coal (M/T) 12,621,000 49,280,000 .26

Wheat (M/T) 322,000 5,148,282 .06

Source: (A) 0"N Statistical Yearbook 1973* Korea, Taiwan, South-
east Asia
(B) Finance Ministry

2J5

Analogies to the 1930s thus have been discounted on five

grounds. ' The third and fourth conditions may change. Indeed,

one potential problem of Japanese politics is that it might be
difficult to contain, quickly, a regime which was prepared to
disregard minority party and media opposition in the conduct of
its programs. However, the first condition noted above would
prevent the cloaking of consistently unsuccessful policies in
Imperial protection. Some may long for a return to pre-war
spirituality and frugality. Others may wish for increased
defense spending. Except for a few extremists, however, there
is no support for the dominance of military values. At the same
time, the physical limits of the utility of Japan's use of force
will preclude jingoist adventurism.

Charges of militarism will persist, however. They are too
useful a political tool for the opposition. In fact, this
equation of legitimate self-defense concerns with militarism has
been one of the main reasons for the lack of a meaningful debate
on security policy in Japan. The same is true for nuclear
questions.

^For some additional reasons, see Richard Ellingworth,
Japanese Economic Policies and Security, Adelphi Paper No. 90
(London: IISS, 1972).

lJakane Chie has voiced concern that the single-minded
dedication of the Japanese once their goal is defined could be
dangerous if the wrong ideal were chosen. See Y/akaizumi Kei,
"Japan's Dilemma: To Act or Not to Act," Foreign Policy, 16
(Fall 1974), PP. 30-47.

236

The Quest for a Satisfying World Role

Since 1945> Japan's international political role has been
relatively passive. Her economic strategies have been reactive,
but also highly nationalist.

Quite apart from the militarism issue, it is possible that
Japan might try to influence external events more actively in
the future. There is no doubt that she would appreciate more
international recognition. But how far she will go in seeking
the associated commitments, or even accepting those now avail-
able (such as UK peace-keeping assignments), remains to be seen.

The key question is whether or not Japan can find a place
for herself which is emotionally satisfying without being
expansive. It is not clear that she can. On the other hand,
it does not necessarily follow that dissatisfaction will lead to
expansion, at least in the near term. In the first place, so
long as the Japanese are undecided about their own self-image,
they probably will not try to impose it on others. Should they
again succeed in some national achievement which could be the
object of collective pride, such as the Meiji modernization or
the post-war economic miracle, it might be tempting to hold it
up as a model. The establishment of a stable, welfare-oriented,
low-waste society might be such an example, but its fulfillment
seems years away.

In the second, if Japan's economy really is endangered,
the excess energy (physical or mental) available for non-essential

237

foreign policy projects will be marginal. * A diminished
emphasis on the separation of politics and economics, and increased
commitments to international cooperative plans might give the
appearance of an expanded political role. Such moves, however,
could he understood better as new strategies for the economy's
maintenance than as a fundamental redefinition of international
responsibilities.

Finally, the characterization of even Japan's current role
as "passive" is misleading. It is true that it is reactive in
the sense that the major initiatives usually are left to others.
But it also is highly opportunistic, self-serving, and fast-paced.
The diversification of resource suppliers, strategies to cope
with nationalizations and trade barriers, and steps to reduce
vulnerabilities to third party actions are challenging, time

It might, of course, be tempting to resort to the ploy

of foreign distractions to domestic problems. 77ere strikes,

riots, or terrorist activities to proliferate, for instance,

externally- sponsored subversion always could be blamed. But this

is not the same as embarking on foreign ventures oneself.

2£>

There is a strong possibility, however, that economic

activities will be more formally related to security. For
instance, aid to developing countries may come to be considered
as non-military defense spending. (Shinohara Hiroshi, interview,
December 9» 1 974* This also v/as suggested by Ellingworth, op.
cit. , p. 31 •) Additional developments eventually might include
arms sales or much harder positions on lav/ of the sea issues,
but would exclude almost any attempts by Japan to forcibly coerce
other states. As has been argued throughout this paper, the
ability of naval vessels to exercise such suasion is declining,
while the introduction of ground troops is out of the question.
A nuclear decision might further Japan's general bargaining
position, but she would be limited in her ability to use it out-
side of a deterrent role.

238

consuming, ever-changing, and vitally important. While they may
have had a one- dimensional economic aura in the past, they
certainly will become multi- faceted in the future. Should the
security ties with the U.S. loosen, the additional burden of
balancing her position among the nuclear powers would be added.
In sum, Japan's weaknesses require, and will continue to
require, continuous foreign policy adjustments. Even with the
constant factor of the U.S. military relationship, a successful
course amidst these often-conflicting pressures is a noteworthy
achievement, though it could be better presented to the public
as such. Should a neutralist option be chosen, she will not be
permitted the luxury of a Swiss or Swedish-style aloofness from
international entanglements, especially since economics has been
elevated to the status of "high politics." Her dilemma is not
between international ties or their absence, but rather how to
balance the conflicting demands of multiple linkages. Indeed,
the problems of Singapore's survival might be a better analogy
than Switzerland's perpetual neutrality or Sweden's non-alignment.
In time, perhaps, Japan might acquire a reputation for imparti-
ality which would insulate her from some of these challenges,
but it certainly will not be within the time frame of this study.

External Changes

The People ' s Republic of China

Predictions regarding post-Maoist China seem to lie more
in the realm of astrology than political science. Some

239

alternatives, however, include (1) a general continuation of
present trends, (2) rapprochement with the USSR, (3) a more
belligerent China or (4) a fragmentation of the nation in the
course of a power struggle.

It seems evident that the present situation maximizes
Japan's flexibility. A tri-lateral structure in the Northwest
Pacific offers opportunities for approaching both the PRG and the
Soviet Union while reducing her dependence on the United States.
The easing of tensions also encourages trade relationships and
eases the pressures for defense spending. Washington's recog-
nition of Peking would further institutionalize these develop-
ments although it could have unpleasant aftereffects if China
then chose to strike against Taiwan.

Much of this flexibility would be lost should the Sine—
Soviet dispute be resolved. In this event, Japan might feel the
need to increase her own defense effort, but she also would
almost certainly be driven back towards the United States.

Similarly, if China became more belligerent, either towards
the U.S. or her neighbors, there would be strong pressures for a
larger Japanese security role. An armed PRC attack on Taiwan,
though less inflamatory than it once might have been, would
reverse the relaxation of tensions in the region, at least
temporarily. To succeed, China also would have to demonstrate
a quantum jump in amphibious or airborne capability which Japan
might find disquieting. Certainly it would change the balance

240

of power in the Senkakus and western Ryukyus. A PRC naval build-
up could be another justification for enlarging the MSDF. At
the same time, unless the U.S. showed complete indifference,
Japan probably would prefer to restrengthen the bi-lateral ties
rather than face the People's Republic alone. It is possible,
of course, that Peking could try to force Tokyo to chose between
itself and Washington. It even is possible that this might suc-
ceed if coordinated with some of the U.S. -Japan strains noted
earlier. However, the initiative in such circumstances would
remain with Washington, which could maintain the ties if it were
willing to make the effort. This gambit also would threaten
China with isolation against both the West and the Soviets.

The fourth choice, a fragmented China, would have world-
wide implications. The key question for Japan is whether the
return to bipolarity in the Northwest Pacific would push her back
to the U.S. alliance or whether she would be drawn into the
vacuum herself. The only real benefit of the latter course for
Japan would be psychological. It is by no means certain, however,

In the face of competing demands by the nuclear program,

a 3 million man army, and an air force and riverine force for the
northern border, the "blue water" component of China's navy has
done well just to survive. Nevertheless, reports persist in the
Western press and technical literature suggesting that the PRC
navy may soon try to spread its influence farther afield.
Missile destroyers have been built, but there is little that
could operate beyond the range of fighter cover. In any case,
even if such a decision were made soon, the time lags involved
in the intelligence evaluation, decision-making and ship con-
'stfuction would put it well into the 1980s before a PRC build-up
was reflected in 13SDF force levels.

241

that she could take China's place even if she wanted to. At the
heart of the PRC's credibility as a major power is her ability
both to absorb a nuclear strike and to swallow an invading army.
Japan can do neither, and her leaders know it very well.

One probable consequence of a sharp decline in Chinese
influence would be a stronger Japanese position towards Taiwan
and Korea. This would be especially true in the case of seabed
resource disputes. However, the relative increase in Soviet
power would make the U.S. security ties more attractive. In
turn, this would restrict Japan's freedom of action in Southeast
Asia. Even if she were tempted to overlook her own weaknesses
and play a larger role in the Northwest Pacific, she would be
limited farther south to those efforts which did not threaten
America's growing economic presence there.

In sum, events in China will be keenly felt in Japan. It
is possible that these would spur an expansion of the SDF, or a
less conciliatory posture towards her immediate neighbors. But
unless Washington were to cut her off completely, Japan would
not become significantly more activist in the region as a whole.

The Soviet Union

The future course of the USSR is relatively more predictable
than China's. A continued policy of detente on the one hand and
friendship and economic cooperation with Japan on the other would
facilitate Tokyo's equidistant diplomacy. But the replacement of
the Security Treaty with a Moscow-oriented pact is inconceivable

242

in the near future. At the same time, Japan's development of
Soviet resources will be carefully designed to increase her own
flexibility, not simply to substitute one potential source of
blackmail for another.

The completion of the second Trans-Siberian rail line in
the early 1980s will increase Russia's military potential in the
Far East. Without a complete abdication by the U.S., however,
any hint of its use would only drive Japan closer to Washington
again. The same probably would be true for a general breakdown
in detente.

The United States

The U.S. and Japan may drift apart if the axis of confron-
tation continues to shift from East-West to North-South problems.
In case of renewed tensions in the Northwest Pacific, America's
reaction will be the key to Japan's response. Neither the Soviet
Union nor China would be able to keep her from returning to the
West unless the U.S. turned away.

In the meantime, though both Washington and Tokyo may want
to retain some tangible evidence of the U.S. commitment, budgetary

and balance of payments constraints could restrict the basing of

2ft
American units in Japan before too long. In turn, this might

provide the occasion for a reevaluation of the Security Treaty

One estimate of the U.S. base costs is ¥200 billion

(about $670 million) annually. Cited by Taoka Shunji, December
30, 1974.

243

system. A total abolition of security ties would not be in the
interests of either side, but some sort of redefinition will be
almost inevitable.

Such a shift, by itself, probably would not lead to more
emphasis on the SDF, but it could in some areas. Particularly
in the logistics field, the more distant the U.S. re-supply
forces, the larger the domestic capacity would have to be.
Without an increase in tensions, however, few changes would be
demanded. Some additional funds might be appropriated as a
symbol of resolve, but the unit costs of new construction are so
high as to preclude a major expansion of forces without a drastic
change in priorities. If anything, it would be the non-SDF com-
ponent of security spending which probably would be increased.

It is, of course, theoretically possible that an increase
in tension might be accompanied by American indifference.
Japan's options in such a case would be three-fold: accommoda-
tion, an attempt to establish her neutrality, or expansion of
the SDF, with a possible re-definition of their roles. A priori
it is difficult to predict which course she would follow. A
combination of neutrality and enhanced self-defense might be
ideal, but the choices would depend greatly on the state of the
Sino-Soviet balance at the time. The likelihood of such an
abandonment seems remote, however. In Robert Osgood's words:

. . . There is no American interest in Asia that
does not depend on America's central interest in

244

maintaining the vitality of its alliance with
Japan . . .29

Other States

It has been argued earlier that the opinions of Southeast
Asian states would not really be a constraint if Japan saw her
basic interests threatened. Whether or not they could be a
determinant of MSDF deployments i3 another question. Disturbances
in Indonesian waters might threaten the crucial tanker routes.
This certainly would produce calls for protection of the ships, but
it will be shown later that no amount of harassment could cause
enough economic harm to offset the costs of deployments. More-
over, it already has been argued that naval vessels alone are
unlikely to quell such disturbances, and it is very doubtful if
anyone would be willing to commit any of the other Self-Defense
Forces to such work. Finally, given the lack of logistics sup-
port, it is not clear that the MSDF ships could operate that far

from home. Nevertheless, the psychology of the issue is such

30
that it might stimulate a few token deployments.

^Robert Osgood, The Weary and the Wary (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 91*

* Donald C. Hellmann, in Japan and East Asia (New York:
Praeger, 19?2), argues that the web of economic ties linking
Japan to East Asia (including Southeast Asia) inevitably will
draw her into regional politics ". . .in ways that ultimately
will require a new and expanded security policy." (p. 169).
This may well be true eventually, but in part it is predicated
on continued rapid economic expansion which seems at best to
have been delayed.

245

Changes and Continuities in Maritime Affairs

Although these arguments mostly seem to point to a mainte-
nance of the status quo, this is by no means the case. Japan
will continue to act to maximize her flexibility. Her nuclear
power programs; shipbuilding, electronics and aircraft industries;
and scientific rocket development have given her the basis of a
nuclear option should she so choose. The Security Treaty System
has enabled her to concentrate on economic growth for over
twenty years. Even the SDF reflect this propensity for flexi-
bility since their force structures, for the MSDF and ASDP at
least, consistently have stressed future potential at the expense
of current capability. Similarly, the whole thrust of resources
diplomacy is directed to the maximization of alternatives.

This stylistic continuity, however, may encompass major
substantive changes. For instance, new resource finds, techno-
logical breakthroughs, local wars, nationalizations or other
discontinuities may alter the relative importance of raw
materials suppliers. (U.S. and European markets, however,
almost certainly will remain central to Japan's trade.)
Increased contacts with the socialist countries may have far-

J Whether or not this was the result of a deliberate

decision in 1947, as Weinstein argues, or through the lack of
one, as advocated by Auer, does not alter the result.

52See Auer, op_. cit. (note 5-34), P« 145, and Hughes, op_.
cit. (note 5-34), P» 338.

246

reaching consequences as the PRC and USSR enter into economic
competition and interdependence with the capitalist world. Such
topics quickly will lead too far afield for this study. One
area which can be investigated, however, concerns extended
claims to ocean jurisdiction.

A Twelve Mile Territorial Sea

Having agreed in principle to a universal twelve mile

limit, Japan will extend her own three mile territorial sea

before very long. Aside from the fact that the area to be
defended has been increased severalfold, the shift will bring
the Tsugaru Strait (between Honshu and Hokkaido) completely with-
in Japanese jurisdiction. This poses two problems.

The first is whether or not the strait should be governed
by a regime of free transit, or one of innocent passage. The
latter, it is argued (usually by defense personnel), is more
appropriate on national security grounds because of the limita-
tions which it would pose on Soviet naval and air operations
(see Chapter Three). The mobility of U.S. forces would not be

^Tokyo Shimbun, April 23, 1974-

^From 58,650 sq. km. to over 240,000 oq. km. 3-mile data
from U.S. Department of State, Office of the Geographer. 12-mile
figure estimated from linear extensions (4x) in some areas plus
greater enlargements (up to 16x) around outlying islands.

^The Eastern Tsushima Strait (between Iki Island and
Shimonoshima) is 25 miles wide and thus there still will be a
mile-wide corridor of the high seas in the center. The Soya
Strait (between Hokkaido and Sakhalin) is less than 24 miles,

247

affected by virtue of bilateral agreements. Opponents of this
position point to Japan's call for free transit (at least for
surface ships) in all other straits, and the difficulty (and

danger) of doing anything about Soviet submarines and aircraft

if they did not comply with innocent passage provisions. It

seems likely that a regime of free transit eventually will be
decided on for the Tsugaru Strait.

The second problem involves Japan's three non-nuclear
principles. A warship carrying nuclear weapons in territorial
waters presumably would violate the restrictions on the importa-
tion of such devices. However, if Tsugaru Strait traffic is not
to be restricted, some compromise must be made on the principles
themselves.

By rights, the broadened territorial sea should justify
some increased expenditures for its protection, at least for

but lies partly within Soviet jurisdiction. The Western side of
the Tsushima Strait is 23 miles wide and would be overlapped by
Japan and South Korea.

J Yomiuri, August 3, 1974*

^'In the event of hostilities, Japan would have an obliga-
tion as a neutral power to ensure that belligerent warships did
not violate her waters. Norway's failure to enforce such rights
led in part to the Altmark affair, while Uruguay's insistence
on them resulted in the scuttling of the pocket battleship Graf
Spec. Whether or not Japan would choose the latter course and
risk Soviet wrath remains to be seen.

58See Mainichi, August 8, 1974- The three principles are
that Japan will not possess, produce, or permit the introduction
of nuclear weapons into her territory.

248

improved surveillance systems and patrol craft. It probably will
not, however. In any case, the additional requirements of the
territorial sea will pale before the demands of the 200 mile
economic zone (see below). The nuclear weapons question does not
affect the MSDF directly, but any devaluation of the three non-
nuclear principles (some now are calling them the 2.5 principles)
may simplify future changes in attitude.

200 Mile Economic Zone

Although Japan consistently has opposed the 200 mile con-
cept, it is almost inevitable that she will follow world trends
and declare one herself. The complications introduced by a pro-
liferation of strictly 200 mile claims in the Northwest Pacific
would be formidable, as shown in Figure '/-1 . Under any set of
baselines, Japan will have oceanic borders with The Philippines,
Taiwan, the People's Republic, South Korea, North Korea and the
USSR. If the Northern Marianas become an American territory,
she will add a boundary with the U.S. as well. Moreover, 80
percent of Japan's distant-water fish catch (40 percent of her
total yield) would be within the zones of Canada, the U.S., the
USSR and the PRC .

To these issues also must be added the difficult problems
of the Senkaku islands ownership, whether or not various rocks
and islets can be used for baseline measurements, the use of
median lines or continental shelf geomorphology as the basis for
delimitation and the status of the Soviet-occupied northern

249

=^_r&.\..0-r=

250

islands as the source of a 200 mile claim. The four hatched
(disputed) regions on Figure 7-1 total over 340,000 square kilo-
meters, more than 90 percent of Japan's land area. Figure 7-2
illustrates the unresolved boundaries on the East China and
Yellow Sea shelves. Because of overlaps, these ocean issues
also are tied to the hostilities between Taiwan and the PRC and

between North and South Korea. There is not space to examine

these arguments in detail, but a greatly increased potential

for disagreement certainly will exist when the zones are
designated.

It is this development (if any will) which may bring the

greatest changes for the MSDF and, perhaps, for the ASDF as well.

The requirements for enforcing one's jurisdiction in a 200-mile

economic zone are much more complicated than in a twelve-mile

territorial sea. Not only is the area covered much larger,

but existing radars also inadequate for monitoring even 20 or 30
miles off the coast. Besides providing issues in which the MSDF
might get involved, the zone also will require more LISA patrol
craft.

Though officials recognize that Japan would be better off
in a free trade environment, the economic zone could come to have

^See park Choon Ho, "Oil Under Troubled Waters: The
Northeast Asia Seabed Controversy," Harvard International Law
Journal, XIV (Spring 1973), PP» 212-260.

4°3, 862, 000 sq. km. vs. about 240,000 sq. km.

251

Figure 7-2

This dormant 11 lor backa'ound Ml ond del noi

Disputed Seabed Areas on the East China and Yellow
Sea Continental Shelf

252

great popular appeal. After all, the area of a 200-mile claim
would be more than ten times the present area of a country which
always has been concerned about its lack of space.

It is too early to tell whether or not zone-related dis-
agreements will be resolved by means other than diplomacy. While
no formal protest was made, the 1974 Chinese action in the
Paracels caused private concern within the Gaimusho. Had China
extended her reach to the Spratlies, fears of a similar gesture
in the East China Sea disputes (notably the Senkakus) would have
been intensified. For the moment, however, the Senkaku issue

A 0

officially has been shelved between Tokyo and Peking.

All these disputes, of course, will be submerged in the
larger framework of Japanese diplomacy. As rich as the East
China Sea continental shelf may be, it has been less important
so far than improved ties with the People's Republic. By the
same token, the emotional Northern Islands issue has not pre-
vented a v/arming of relations with Moscow. Resentment over ever-
more-severe fishing limitations by the U.S., Canada and the
Soviet Union also has been kept in perspective. In the future,

/•1
f See Jay H. Long, "The Paracels Incident: Implications

for Chinese Policy," Asian Affairs, 4 (l.larch/ April 1 974) » PP»

229-239.

Agence Prance Presse reported (October 1, 1972) that
Chou En-lai had dismissed them as "a few fly-specks on a map"
during his meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka.

A 1968 ECAFE survey pronounced it as potentially "one of
the most prolific oil reserves in the world." See Park, p. 213.

253

it is probable that Japan will intensively develop the resources
in her own area and avoid issues provocative to the superpowers.
Whether or not she will be so deferential to Korea, Taiwan or
the Philippines is questionable.

Oceanic States and the "World Lake"

Figure 7~3 is a reproduction of part of a State Department
chart showing the area under Japan's jurisdiction should the
seas be entirely divided on the basis of median lines. Even
before this ultimate erosion of the high seas was reached, how-
ever, extensions of national ocean claims would create a group
of geographically advantaged states with control over especially
large areas of the seas. Malta's Ambassador Pardo has termed
these Oceanic States, and has suggested that they may come to

have a considerable community of interest linking otherwise

disparate stages of economic development or social systems.

This may v/ell be the case in the future, but even if such a
division could be arranged in the period of this study, it will
be many more years before Japan is likely to forge major diplo-
matic ties based on ocean interests alone. In the Northwest
Pacific, such an area would not add many more problems than the

^^U.S. Department of State, Office of the Geographer,
"World Lake" Chart.

^Some of the more prominent are: The U.S., the USSR,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Britain and France (by virtue of
distant islands), Chile, Mexico and Brazil. Japan ranks approxi-
mately 10th in ocean area under such a regime.

254

Figure 7~3

Office of the Geographer
U.S. Department of State

JAPAN'S SHARE OP A PARTITIONED OCEAN

255

200 mile zone, though Japanese fishermen would suffer.

Summary

There is no compelling evidence to support forecasts of a
major change in the domestic political constraints on the MSDF
during the next five years or so. Beyond that there is more un-
certainty, but little indication of what the SDF might be used
for even if they were unrestricted. Even were commitments to be
made to UN peacekeeping forces, the budgetary limits show no
signs of relaxation. Indeed, the multi-nationalization of
Japanese shipping (along with that of most other nations) may
reduce support for the MSDF's merchant marine protection even
further. In a severe recession, some defense construction
might be used for pump-priming, but this probably would not be
significant. If the decision were taken to permit foreign arms
sales, the lowered costs from longer production runs might ease
some SDF procurement problems but, again, its influence would be
marginal. A U.S. pullback probably would dictate a logistical
strengthening, and perhaps some increased appropriations. But
there are no signs that the MSDF would be used to fill part of
the vacuum. If any stimulus does arise for an increase in LISDF

Of course, the reverse argument also could be made,
namely that since Japan could only count on her own dwindling
number of ships in time of emergency, she could not afford to
suffer heavy losses and thus should increase her sealane defense
capabilities. Nonetheless, bureaucratic and political consider-
ations make it doubtful that this view would prevail.

256

capabilities, short of a drastic change in the international
situation, it may be from ocean resource zone extensions.

The hypothesis that emotionally-based demand for a larger
world role will spur a defense build-up also is tenuous. Unless
an immediate threat arises in the Northwest Pacific, diplomacy
will continue to be the focal point of Japan's security measures,

PART III

THE SEA AND JAPAN'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Chapter Eight .
Chapter Nine
Chapter Ten

Introduction

. The Military Dimension - Part I:
Global and Regional Interests

. The Military Dimension - Part II:

The Local Balance and Other Considerations

. The Non-Military Dimensions of Japanese
Seapower

THE SEA AND JAPAN'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS
Introduction

The relationship between seapower and Japan's strategic
interests can be approached in at least two ways. The first is
the concept that Japanese security depends on a stable balance
of power on three levels — global, regional and local. The second
is keyed to the versatility of naval forces in meeting or deter-
ring a variety of threats, and to the potential for leverage
inherent in non-military ocean activities. The distinction also
must be made between actions designed to exert pressures on
other states, and those meant to reduce one's own vulnerabilities
to such pressures.

This section will consider some ways in which Japan can use
the seas to promote or protect the interests outlined in Chapter
Five. The general roles which the MSDF can play on each of the
three levels will be examined, followed by more specific discus-
sions of force mixes. The constraints and their evolution out-
lined in the previous chapter will be considered to apply, but
sometimes will be relaxed for the sake of argument. A final
chapter will be devoted to Japan's commercial seapower.

258

Chapter Eight

THE MILITARY DIMENSION - PART I
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL INTERESTS

At the present time, any discussion of the MSDF's roles
(indeed of any part of Japan's external security) must consider
the United States as well. These calculations include at least
four questions:

1. What are Japan's interests on a particular issue,
and does she have the ability to defend them by

herself?

2. If not, do U.S. and Japanese interests coincide?

3. If they do, does the U.S. have the capability and,
just as importantly, the will to act?

4. If the second and third conditions are satisfied,
what contributions can Japan make to the U.S.
effort? If they are not, are there other powers
to which she can turn?

One may question the wisdom of basing plans on such

continued reliance on the U.S., but it is a current fact of life.

The Global Balance

Japan's interests on the global level lie in the prevention
of a general war and in the stability of the international climate ,
She will be unable to secure them by herself. On the whole, how-
ever, they coincide with those of the United States, especially

259

260

on the prevention of nuclear war.

By almost any projection, Japan's armed forces will not
have a major impact on the global military balance within the
next 10-15 years. Even were a decision on full-scale nucleari-
zation to be made today, it is doubtful that anything more than
a force de frappe could be created within this time frame. Had
the great economic growth rates of the 1960s been sustained, it
might have become possible to offset this military weakness with
other forms of pressure. However, the world-wide shortages,
uncertainties and instabilities which loom in the future are
poor conditions for Japan's prosperity. Neither does she have
large reserves of food or raw materials to offset international
imbalances and promote moderation. Japan doubtless will continue
to play an important role as a major industrial nation, but her
image as an emerging superstate with the key to global equilibrium
no longer is credible (if it ever was).

Without becoming enmeshed in the debates over "How much is
enough?", or whether or not mutual deterrence is a sane v/ay of
avoiding the holocaust, it is certain that Japan's sense of

insecurity would be increased if the effectiveness of the U.S.

2
strategic forces were in doubt. In any case, there is nothing

For instance, after more than a decade of the French and
Chinese weapons programs, each reportedly still had fewer war-
heads than the U.S. has on one (MIRVed) Poseidon submarine
(160 to 224 according to published accounts).

T?his is not simply the question of whether or not the

261

that Japan can do about it except to hope that America's efforts
to preserve the balance on her own account will be adequate.

Both nations also have a stake in creating a stable inter-
national climate, but Japan's need for such stability is greater,
while her ability to promote it is less. This asymmetry contains
the seeds of several possible differences, summarily noted in
Chapter Five. In the first place, actions which America takes

to stabilize local and regional conflicts may be seen as escala-

3
tory by Japan. In the second, Washington's ability to withstand

pressures involving resources and energy is much greater than
Tokyo's, (indeed, the U.S. itself may be seen as a primary
villain in a crisis over foodstuffs.) This is related to the
third point, which is that the U.S. has opted for strategies to
maximize its independence from resource suppliers while promoting
interdependence in the industrialized world. Japan, on the other
hand, has tried to increase its interdependence with developed
and developing countries alike. So long as U.S. policy continues
to consider the weaknesses of the Western alliance as a whole,
Japan will be protected by those even more vulnerable than her-
self. But she could pay dearly for her previously close ties

U.S. "nuclear umbrella" applies to Japan. As noted earlier
(p» 159)j the "nuclear umbrella" issue is associated with the
continued utility of the Security Treaty. Without the treaty
there still might be an effective "umbrella" but without a
credible U.S. deterrent neither formal nor informal ties would
provide much protection.

%itness the alarmed Japanese reaction to the U.S. military
alert during the Yom Kippur War.

262

should Washington retreat to a more nationalistic stance.

In point of fact, Japan's economic policies now are able
to affect the prosperity, or at least the balance of payments,
of most of her trading partners. Such strength implies an
influence on global stability as well, though it is much less
easily assessed or controlled. Nevertheless, the military ele-
ments of global peacekeeping will remain the province of foreign
forces.

For whatever purpose, American seapower can bring to bear
the fleet ballistic missile system (Pffl) ; a flexible array of
general purpose naval forces; a limited, but increasingly modern
merchant marine; and a number of technologies for extracting
food and energy from the seas.

The FBM is, and will remain, one of the most secure parts
of the strategic balance. The U.S. merchant marine, progressive
though it may have become, will not play much of a role in
global stability. Advanced maritime technology may be stabilizing
if it can provide distributable surplusses of food, resources or
energy. If it is used simply for the benefit of the industrial-
ized countries, its effect will be neutral at best. In either
case, its impact probably will be felt only gradually over the
next few years.

The key issue, then, is the degree to which American

^See Tsipis, et al. , The Future of the Sea Based Deterrent,
op. cit. (note 1-45T7 PP» 3_9»

263

general purpose forces can, or will, support Japanese interests.
In the global context, this boils down to how much such naval
power actually contributes to stability. A definitive answer,
of course, is impossible, but it has been argued in Part I that
the absence of major power naval forces has led to disorder at
sea in the past. However, the rising costs of technological
sophistication have reduced the numbers of ships available for
peacekeeping roles. Moreover, unless some dramatic event occurs
to re-establish the political credibility of Western warships,
their impact on coastal states will decline even when they can
be present.

Thus, should present trends continue, the U.S. Navy's
general purpose forces will become less and less able to maintain
order on a global scale. In turn, this would reduce the incen-
tive for Japan to build her own naval force to take up the thank-
less mantle, even if the domestic situation allowed it.

On the other hand, if the U.S. acted successfully to
restore the efficacy of gunboat diplomacy, the choices would be
more difficult. In the short run, American military action
against either resource-rich states or oceanic claims could sub-
ject Japan to severe pressures through embargoes or retaliatory
terrorism unless she publicly broke with the U.S. Should that
happen, calls for a naval buildup could develop since (a) the
heretofore all-important security links with Washington might no
longer be credible and (b) the example of using force to control

264

resources might have been made attractive as a last resort.
Although her growing dependence on increasingly diverse regions
would make it impossible for Japan to pursue such a policy
successfully, its advocates might arise nonetheless.

Should an American campaign fail, an even more ambiguous
situation could result. The apparently diminished utility of
distant-water naval forces would have to be weighed against the
loss of reassurance which would accompany the break-up of the
Security Treaty.

In either case, however, if the basic relationship could
survive the short-term stresses (perhaps through resource-
sharing), there would be little incentive for naval expansion.
Either someone else would be doing the peacekeeping already or
it would be evident that no one could.

This discussion has considered neither the probability nor
the propriety of such actions from the U.S. point of view. The
point simply has been to note possible Japanese reactions. The

prospects that others might execute such a policy also have been

discounted, mainly on the grounds of capability.

Regional Balances

The Japanese usually think of their regional concerns only
within East Asia and the Western Pacific. In point of fact, they

The question of the re source- related disputes in the eco-
nomic zones or along the East China Sea continental shelf will
be examined later.

265

also depend on stability in other regions as well, notably the
Indian Ocean, and, increasingly, Latin America. (See Tables
5-1 to 5-30

Japan's interest in these areas typically involves (1) the
acquisition of raw materials, (2) the maintenance and expansion
of markets, (3) the safe transport of exports and imports and
(4) the containment of regional disputes. Her commercial sea-
power can support the first two objectives. Naval forces may be
necessary, though not sufficient to achieve the last two goals.

Although the MSDF now is restricted to training squadron
visits outside of home waters, this may not be so in the future.
Japan's regional security options include the development of
enough naval power to act as a surrogate for the United States
in the Western Pacific. Alternatively, she could totally disavow
such involvements and abolish the American presence. In between
are a variety of choices, to be discussed below.

Options Involving the United States

( 1 ) The continued provision of bases for U.S. Forces
(Western Pacific only)

The deployment of extra-regional warships for stabilizing
regional disputes usually has all the disadvantages associated
with global peacekeeping. In an area such as the Northwest
Pacific, however, where the interests of three nuclear powers
and Japan converge, America's ability to introduce general pur-
pose naval forces can be genuinely balancing. Moreover, thi3

266

interest extends throughout the region in so far as neither Japan
nor the United States would welcome a hostile presence or a state
of turmoil astride the gateways to the Indian Ocean.

The availability of Japanese bases greatly facilitates
U.S. operations in the Northwest Pacific, but the Japanese them-
selves have reservations about the extent of America's activities.

The contentious points have been the "Par East" clause of the

Security Treaty and the system of "prior consultations." The

Vietnam Y/ar raised questions about the geographic scope of per-
missible American operations. Reports of nuclear weapons aboard
U.S. warships have brought doubts about Washington's compliance
with consultation agreements. So long as the bases are used to
counter Soviet or Chinese pressures on Japan, or are seen to
deter a Sino-Soviet conflict, there will be few limits on
America's freedom of action. However, should Japan be used to
support operations related to a Taiwan-PRC or Korean conflict
there is likely to be a serious domestic outcry. This also is
true for possible outbreaks elsewhere in Asia, although neither
the Japanese reaction nor the U.S. need for the bases would be
as strong.

In the past many members of the LDP have supported U.S.

The Par East clause stems from Article IV of the Security
Treaty. The consultation formula was contained in an exchange
of notes between Washington and Tokyo dated January 19, i960.
Some of the resulting problems have been outlined by Emmerson,
op. cit. (note 5~33)> PP» 82-89»

267

actions in private more strongly than they have been able to do
openly. But it is not certain that such support will continue
as younger politicians come into positions of leadership. This
is even more true if some sort of coalition government develops.

Thus, America might find itself basing contingency plans
on facilities which could become unavailable when they were most
necessary. In fact, the base right agreements may come to have
little meaning. So long as the two countries remain close, U.S.
ships will have access to Japanese ports and repair facilities
in peacetime. In wartime, if Japan's interests are threatened
she would ask for assistance and the U.S. probably would accept.
Should Japan not see her interests in jeopardy she would probably
refuse landing rights or ship entry in the same way that much of
Europe did during the Yom Kippur War.

From the U.S. military standpoint, of course, it would be
better to keep the Japanese facilities even though they will have

to be consolidated rapidly. Broader consideration, however,

7
might suggest a retrenchment to the Llarianas or the Philippines.

A full discussion of this point would extend far beyond the scope

^See Chapters Five (p. 160) and Seven (p. 242). One impor-
tant counter- argument to such a move is that the return of
Okinawa has made it very difficult for the U.S. to get to Korea
without crossing Japanese airspace. Indeed, were both the
Philippines and Japan to declare a 200-mile territorial sea, it
also could become impossible to get to Taiwan legally without
permission. Some of the benefits of an American pullback are
given in James H. Webb, Jr., Micronesia and U.S. Pacific Strategy;
A Blueprint for the 1980s (New York: Praeger, 1974).

268

of this study. As argued in Chapter Seven, however, such a with-
drawal probably would not lead to a major expansion of the Self-
Defense Forces, especially if it were done tactfully and with
adequate consultation. This is particularly true if America
explicitly re-stated its commitment to Japan's security in the
process.

(2) Developing the SDF to free U.S. forces for other duties
(primarily Western Pacific, but also the Indian Ocean in
a more limited sense).

This could be accomplished by having the MSDF: (a) take
over some of the reconnaissance and surveillance duties in the
Northwest Pacific, (b) be able to extend the period in which
Japan could resist direct military pressure to permit the wider
dispersal of American assets, (c) become more closely integrated
into the U.S. force structure, for instance by exercising more
frequently with available U.S. units, or even by providing
escorts for carriers where possible, (d) develop into a regional
force capable of acting as a surrogate peace keeper should the
need arise.

In the present domestic climate only the first and second
alternatives are feasible, although the conduct of more joint
training might be beneficial and not too sensitive.

Since the MSDF would like to improve its intelligence
apparatus anyway, it probably will acquire more capability for
acoustic surveillance and surface ship tracking in the next few

269

years. In turn, this information could be made available to the
United States. Although the remote sensing technology outlined
in Chapter One may reduce American reliance on foreign sources
for strategic intelligence, the need for identification and
timeliness will continue to require as many tactical inputs as
possible. Given the amount of cloud cover in the Northwest
Pacific (see Figure 8-1), some low-level reconnaissance plat-
forms could be very useful.

Since no major acceleration is seen in the rate of Japan's
defense build-up, the improved capabilities of the SDF, per se,
are unlikely to enable the U.S. to redeploy many of its units.
Some problems of the defense of Japan itself and suggestion for
SDF improvements will be found in the next chapter.

The integration of Japanese ships or aircraft into American
operational units will be politically impossible without a
drastic change in the threat situation. Indeed, it will take
concerted efforts just to keep the military relationship from
drifting apart, much less to strengthen it.

In the final case, the previous chapter already has con-
cluded that the next decade will see no compelling domestic
pressures for a geographically expanded MSDF role. Even were
the defense perimeter pushed outward, a more activist form of
naval supremacy is unlikely. As Michael MccGwire has noted:
"The flexibility of seapower . . . can only be successfully
exploited when there exists a surplus of capability over one's

Figure 8-1

270

-+- l i, i

NORTHWEST PACIFIC CLOUD COYER (in tenths)

Top figure in each block is the average for the clearest month.

Middle figure in each block is the average for all months.

Bottom figure in each block is the average for the cloudiest month.

Source: Hc0o 97. Sailing Directions for Japan.

271

essential defensive requirements ....'• Japan will not have
such a surplus in the near future. With the exception of Singa-
pore, it also is hard to imagine many Southeast Asian countries
which would welcome a Japanese naval presence in the same period,
defensively oriented or otherwise. Though this would not be a
binding constraint in itself, it would reduce the incentive for
such developments from Tokyo's point of view.

Even should it become theoretically attractive, a serious
drawback in attempting a wider naval role is the historical
generality that maritime or air forces rarely have been decisive
by themselves. It would be one thing to extend the MSDF to play
a more visible part in the Western Pacific. It would be quite
another to develop the intervention capability which might be
necessary to make that presence credible. On the other hand, it
was suggested in Chapter Four that such pointed calculations
rarely enter into the evaluation of naval presence, at least
among the persons interviewed by the author in Southeast Asia.
Moreover, the real significance of a distant-water I.ISDF deploy-
ment would be as a reflection of a major political change within
Japan itself. Under such condition of uncertainty, the influence
of Japanese units might be greater than would be warranted by
their actual capabilities, at least in the beginning.

Leaving aside the development of a regional navy, it is
interesting that none of the above suggestions would require

MccGwire, _op. cit. (note 1 -54) > P» 8i

272

major changes in the current composition of the SDP (the second
point, for instance, could partly be accomplished by improved
logistics). As will be discussed later, Japan's present force
structure may not be best suited to the unilateral protection of
her own interests, but it is nicely complementary to the U.S.
Navy.

Options Involving Countries other than the U.S., or

Multi-lateral Ties

(1) Cooperate with the PRC or USSR (Western Pacific)

Both the USSR and the PRC could profit greatly from mari-
time cooperation with Japan. Indeed, each might gain more from
such assistance than the United States. Were Japan's ties with
the U.S. to loosen, she may well seek closer relations with her
mainland neighbors, particularly with China. Commercial maritime
associations may grow rapidly. However, for either socialist
country to play an active part in regional peacekeeping and for
Japan to align herself with one of them would require domestic
and international transformations which would completely alter
the Pacific balance. So far there is little evidence of such a
shift. Moreover, the anti-communist sentiment noted in Japan's
leaders extends to most other levels of the society as well.
Recent election gains by the JCP have been seen more as an anti-
LDP vote than as a pro-communist one. While this would not
dampen Japan's general desire to improve relations, it would
pose serious obstacles to the conclusion of closer ties,
especially in the military sphere.

273

(2) Japanese participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations
(any region)

The political problems of Japanese manpower contributions
to UN forces were noted in Chapter Six. Although such partici-
pation would seem a simple way to begin Japan's demonstration of
increased responsibility in international affairs, the fact that
it would involve the dispatch of ground troops will continue to
be a major stumbling block. If some form of maritime observers
(perhaps for fisheries disputes) could be arranged, it might find

an easier acceptance (LISA officials could be sent, for instance).

9
If it were outside Asia, so much the better. While such

arrangements may seem unlikely at present, they may become less

so if law of the sea disputes proliferate.

(3) An Asian Multi-Lateral Force (Western Pacific)

In 1973, Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore proposed
that Japanese warships might join a multi-lateral task force in
Southeast Asian waters. Although Lee was concerned mainly with
a balance of major power fleets, suggestions also have been made

that some sort of ASPAC or ASEAN squadron might be feasible,

10
along the lines of NATO's Standing Naval Forces.

°This discussion is limited to personnel. The MSDF or
LISA also probably would be reluctant to part with a scarce ship,
although the icebreaker Fuji has been dedicated to international
Antarctic research for several years.

10STANAVFORLANT consists of about four destroyers or
frigates each drawn from one of the NATO fleets. It has been
in operation since January 1968, but is more of a political

274

Within ASEAN itself, such an organization might have some
merit, at least symbolically. There even is an operational
foundation. Thai and Malaysian units have conducted joint anti-
smuggling patrols along the Kra Isthmus. Indonesia and Malayesia
also have cooperated in the Straits of Malacca. But an ocean-
going standing force is improbable. For one thing, Singapore
has no ships larger than missile patrol boats. Thailand and
Malaysia each have one modern frigate, the fleet flagship in
each case, which they would be reluctant to commit to detached
control. For another, there are a number of serious ocean-
related disputes among the member states — Malaysia (Sabah) has
at least tacitly supported the Moslem insurrection in the southern
Philippines around the Sulu Sea, shelf-locked Singapore differs
with her neighbors on the control of the Straits of Malacca, and
there are several unresolved seabed delimitation issues.

Even should an ASEAN force materialize, it is doubtful that
Japan would be invited to participate.

The anti-communist oriented ASPAC has become moribund with
the advent of de tente .

Perhaps the most interesting arrangement (and the most com-
patible from a philosophical and material standpoint) would be
MSDF cooperation with Australian or New Zealand units. One might
even speculate on Japan's taking Britain's place in the Five

showpiece than an effective combat force. In May 1973 a Standing
Naval Force Channel was activated, and there is hope of a similar
unit in the Mediterranean.

275

Power Defense Agreement (FPDA) for Singapore.

It must be reiterated that this is pure speculation. There
is no evidence pointing to such cooperation at present. As
noted earlier, the first signs of Japanese participation in
international peacekeeping probably would come through the UN

outside of Asia. But the possibility of jie facto maritime

arrangements with other states cannot be excluded.

(4) Arms Sales

Present limitations on arms sales stem from two sources:
(a) the Government's 1962 position that weapons cannot be ex-
ported to (1) countries at war, (2) Communist countries, or (3)
countries under UN sanctions; and (b) the genez*al political
sensitivity of military matters in Japan. A weapon officially

has been regarded as "a tool for killing and injuring and for

13
direct combat purposes," but the interpretation is subjective.

For instance, a jeep with a gun mount is a weapon, and cannot be

"1 *1

Bix, "The Security Treaty System," op_. cit. (note 6-27),
quotes a report of " . . . naval maneuvers with Australian and
Malaysian warships during the summer of 1969 . . . ." Just what
these consisted of is not clear. There are, however, few
references to them in revisionist wri tings which would hardly be
the case had any sort of important ties been developed.

1 p
The U.S. Navy, for instance, might act as an intermediary,

i.e. joint U.S. -Japanese exercises held simultaneously with ANZU3

training.

1^Given in the Diet, March 23, 1972. Quoted by an official
of the Equipment Bureau, JDA, in an interview, July 25, 1974*

276

exported. Without the mounting, it may be. Such equipment as
Japan has sent overseas generally has been oriented towards
police work, but some have been questioned. One of the most
controversial contracts involved the 1 971 sale of helicopters to
Sweden.

Nearly all Japanese who were interviewed regarded the pros-
pects for a future expansion of arms exports as doubtful.

Certainly the defense production sector of Japanese industry is

15
in no position to initiate such a program on its own. But the

profitability of such a trade might promote it nonetheless. This
is particularly true if a major arms market developed in East or
South Asia. In 1 974> for instance, it was reported that several
European firms were considering the establishment of weapons-
related plants in Singapore.

In the past twenty-five years there have been adequate
opportunities for Japanese exports in other fields. Should the

1 A

Although Sweden had requested them for police work, they

were based on a U.S. military design.

1 S
^Defense production in Japan in 1973 accounted for about

• 496 of GNP.

1 (

Several sources indicated that the Dutch Fire Control

System manufacturer Ilollandse Signaalapparaten would establish a
factory in conjunction with a Phillips Electric venture already
in operation. The Swedish and Swiss firms of Bofors and Oerlikon
also were ostensively interested in a Singapore-based operation.
These have not yet been verified however. The Singapore Ship-
building Company builds fast patrol boats with assistance from
Lurssen of West Germany. Similar craft also are constructed by
a subsidiary of Britain's Vosper Thorneycraft. All data derived
from interviews conducted in Singapore between May 28 and June 4,
1974.

277

economic climate become particularly severe, however, this here-
tofore forbidden source of foreign exchange might become more
attractive. The production of such equipment in overseas sub-
sidiaries also might become politically acceptable, though it is
not at present.

The naval component of such sales could range from warships

to electronic equipment such as radars or radios which are common

to all vessels. Japanese and subsidiary yards have, in fact,

built a number of vessels which appear on foreign naval rosters.
They are listed in Table 8-1 .

Note that most of these ships pre-date the 1962 export
restrictions. Even for those that do not, such designs as patrol
craft can be considered as being for internal security (police)
rather than external security (naval) duties. Moreover, any
armament now on board almost certainly was mounted after leaving
the shipyard. One measure of the scrupulousness with which the
principles have been observed was the 1965 decision to turn down

an Indonesian request for landing craft because of Konfrontasi

1 ft
with Malaysia.

Marine-related defense production for export probably will

continue to bo concentrated in shipboard equipments, such as

The Republic of China (ROC) navy, for instance, uses

Japanese navigational x-adars on some units. ROC naval officer

(who requested anonymity), interview, May 8, 1974*

1 ft

Cited in Mat sue da and Moore, op_. cit. (note 7-21), p. 619«

278

Table 8-1

FOREIGN NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BY JAPANESE SHIPYARDS

Year

Country

Type Ship

Number

Builder

1954

Brazil

Transport

Ishikawajima

1955

Taiwan

Landing Craft (LCU)

Ishikawajima

1956

Brazil

Transport

Ishikawajima

1957

Taiwan

Torpedo Boats (FT)

Mitsubishi

1957

Brazil

Survey Ship (armed)

Ishikawajima

1958

Philippines

Command Ship

Ishikawajima

1961

Indonesia

Landing Ship (LST)

n.a.

Submarine Tender

Ishikawajima

Ocean Tug

n.a.

Harbor Tug

n.a.

1966

Philippines

Hydrofoil Patrol
Craft

Hitachi Zosen

1968

Israel

Coastal Patrol Craft

Mitsubishi

Brazil

Oiler

Ishibras

(in Brazil)

1969

Taiwan

Oiler

Ujina

1974

Burma

River Patrol Craft

20
(about)

Mitsubishi

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1974~75» passim. The year, in

general, is the date of launching. Burmese craft noted
during several interviews. They are part of a group of
about 50 boats, some of which are used for cargo, some
for ferry, and some for patrol purposes.

279

electronics or auxiliary machinery. It is unlikely that such
sales will approach anything like the present volumes of Euro-
pean firms, but some increase would not be surprising.

(5) Training of personnel

In the future, it is possible that Japan might be more
willing to accept the overtures for the training of developing

country military personnel. Officers of Singapore and Thailand

have attended Japan's National Defense College in recent years.

Reportedly, many other requests for training from Southeast Asian
countries have been declined. Such assistance can leave lasting
impressions, witness the influence of the Royal Navy in Japan
from the beginning of the build-up of the Imperial Navy to the
end of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance.

(6) Financial and Technical Assistance

The previous chapter indicated that non-military security
spending, namely various forms of aid, almost certainly would be
used to complement the formal defense budget. The explicit
designation of such funds for military purposes by the recipient
country would cause political difficulties in Japan, but this
constraint may weaken in the next few years. Even if it does
not, however, security assistance could be feasible in a multi-
lateral context. For instance, a financial pool might be
established with contributions from several countries.

19
yMomoi Makoto, interview, January 25, 1973'

280

Recipient states could put such funds to a variety of uses,

including security. The direct linkage between Japan and

foreign weapons procurement thus would be broken.

By the same token, technical assistance or ventures with
multiple purposes — developing country shipyards, for instance —
also could be acceptable.

Other Regional Considerations

Two final points of regional security must be considered.
The first is the safety of tankers far from Japanese home waters.
The second is the advantage of seeking stability, particularly in
the Indian Ocean, through ties with other middle power navies.

There are four situations under which Japanese merchantmen

could be threatened — through a breakdown of order at sea, as an

offshoot of a local war, as a result of a campaign specifically

directed against Japan, or in connection with a general war at
sea. Unless the U.S. and USSR actively oppose the first trend,
Japan can neither expect much assistance nor act effectively in
her own behalf. If the ocean situation became highly chaotic,
it might become possible to escort shipping as far as Southeast

This is similar to the "Pacific Fund" idea advanced by

several prominent Japanese. The author also investigated this

concept during the trip to Southeast Asia and found it well

received, in principle at least.

Foreign merchantmen have been damaged in most of the

recent limited wars — in North Vietnamese ports by U.S. bombing,
off Karachi by Indian Styxs, at Latakia by Israeli patrol craft,
in Tripoli by Libyan minefields, and on other occasions.

281

Asian waters. But beyond there, MSDF logistics limitations would
preclude effective protection unless someone else was willing to
include Japanese ships under their own escort.

Similarly, in the second event, the overall power of the
U.S. or the Soviet Union might deter deliberate attacks on their
merchantmen, but the damage incurred in local wars usually has

been accidental, and hence largely undeterrable. It is possible

that some sort of Nyon-type guarantee of the security of

shipping in the vicinity of a protracted war could be set up.
But probably the best that Japan could hope for would be that
superpower intervention would halt the fighting itself, rather
than protect the ships per se.

The impact of law of the sea changes on Japan's attitudes
towards distant shipping should not be discounted. In the late
1960s and early 70s, any interruption of traffic in the Straits
of Malacca would have led to calls for defense of the sealanes
by right-wing Japanese and forecasts of J.ISDF dispatch by leftist
critics. The 1968 grounding of a VLCC in the Straits prompted a
series of navigational surveys in which Japan' s participation
generated considerable riparian state resentment. In January

1 97 5 » however, the 237>698-ton tanker Show a Maru struck a reef

23 - -

off Singapore. Tokyo's response was reported as follows:

See above, note 1-46.

It is interesting that the ship was in the Straits at

all, in light of the December 1972 Malay-Indonesian declaration
excluding ships over 200,000 tons. Many coastal state claims
have been disregarded during the law of the sea negotiations,
however.

282

Confronted with this big incident of a Japanese
ship polluting international waters with oil, the
Government has come around to the view that it
appears inevitable that free navigation of shipping
is due to come under some form of international
restriction in the future. ^4

This is hardly the militaristic outcry once envisioned.

The increasing acceptance of restrictions on shipping
through legal regimes will make it harder to justify unilateral
responses to restrictions which stem from local wars or other
disturbances not specifically directed at Japan. As noted
earlier, however, some sort of multi-national action might be
possible if violations of propriety become too flagrant.

The cases of a campaign against Japan itself and a general
war at sea will be considered in the next chapter.

The other basic question, concerning the advisability of
seeking regional stability through local naval hegemonies
probably will not be Japan's to decide. Devolutions of power,
should they take place, will be determined by the superpowers.
Moreover, such surrogates will derive their primary strengths
from superpower arms, to which Japan can offer few alternatives.
In its pursuit of a maximum diversification of resource
suppliers, Japan cannot afford to be on the wrong side of a
power struggle involving an entire region, and so would do best
to sell her offerings (military or otherwise) to all sides or
none. It was suggested in Chapter Four that stability as an

"%KIW, January 14, 1975, P- 2.

283

offshoot of regional hegemony was preferable to anarchy, recog-
nizing that the price for such equilibrium might be restrictions
on the very navigation it professes to protect. It is in such
situations that Japan can best contribute to both her own
interests and the evolution of the international system. By
using her own formidable marine commercial potential to build
ships, train seamen, etc., she can enhance the stake of the con-
testing powers in eliminating restrictions on seaborne trade, at
least between regions. In time, these might lead to the reduc-
tion of discrimination to some lowest common denominator while
broadening the focus of ocean management beyond the national
level.

Chapter Nine

THE MILITARY DIMENSION - PART II
THE LOCAL BALANCE AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Japan's physical security and political autonomy both rest

on a balance among the nuclear powers in the Northwest Pacific.

A deterioration in this local equilibrium could lead to threats
of invasion, air attack or blockade, attempts at intimidation by
demonstrations of force, or moves against third parties which could
create undesirable precedents. Whether or not there were any
overt pressures, Japan would be at least deferential towards any
power which held naval superiority in the Northwest Pacific.
Even within a generally stable balance there may be conflicts
over ocean resource zones, terrorist activities or infiltration.

It is at this local level that the MS DP is designed to
operate. It also is within the adjacent sea areas that its
greatest potential lies, for that is where Japan can act as a
coastal state in the defense of her interests.

Patterns of Threats

No one so far has been able to put forth a txuly believable

This would be true even if she pursued armed or unarmed

neutrality.

284

285

scenario for an attack on Japan. There simply are too many
hypotheses which must be strung together to arrive at such a
threat from the present situation. Another approach, however,
may be more fruitful. Namely, by beginning with the objectives—
the internal changes in Japan which an opponent might wish to
encourage — one can work backwards to the methods which might be
used to achieve them.

Basically, Japan could find herself threatened with force

on the strategic level by those who sought to (a) overwhelm a

united country, (b) weaken the nation by accentuating internal
divisions, (c) intimidate the government if the State were

divided or (d) promote revolution or social upheaval. Tacti-

3
cally, force may be employed to impose one's point of view in

a particular dispute, or to improve a negotiating stance.

The key point is that neither the international situation
nor the domestic one can be considered independently. The inter-
action between the two will be at least as important as either
by itself.

I.e., in such a way as to endanger the territorial

integrity, political autonomy or economic well-being of the home
islands themselves. Some rationales for such pressures might be
to gain better access to the Pacific, split the Western Alliance,
eliminate economic competition or encourage one's own brand of
revolution.

cally.

I.e., less important issues, usually localized geographi-

286

Direct Threats to the National Territory

It is unlikely that a united Japan would be left to face a
major assault alone. Such an attack could not be quick and

easy. Moreover, there is no question of the legitimacy of

5
Japan's borders. Thus the international community would not be

presented with a fait accompli. It would witness several weeks
(at least) of attacks on territory whose sovereignty is unques-
tionable. However far America might have renounced its inter-
national commitments, the success of such aggression would
establish a very dangerous precedent. Similarly, although
sporadic attacks on individual merchant ships might not invoke
U.S. assistance, America is too dependent on her own sealanes to
allow a coordinated campaign against Japan to go unanswered.

A weakened and divided Japan, on the other hand, probably
could be coerced towards the desired position without the actual
use of force.

H'/hile I accept Mr. Kaihara's critiques of the Self-Defense
Forces, I do not agree that the country could be quickly over-
whelmed— assuming that it chose to resist. See Taoka, op_. cit. ,
(note 5-11), passim.

Excepting the Northern Islands question and some seabed
disputes. But these will be discussed later.

Whether or not the process of such intimidation would
unify the country will have to await the actual course of events.
Perhaps the most dangerous situation (in the sense of leading to
a longer struggle) would be a case where outside pressures
created a will to resist which was not recognized by attacker
and allies alike until the fighting already had begun. This, of
course, is precisely the error that Japan herself made at Pearl
Harbor.

287

The potential threats which a united Japan might face
range from nuclear or conventional air strikes to invasion.
Among the roles which naval forces could play in such situations
are: deterrence, early warning, air defense, and invasion
defense.
(1 ) Deterrence

The question of Japanese nuclearization has been explicitly
excluded from this study. Were such weapons to be decided on,
however, there would be valid arguments for putting them in sub-
marines to enhance their survivability. Such a force probably
would not affect the MSDF very much. The fact that sea-based
deterrence resides in naval ships does not increase a nation's
naval power per se. The missile submarines would not be avail-
able for ASW or anti-shipping roles until they had launched their
weapons, by which time such additional capability probably
wouldn't matter very much.

The conventionally- armed SDF, however, can deter simply by
reducing the prospects for the quick (not necessarily the ulti-
mate) success of an assault. Such a philosophy implies that at
least some capability should be maintained against as broad a
range of threats as possible to minimize the chances of blackmail
by means for which there are no defenses. This is reinforced by
the fact that Japan is limited in her ability to exert counter-
pressure on other issues.

288

(2) Eaxl.y Warning

One of the weaknesses of Japan's air-defense system is the
vulnerability and limited number of air-search radar sites.
(See Figure 9-1«) One writer has noted that the destruction of

any two adjacent radars could leave a detection- free approach

7
corridor for low altitude aircraft. Furthermore, even when

operational, such sites are horizon- limited in the detection of

low flyers.

Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft can give the most

effective notice of impending air attack. Surprisingly, none

are included in the ASDF inventory, although halting steps are

Hughes, _op_. cit. (note 5_34), P« 334* It should be
remembered, however, that few other countries are better off.
In NATO, for instance, the NADGE system (NATO Air Defense Ground
Environment) contains ". . .no provisions for the detection and
countering of missiles and low-level, sub-radar threats."
Furthermore, although additional coverage is provided by inter-
faces with national air defense systems in some countries, NADGE
also is vulnerable to the creation of detection- free corridors
by the destruction of only a few radars — particularly in the
south. This probably will not be remedied until the U.S. A7/ACS
(Airborne Warning and Control System) becomes operational late
in the 1970s. (See Jane's Weapon Systems, 1973-74, pp. 195-196.)
The U.S. southern coast is vulnerable from Cuba — a fact often
stressed in the early 1960s. In part, each of these cases is a
corollary of the 7Je stern defense philosophy which (until
recently, anyway) emphasized sophisticated equipment in neces-
sarily smaller numbers. The contrasting approach is provided by
the Soviet air defense network, which is built around thousands
of relatively simple (and overlapping) radar, missile ajid gun
sites.

See the description of the American AWACS in Richard D.
English and Dan I. Bolef, "Defense Against Bomber Attack,"
Scientific American, CCXXIX (August 1973), pp. 11-19.

289

Figure 9-1

Hughes, p. 355

JAPANESE AIR DEFENSE RADAR COVERAGE

290

9
being taken to procure them. On an interim basis, therefore,

and also in areas away from the primary threat axis, MSDF units
sometimes could provide mobile radar coverage and additional
intelligence.

It is recognized that picket duty is an inefficient use of
Japan's ASW-oriented destroyers and frigates. Furthermore, the
ships assigned to such stations traditionally have suffered
heavy casualties — witness the tremendous losses of U.S. destroyers
off Okinawa in 1 945* Nevertheless, if no alternatives were avail-
able, and air attacks were expected, the diversion of some MSDF
ships to early warning tasks might be attractive. As a change in
policy, it also would signal an awareness of a coming crisis and
a willingness to respond to it.

(3) Air Defense

Most MSDF ships are poorly suited to break up massed air
attacks, or even to defend themselves. Only Amatsukaze has a
surface-to-air missile capability, although two more guided
missile destroyers (DDG) will be added by the end of the Fourth
Defense Plan.

In any case, the important targets to be defended are on
land, except possibly for offshore oil fields. Moreover, even
a missile ship probably would require more fighters to defend it

The AEW acquisition, along with the PXL, was delayed by

the debate over domestic production.

291

than its armament could free for other tasks. Should forward
air defense, fighter cover for ocean resource disputes, or pro-
tection of outlying islands be required, however, the limitations

10
of the F4EJ (the Japanese version of the U.S. F-4 Phantom air-

craft) might necessitate shipboard air control. This in turn

would require greater coordination between MSDF and ASDF units —

the more so because the MSDF, unlike the USN, does not have air

defense aircraft of its own to draw on for experience.

In inshore waters, air defense weapons on patroling ships
could force frequent changes in the approach and exit corridors

In order to restrict the offensive potential of the air-
craft, its self-contained air- intercept capability was reduced.
Instead, target information is fed to the aircraft from ground
radars. It is questionable how well this would work in an
intensive electronic warfare (EW) environment or if some of the
ground stations were destroyed, but even in peacetime some sort
of forward base probably would be needed for offshore operations,

Air control, in this sense, means the shipboard capa-
bility to direct fighters to intercept other aircraft. One
essential device for such work is a height- finding radar, which
now only is found on Amatsukaze . The MSDF potential for air
control missions could be improved fairly quickly by the instal-
lation of height-finding or three-dimensional radars on newly
built or refitted ships.

Hegrettably, there is little evidence that such coopera-
tion is developing. No ASDF aircraft were involved in the Yuyo
Maru sinking (see below, p. $17)* Though this had some basis in
budgetary and operational concerns, it also appears that neither
the MSDF nor ASDF was very enthusiastic about a joint training
exercise. (JDA official, interview, December 13, 1 974* ) Auer,
op. cit. (note 5-34) > PP« 291 ff. 16, notes a 1971 case where
ASDF aircraft, assigned to make simulated attacks on MSDF units,
mistakenly made their passes against a Soviet destroyer, thus
precipitating a minor international incident.

292

for attacking aircraft, thus complicating an opponent's planning.
In this regard, mobile anti-aircraft units on barges, or con-
tainerized SAM mountings could be very useful items of coastal
air defense.
(4) Defense Against Invasion

Whatever their other missions, the SDF must have some

ability to defend Japan against invasion, however remote that

•1 2

possibility may be. It has been suggested (Chapter One) that

air superiority is the key to control of coastal waters. Despite
the limited range of Soviet fighters, it is doubtful that the
ASDF could maintain control over the skies of Hokkaido and
northern Honshu, especially since its airfields would become
early casualties. However, during the first stages of an
invasion they could provide cover for a naval strike against
the landing force in addition to delivering their own ordnance.
Moreover, by distracting the escorts they could provide better
opportunities for submarine attack.

See above, p. 15/. One uncertain factor in invasion

defense is the willingness of the Japanese people to resist.
A recent survey indicated that "if Japan is invaded by armed
force by a foreign country," 44/« of those interviewed would flee
or not resist. (Tokyo Shimbun, November 24, 1973)* On the other
hand, the same poll showed over yQf/o willing to fight with the SDF
or to offer guerrilla- type resistance — a manpower pool of over
thirty million if extrapolated to a national response. It is
very hard to judge wartime reactions from peacetime polls. How-
ever, several observers have suggested that the surrender and
peaceful occupation of 1945 were possible so long as foreign
troops were not on Japanese soil. Had the invasion actually
taken place, it is said, the resistance would have been bitter
and lengthy.

293

As Taoka has pointed out, the amphibious forces of the
Soviet Pacific Fleet are limited. In particular, they have:

Table 9-1

SOVIET PACIFIC AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS
(as of July 1, 1974)

Type

Class

Number

1ST

Alligator

lsv/m

Polnocny

MP8

MP4

15
2

LCT

Vydra
MP 10

35
10

Capacity (each)

1,700 tons, 30 light tanks, about
15 medium tanks

350 tons, 6 tanks (est.)
400 tons, 6 tanks
? tons, 6-8 tanks

250 tons, 6 tanks (est.)
150 tons, 4 tanks

59 24-25,000 tons, about 480 tanks

and armored vehicles

Source: M. MccGwire, et al., Soviet Naval Policy, Chapter 22

(LSV and LCT class figures estimated. Type totals only
were specified in most cases.) These numbers are con-
siderably higher than those given in Jane's Fighting
Ships, 1974-75.

Thus the 250 medium tanks (T54/55) and 19 light tanks

1 R

(PT76) of a single Soviet mechanized division would require
more than half the capacity of the Pacific amphibious forces.
The problem is compounded when armored personnel carriers, tank

^Taoka, _op_. cit. (note 5_11)> P» 28.
1^The Military Balance 1974~75, p. 83.

294

destroyers and artillery are included. When coupled with the
tenuous supply lines at the end of the Trans-Siberian Railway
and the Chinese position on the Russian flank, the direct
invasion threat to the home islands does not seem particularly
impressive. This is true even should the Soviet Union use
merchant shipping support and airborne troops for the initial
strike. This point is magnified by the frequently rough waters
in the Sea of Japan, the vulnerability of such a landing force
to submarine attack throughout its transit, the Japanese exper-
tise at mine warfare, and the fact that the GSDF keeps four
divisions and 300 tanks deployed in Hokkaido against such an
eventuality.

The People's Republic of China is even less of a direct
menace, with some 4-00 miles of sea to cross, and a much less
capable long-range amphibious force. Indeed, the PRC has had
great difficulties mounting assaults against the Nationalist-
held offshore islands ever since 1 949 •

The use of Korea as a stepping stone would add several
possible threat axes to complicate Japan's planning, but would
not offset the socialist countries' logistics or transport weak-
nesses.

Thus, neither China nor the Soviet Union could afford to
suffer many losses in an amphibious operation without seriously
degrading its ability to sustain the campaign.

This situation is not so secure with regard either to the

295

southwestern Ryukyus, or some islands on the East China Sea
continental shelf. Both probably could be taken by a quick
attack, and an incentive might be provided if there were dis-
coveries of nearby seabed resources. The defense of these areas
will be discussed below in connection with oceanic boundary pro-
tection.

The question now arises of the armament for ships in an
anti- invasion role. The advantages of ship-to-ship missiles
have been proven on numerous occasions. Speed and sea-keeping
ability will be important, especially in the Sea of Japan.
Although some air defense will be necessary, it would be expected
that fighters would provide cover insofar as possible. Thus
point defense rather than area defense systems would be more
cost-effective. A major anti-submarine suit would be superfluous
since most of the sensors would be incompatible with a sudden,
high-speed strike. Should some sort of screen be needed, it
might be provided by shipboard helicopters. The most suitable
platform for such a mission from speed and maneuverability stand-
points probably would be a surface skimmer.

In sum, then, the optimum surface ship for the protection
of Japanese coastal waters would seem to be a surface effect
ship or hydrofoil with SSMs, a reasonable air control capability,
point defense weapons, and a minimal ASW suit. Air cover, par-
ticularly in the Sea of Japan, should be available. These also
should be complemented by submarines, both for attacks on the

296

landing force and on escorts or pickets.

Such submarines, incidently, need not be nuclear. The
increased cost of an SSN makes sense only if Japan were to adapt
a defense-in-depth strategy of carrying attacks to the enemy

while his submarines were in transit, or sinking his own coastal

1 6

shipping. If attacks on invasion forces or blockades of

straits are to remain their primary mission, it is not certain

that a noisy, first-generation SSN would be much more effective

than a quiet, advanced conventional boat. On the other hand,

building at least a few nuclear submarines would give Japan

additional options, as well as experience in the construction of

1 8
such ships. ' With the increased cost of fuel, the life cycle

costs of an SSN also might not be disproportionate. In any

1 C\

Janes E. Auer, in "Japanese Militarism," US NIP t XCIX

(September 1973)> P» 51 1 notes that "If attacked, [Japan's]

forces would be authorized, the government has stated since 1 959?

to attack enemy bases." Presumably this also would include

forays into the Sea of Okhotsk or the western Sea of Japan.

The Soviet Union has continued to build non-nuclear sub-
marines, some of which may use exotic propulsion systems such as
the Walther-cycle pioneered by Germany during Y/orld War II.
Alternatives might be hydrogen peroxide systems like Britain's
Explorer and Excaliber, improved fuel cells or high-capacity
batteries.

1 ft

Commander Sekino has noted that a warship power reactor

would not be subjected to international inspection under the

non-proliferation treaty. Japan thus could carry out advanced

research without fear of losing industrial secrets if NPT were

ratified.

A 1972 study found that the average construction costs

of a nuclear submarine ranged from 2.4 to 11. 4 times those of a
conventional boat, with 5*1 a-s "the most likely figure. Life

297

case, the decision probably will be based more on political con-
siderations than on military ones. It would be facilitated if
world-wide trends pointed to the wide-spread use of such plants
in merchant ships.

It may be useful at this point to compare this approach to
that adopted by Sweden and in Germany whose naval concerns are
mostly coastal defense. Table 9~2 summarizes Swedish, German
and Japanese defense forces.

Note that Japan is able to maintain a force roughly three
times as large as Sweden's with only a quarter of the burden.
The SDF have become slightly less than half the size of Germany's

with only about a third of the relative expenditures. Of course,
numbers alone are a poor measure of a nation's military effec-
tiveness. The point, however, is to show that the general result
of the Japanese defense effort does not compare unfavorably with
that of some European States. Neither is it unreasonable in
light of the current threat to environment and her more secure
geographic situation.

cycle multiples lay between 1 .65 and 4»25 with 2.90 as most
probable. See the abstract of LCDR James R. Shreckengaust, USN,
"Conventional vs Nuclear Attack Submarines" (U), unpublished
thesis, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, K.I., 1972. SECRET/
NOFORN in Naval War College Journal of Abstracts 1971-72, p. 95*

This is true even despite the Ivlutsu fiasco. See below,

note 10-13.

For instance, much of German land effort is devoted to

tanks and armored personnel carriers for use on her northern

298

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500

Still, the emphasis placed by Germany and Sweden on small
patrol craft for coastal defense is important. Particularly
valuable, although not shown in the table, are the shelters which
Sweden has built for her ships. Carved out of rock along the
coast, they are said to be capable of withstanding nuclear
attacks. Earthquakes would be a drawback against such a plan for
Japan, but since civilian submarine tunnels have been designed,
this should not be insoluble. In any case, the fate of the North
Vietnamese torpedo boat fleet after the Gulf of Tonkin incident
indicates the fragility of exposed fast patrol boats. Unlike
logistics improvements, such shelters would be fairly long lead-
time items, whose construction would have to be begun well in
advance of hostilities.

Direct Threats to the Sea Lines of Communication

(1) The Nature of the Problem

In contrast to the coastal orientations of Germany and
Sweden, problems of sealane protection weigh heavily on Japanese
defense planners. The experiences of World War II are an impor-
tant part of these concerns. In that conflict:

plains. Aside from the obvious lack of land frontiers, Japan's
topography limits the usefulness of such mobility even if it
were available. Similarly, Japanese ground attack aircraft are
restricted by their potential as "offense weapons." Note also
that, despite its large size, the Bundesmarine is primarily a
coastal defense force. Over half its tonnage is devoted to
support ships.

301

The war against shipping was perhaps the most
decisive single factor in the collapse of the
Japanese economy and the logistic support of
Japanese military and naval power. 22

Today the nation is even more dependent on imports than in the
1940s, and its stockpiles are lower. The size and value of
modern tankers and container ships drastically increases the
importance of each sinking, while the modern submarine is much
more capable than its predecessors. By no stretch of the imagi-
nation could the present Self-Defense Forces protect the ocean
lifelines in a sustained campaign.

The improbability of such an offensive may suggest that
it should be dismissed out-of-hand but the fact remains that
Japan's weakness to this form of attack is conceded by nearly
all analysts, whether they support or oppose an escort role for
the MSDF. What are frequently overlooked, however, are her
strengths and the vulnerabilities of her potential opponents.
Therefore, to highlight these points, as well as to introduce
the concept of containerized weapon systems, it is worth dis-
cussing sealane defense at some length.

For the sake of argument this analysis accepts the "worst
case'* assumption of a Soviet campaign against Western Pacific

uSSBS, The War Against Japanese Transportation (hereafter
Transportation) , op. cit. (note 1-55) » P« 6.

^fccGwire, op_. cit. (note 1 — 54) » has pointed to the
unlikelihood of a submarine attack against NATO on the grounds
of Soviet capabilities, requirements, national interests and
intentions. Many of the same arguments operate in Japan's behalf
as well.

J02

shipping around 1980. It already has been suggested that the
U.S. would almost be forced to offer at least some assistance
under these circumstances. The less intense, but perhaps even
more dangerous case of sporadic attacks on widely dispersed
merchantmen will be examined later.

The crucial factor for Japan in a modern guerre de course
would be time. Initial losses would be heavy, since the sub-
marine fleets probably would be deployed prior to hostilities,

O A

and convoy systems could not be organized immediately. These
sinkings, particularly if they included a few supertankers, would
have a great psychological impact. Insurance and freight rates
would be driven to extraordinary levels. Seamen might balk at
serving. But the rapidity with which the overall economy would
be affected will depend on a number of conditions. Among them
are: (1) stockpiles, (2) austerity measures, (3) the availability
of substitute materials, either domestically or from regions which
are not cut off by the fighting, (4) the ability of the ship-
building industry to replace losses, and (5) the effectiveness of
defensive measures, taken either unilaterally or in concert with
allies.

O A

The critical shipping situation faced by the Allies
immediately after the resumption of unrestricted submarine war-
fare in 1917 probably is a better analogy for a modern undersea
campaign than the World War II experiences. In the latter case,
nearly three years passed between the commencement of hostilities
and the greatest submarine successes. The U-boats recorded their
best hunting in 1941 and '42, while U.S. submarine sinkings
peaked in 1944*

303

Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the defense of the
sealanes is not an end in itself. The United States must keep
the North Atlantic and Pacific open in order to fulfill its
treaty commitments, as well as for its own security and com-
mercial motives. Japan, on the other hand, needs only to be
able to survive for the duration of a conflict. A combination
of increased stockpiles, domestic conservation and a credible
capability to protect at least part of her commerce may enable
her to remain neutral in a war which is not specifically directed
at her, and to hold out long enough for foreign help to arrive in
one that is.

Unclassified reports of U.S. war planning are difficult to

come by. In the North Atlantic, however, a termination within

90 days is assumed. Under such conditions, in a NATO war in

1980, it is expected that some 185 American merchantmen would be

sunk — from a total of about 450 U.S. flag vessels. The assump-
tions and data underlying this study are not available r and it
therefore is hazardous to extrapolate the results to the Pacific.
However, a figure of about 200 ships lost in the first three
months of a Pacific War also might be reasonable as a first

Blackwell Testimony, op_. cit. (note 1-52), pp. 58-69.

Ibid. Included are 43 containerships, 83 other dry

cargo vessels, 39 tankers, and 20 older vessels from the reserve
fleet. U.S. fleet total is a 1978 estimate from Kasputys, op.
cit. , p. 162.

304

approximation. One reason for this is indicated in Table 9~3»

Note that the U.S. Pacific fleet and the MSDF comprise a rela-
tively larger share of non-communist ASW units than the Soviet

28
Pacific Fleet does of socialist submarines. Moreover, in both

oceans geography has been unkind to the USSR, with choke points

at the entrance to the Baltic and the GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-

UK) gap in the Atlantic, and at the Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya

Straits in the Pacific. Only Petropavlosk in Kamchatka faces

the open ocean, and it is restricted by weather and logistics.

Bases in the Kuriles could be developed or serviced by tenders,

but there still would be logistics problems.

Thus, though it would seem that fewer than 185 ships would

be lost in the Pacific, a figure of 200 will be used to allow

for LIS DP weaknesses and the possible diversion of U.S. assets to

a simultaneous NATO crisis. This is a tremendous loss rate.

Drawing from one projection of average ship size and numbers in

1980, 7 it would equate to over 3,900,000 GRT. By contrast, the

The Soviet decline is derived from the assumed phase-out

of more than 120 diesel submarines (Q, W and Z classes) built

during the mid-1950s. A replacement rate of 9 attack submarines

a year was assumed, with the rest of Soviet attention being

devoted to missile boats.

This assumes that USSR and PRC assets would not be addi-
tive in an oceanic conflict in the near future. Were they to be,
the geographic constraints on the USSR would be broken since,
presumably, she also could use Chinese bases.

Bates and Yost, "Where Trends the Flow of Llerchant

Ships," op. cit. (note 2-3), pp. 258-259. Data as follows:

305

Table 9-3
A COMPARISON OF SUBMARINE AND ASW ASSETS IN THE NORTH
ATLANTIC AND NORTH PACIFIC IN 1974 AND 1980

Submarines (excluding FBMs)

Atlantic

USSR (Northern & Baltic Fleets)
Warsaw Pact

Pacific

USSR (Pacific Fleet)
PRC

1214

204

210

(a)

1980

155
6

161

55
50

ASW Units

Carriers

Ocean v '

Sub»

Carriers

& Helo

Ocean

Sub-

Carriers

Escorts

marines

Carriers

Escorts

marines

Atlantic

U.S.

Potential

-z

148

100

152

_28

Allies(d)

244

139

246

135

Pacific

U.S.

Japan

__—

141

148

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1 974_ 75 • 1980 figures estimated
from probable fleet buildup programs and retirements of aging
ships. U.S. assets distributed equally between Atlantic and
Pacific — a reasonable assumption based on 1971 data.

Notes:

(a) Soviet Naval Developments, Chapters 22 and 23, give 155 and
60 respectively for mid-1974 Soviet submarine strengths.
1980 figures, however, are not markedly different.

(b) CG(ex DLG), DDG, DD, FF or foreign equivalents

(d) Britain, France (two- thirds only, assuming some Mediterranean
commitment), Canada (two- thirds, assuming a Pacific squadron),
Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, Norway, Denmark.

506

heaviest losses which Japan suffered to submarines during an

equivalent period in World War II were 1 64 ships of 756,000

30
tons .

Even in the unlikely case that the full weight of the

attack fell on Japanese shipping it is not the magnitude of the

loss alone which must be considered. It is submitted that the

important issues are (a) the amount of the loss as a percent of

Japan's total transportation capacity and (b) the ability of her

shipyards to replace it. The tonnage noted above comprises about

10 percent of the 1973 Japanese merchant marine (presumably, it

would be a somewhat smaller part of the 1980 fleet ) and is

Type Ship

Tanker
Bulk Carrier
Container Ship
General Cargo

Avg.Size

(cwt)

75,000

45,000

13,500

8,000

io of

Total No.

19.5

14.4

7.8

58.5

Number
Lost

117

Tonnage
Lost

2,925,000

1,260,000

360,000

936,000

5,861,000 DWT
equals about 3,926,800 GRT

If the mix of lost ships was the same as the 1974 Japanese fleet
proportion, the losses would total 4,825,000 GRT. Using the
breakdown of U.S. projections given by Secretary Blackwell
(extended to 200 ships) adds up to 3,447,000 GRT.

*HJSSBS, Transportation, op. cit. (note 1-55), p. 47. The
maximum sinkings occurred between August and October 1944' It is
not clear whether this is GRT or DWT.

Although Japan's merchant tonnage is expected to increase

in the next few years with the completion of large tankers and

bulk carriers now on order, this trend eventually may be reversed

as less profitable ships are sold off to foreign owners. It is

probable, however, that the capacity of the 1980 fleet will be

larger than today's, though its numbers may be smaller.

307

proportionately about half as much as the quarterly losses
during 1944* However, at its wartime peak Japan's shipbuild-
ing produced only about a half million tons annually, whereas
the country's average quarterly output during 1973 was about
3,900>000 GRT — nearly enough to replace the losses. Admittedly
resource shortages eventually would curtail the building, but
the backlog of nearly- completed ships probably would be enough
to last through the first critical period. It also may be that
the post-1977 volume of Japanese ship construction will be con-
siderably less than during the recent heyday of the large
tankers. Nevertheless, it almost certainly will continue to be
a sizeable percentage of the expected sinkings.

Other factors also work to Japan's advantage. There is no

need today to support a war economy such as that which consumed

33
over 50 percent of GNP in 1 944- The number of hostile sub-
marines will decline over time as they fall victim to mines and

other hazards while returning to base, as well as by attrition

34
in mid-ocean engagements. Facilities for providing contact

Ibid. , p. 114* An average of 3*710,000 tons of Japanese

merchant shipping was afloat at the time.

USSBS, War Economy, op. cit. (note 1-55)* P» 16.

The decline in her potential opponents' ability to build

submarines rapidly is almost a mirror of her own increased ability
to build merchant ships. Nuclear submarine production probably
will not exceed two dozen boats per year and, although the con-
struction of conventional units could be accelerated, no country
or coalition is likely to match Hitler's 1943 figure of 281 new
U-boats. MccGwire, "The Submarine Threat to Western Shipping, "

308

localization information from seabed hydrophones, satellites or
radio-direction finding nets give on-scene ASW commanders better
intelligence than they ever have had.

None of this is to deny Japan's vulnerability at sea.

Neither is it wise to base all calculations on a single

35
scenario. It can be argued that the probable weapons expendi-
ture rates would exhaust both sides early in such a war, that

the conflict would escalate, or even that the attacker would run

out of torpedoes before Japan ran out of ships. On the other

hand, the engagement could drag out over an extended period of

op. cit. (note 1-54) > P» 3, estimates that 50 or so diesel sub-
marines might be turned out per year by the Soviets if priorities
were so re-ordered. A separate Congressional reference to a
study of a NATO war at sea (perhaps the same one cited by Secre-
tary Blackwell) projects Soviet submarine losses at 70 to JQfo
during the first 90 days. See U.S., Congress, Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, Military Applications of Nuclear Technology,
Part 2, 93rd Cong., 1st Session (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1973), p. 78.

This also has been one of the most important lessons of

World War II for the Japanese. In that conflict her strategic

planning was keyed too much to the concept of a single great

fleet engagement a la Tsushima. See SenC Sadao, "A Chess Game

with no Checkmate: Admiral Inoue and the Pacific War," Naval

War College Review, XXVI (January-February 1974), PP» 26-39*

J As of July 1973 Japan had 4,171 ships larger than 1000

deadweight tons. During 1944, the best year of the Second World

War for U.S. submarines, 6,092 torpedoes were used to sink 548

ships — over 11 fish per sinking. Even assuming that a modern

submarine could average only 5 shots per successful attack, it

still could take as many as 10,000 torpedoes to destroy half of

Japan's merchant marine. Were each of the Soviet's 55 submarines

to carry 24 torpedoes and replenish them once a month, at least

seven months would be required even if the Soviets suffered no

losses. If a net of five submarines a month could be removed

from the order of battle, the campaign would terminate in about

309

time, in which case Japan would suffer severely. Indeed, the
post-war effects of even the abbreviated campaign noted above
would be traumatic. But the problem is not of the hopeless pro-
portions in which it often is couched.

(2) Some Possible Solutions

In fiscal 1972, Japan imported over 512 million tons of
cargo, mostly raw materials, including 118,785*000 tons of iron

ore, 50,783,000 tons of coal, 256,832,000 kiloliters of petroleum

and over 12,000,000 tons of foodstuffs. At the same time, her

merchant fleet contained 159 bulk cargo vessels of over 50,000
GRT, totaling 12,600,000 deadweight tons (carrying capacity).
The tanker portion included 149 similarly sized ships which com-
bined to more than 18,500,000 DWT.

If these vessels could be arranged into six convoys of

about 50 ships each, capable of making eight round trips a

39
year, they could cariy 148,000,000 tons of petroleum

11 months with the loss of about 40/'o of Japan's merchant fleet.
In point of fact, even these losses probably are exaggerated,
since it would be very difficult to maintain much more than 40
to 50fo 01 the available submarines on station.

MITI, Statistics on Japanese Industries, 1973, PP« 76-79*

Although these quantities probably will grow in the next few
years — at least until conservation measures and the industrial
re- structuring can take effect, their growth will be matched by
the size of new cargo ships, thus reducing the need for
additional bottoms.

Japanese Shipowners Association, Review of Japanese
Shipping, 1973 (Tokyo, 1974), p. 28.

Obviously, the convoys would be routed to different

310

(57-8 percent of peacetime imports) and 100,800,000 tons of bulk
cargoes (about 55*6 percent of the raw materials listed).
Although the MSDF only has 45 ocean escorts, it is submitted

that meaningful protection could be provided for such convoys

40
through the use of unconventional concepts.

One such idea is the U.S. Navy's ARAPAH0 project, which
entails the placement of helicopters and containerized support
facilities directly on the merchantmen themselves. At a cost
of $3»5 to 4 million per package, exclusive of aircraft, nearly
any large tanker or containership could be equipped to operate
up to six helicopters or eventually V/STOLs. A particular ad-
vantage of the system for Japan is that no special structural

destinations, i.e. to the Persian Gulf for some oil, to Indonesia
for some other, North America for grain, etc. Sight round trips
per year corresponds to a 20-day voyage each way (including
loading) with 45 days leeway for repairs, delay, etc. At 14
knots (which 85;"'j of Japan's merchant fleet can exceed), the oil
depot at Kiire is about 19 days from Kuwait and 8 days from
Indonesia. Other major Pacific ports, from Long Beach to Sydney,
are within 15 days of Yokohama.

In a nuclear environment, concentrations of ships would
be vulnerable to attack by IltE.Is or IviPJSI.is, especially if targeting
could be done by satellite. The use of such weapons, however,
would open the possibility of like reprisals against isolated
bases such as Petropavlosk. (See LIccGwire, op_» cit.f paragraph
J1 •) In any case, there is little that Japan could do except
disperse the convoys under such circumstances.

See, for instance, J. J. I.lulquin, "ARAPAH0 — Emergency

Helo Cover for Merchantmen," USNIP, XCIX (November 1973) » PP»
113-117* with comments by H. E. Obedin in the I.Iarch 1974 issue,
pp. 103-104. Also, I.lulquin, "The ARAPAH0 System and Its Impli-
cations for Future Ship- Aviation Concept Development," Naval
Engineers Journal, DQDCV (October 1973), pp. 25-34.

311

provisions axe needed for the host ships. Thus the political
questions of getting approval from other Ministries or the com-
panies concerned would not be necessary until a crisis actually
arose. Moreover, much of the training could be accomplished
ashore, perhaps even by reserve units, thus saving both fuel and
family separation in peacetime.

If ocean escorts with helicopter decks are in company, the
effectiveness of the system would be increased severalfold. The
difficult command and control problems of vectoring the heli-
copters would be reduced. Long-range, hull-mounted sonars and
the associated classification and signal processing equipment
would be available. Moreover, by using the ARAPAHO platform
primarily for maintenance (vice both maintenance and operations),
the number of helicopters supported could be as high as ten or
twelve. In short, a convoy with two or three suitably equipped
merchantmen and about four escorts could operate perhaps twenty
to twenty- five helicopters. Moreover, this capability could be
acquired for less than the cost of one additional escort.

This is not an argument for the immediate suspension of

4T?he new 5,200 ton DDH ordered by the LISDF in FY 1975 will
cost ¥44,372,000,000 (about $148 million). 6 HSS-2 anti-sub-
marine helicopters also are budgeted at around $4»5 million each
(¥8,173 million for 6). At $4 million per ARAPAHO package, 3
would cost $512 million. 25 helicopters would add $112.5 million,
for a total of 124.5 million. 100 to 1 50 men would be required
per package as compared with about 350 in a DDH crew. Alterna-
tively, 2 ARAPAHO units and 15 helicopters would be about $75»5
million vs. $86.2 million (¥25,830 million) for a 2,500 ton
escort.

312

destroyer or frigate construction. In the first place, ARAPAHO
works much more efficiently in conjunction with ocean escorts.
Moreover, it will not become available much before 1978, even
in U.S. hands. In the second, the warships are long-lead-time
items whose numbers cannot be quickly augmented in an emergency.
Finally, the 45 ships planned for the end of the Fourth Defense

Plan will barely cover Japan's coastal defense needs, much less

43
those of convoy escort. However, under the assumption that

the budgetary constraints on the MSDF will remain tight, such

modular systems seem to offer promise for the qualitative

improvements envisioned in the Post-Fourth Defense Plan period.

It should be noted that air defense weapons also lend

themselves to containerization. There are at least two

Sekino Hideo has estimated that 32 destroyers and
frigates (among other units) would be needed for coastal defense
purposes ("Japan and Her Maritime Defense," op_. cit. [note 6-1],
p. 121). This tallies closely with a study by a group of former
Imperial Navy officers who concluded that the protection of small
cargo ships in home waters would require 36 destroyers and 16
aircraft. (Reported by Doba Hajime in the series "Maboroshi no
Jishu B5ei" [Visionary Autonomous Defense], Yomiuri, June 15,
1970.) Estimates of convoy defense needs have ranged from 78
(Sekino, interview, December 6, 1974) to 54 (Doba article).
Even accounting for new techniques which might reduce the number
of escorts per convoy, and the possibility of refueling from the
convoyed tankers themselves, 45 total escorts is a marginal
figure.

'Tor instance, the U.S. is considering a system tenta-
tively known as Sentry. This would be a completely self-con-
tained unit including radars, command and control facilities,
and 16 vertically- launched missiles in a single container costing
about $1 million. Alternatively, the Close In Weapon System
(CIWS) might be adaptable. (Mr. Roland Baker, China Lake, tele-
phone interview, October 18, 1974»)

313

merchantmen sunk by SSMs (one of them Japanese) since 1970 which
might have been saved by such devices.

Discussions of a full-scale anti-shipping campaign _in vacuo
have an aura of unreality somewhat akin to those concerning
optimal strategies for a nuclear war. But the fact that some
defenses can be provided is important insofar as it will reduce
Japan's sense of insecurity which stems from her import depen-
dence. Moreover, an ARAPAHO-like system would violate none of
the restrictions against offensive weapons (since, almost by
definition, it is a defensive arrangement) and could quickly be
tailored to threats ranging from a blockade around the home
islands to the distant harassment of passing ships. It also is
compatible with neutral rights of self-defense and is ideally
suited to Japan's primary maritime assets — her merchant fleet
and commercial shipbuilding industry.

There is, however, another potential hazard to Japan's
shipping — a mine blockade.

Mine Y/arfare

On March 27, 1 945 » B-29 mine laying operations were begun
in Japanese ports and inland waterways, particularly around the
strategic Shimonoseki Strait between Honshu and Kyushu. A post-
war analysis concluded that:

. . . this campaign, begun earlier and laid on with
greater weight, would have reduced effective ship-
ping nearly to the vanishing point. 45

USSBS, Transportation, op. eft. (note 1~55)» P« 8.

314

Waterborne transport in pre-war Japan carried about two-
thirds of domestic trade, with nearly all the remainder going by
railroad. The post-war years have seen a dramatic increase in
road traffic:

Railroad (<fo)
Motor Car ($)
Ship (<?o)

Total (10 ton-km)

Table

9-4

DOMESTIC TRANSPORTATION

1?55

1965

1972

52.9
11.6

35.5

30.7
26.0

43.3

17.4

44.7
37.9

81,786

186,343

343,390

Source: Review of Japanese Shipping 1973, P» 34, a^d Un-yu
Keizai Kenkyu. Center, Un-yu Keizai Zusetsu Showa 49,
p. 11.

Nevertheless, a mining campaign, conducted either from aircraft
or submarines, could disrupt Japanese shipping as quickly, and
much more cheaply, than a submarine offensive. The MSDF is

well trained and equipped for minesweeping work, but it took the

U.S. Navy several weeks to clear its own mines from North Vietna-
mese ports, and a number of months to locate and identify all the
debris in the Northern Suez Canal. Thus major dislocations could

46
47,

Ibid., pp. 17, 28.

Harassment might even be done by using ocean currents to
carry floating mines.

315

be expected from even a sporadic application of sophisticated
mines. Sweeping helicopters or special mine-hunting craft
might be partial answers, but the job inevitably will be tedious.
On the other hand, mines or devices like the U.S. Navy's Captor
(encapsulated torpedo) also can make the straits around Japan
very hazardous for foreign submarines.

Divisive/intimidating Actions

Perhaps more likely than direct threats to the nation or
the sealanes would be pressures designed to create uncertainty,
undermine morale and increase domestic divisions. Such acts
might include sporadic attacks on Japanese ships or ships bound
for Japan, naval demonstrations or harassment of economic
activities overseas or offshore.

These would be very difficult to guard against. For one

thing, if kept to a low enough intensity, they might not invoke

49
foreign assistance. For another, being more-or-less random,

guerrilla-like activities away from Japan itself, they would be

beyond the capabilities of the SDF.

However, the creation of such disharmony in Japanese

The complexity of modern mines should not be underesti-
mated. In addition to fuzes which are triggered by magnetism,
noise, pressure, or combinations thereof, there also are timers
to turn the weapons on and off, ship counters to allow the
sweepers to pass before activation, and other exotic features.

The U.S. is not legally bound by the Security Treaty to

come to the defense of Japanese merchantmen, for instance.

316

society would be more difficult than in most other states.
Vertical dissensions (i.e. between industries or factions) would
come more easily than horizontal splits between classes.

Tactics for such a strategy might include sanctions
directed against a whole range of Japanese interests in specific

reprisal for the policies of one industrial group or political

leader. Presumably only revolutionary governments or terrorist

groups would acknowledge such acts, but more established govern-
ments also could proceed clandestinely. Alternatively, specific
companies or activities could be singled out to pay for the
"sins" of Japanese exploitation in general. By themselves, such
activities probably would not have much immediate impact, but
they could aggravate existing internal tensions and heighten
Japan's sense of isolation if no one comes to her aid.

Physical damage need not be inflicted to make an iinpression-

at least not at first. The sighting of submarines near potential

51
targets could be very unsettling. Similarly, the difficulties

It has been suggested, for instance, that during the 1972

textile problems with the U.S., the Japanese textile manufac-
turers found themselves domestically isolated by prospects of
American import restrictions which would have affected other pro-
ducts as well. Although it is not clear that Washington had
sought this result consciously, it was advantageous to the U.S.
position.

The prevailing hypothesis that submarines have little

use in presence roles deserves to be challenged. In peacetime
the either/or nature of a submarine's weaponry lowers its credi-
bility in the eyes of informed observers. The submarine can,
however, have great impact on popular thinking, if only for short
periods. Soviet submarines in Cuba made the front pages of U.S.

317

of sinking modern tankers or bulk carriers offers the possibility
of graduated applications of force, i.e. using only one or two
torpedoes to damage, rather than destroy.

The best that Japan might be able to do under these circum-
stances would be to organize potential targets into convoys to
at least improve the chances for survival of the crews of ships
which might be hit. Point-defense systems or AELAPAHO- type suits
could be helpful if the danger were geographically localized,
but could hardly be bought in sufficient quantities to counter
sporadic threats in widespread areas.

V/hether or not any of these acts would be unifying,
divisive or intimidating cannot be known in advance. The equip-
ment needed to counter them, however, generally would be included

newspapers on several occasions in the late 1960s and 70s. Dis-
coveries of suspicious craft in Scandinavian fjords also have
been widely reported. In times of terrorism, the emotional
response to sightings of unidentified submarines in local waters
or near shipping routes could significantly influence decision-
making. This would be particularly true in a nation as sensitive
about her sealanes as Japan.

J In October 1974, the 40,000 DWT Liquified Petroleum Gas
(LPG) tanker Yuyo Maru #10 was set afire in a collision near
Tokyo. Since the ship would have burned for months, it was
decided that the MSDF would sink it. LPG being much lighter
than water, shellfire was used on the afternoon of November 27
to open up escape holes and accelerate burning. The following
morning two torpedoes were fired to encourage flooding (two more
failed to hit) . The coup de grace then was administered by
additional shellfire. Even admitting the special problems of
LPG, it is easy to visualize the difficulties of dispatching a
VLCC by torpedoes alone. Indeed, perhaps the optimal wartime
tactic against such ships would be to use one or two fish to
enflame or disable them rather than try for actual sinkings.

318

in that designed for more intense threats.

Threats Which Promote Revolution or Social Unrest

Except for infiltration by sea, such threats fall mostly
outside of the province of the MSDF. As noted earlier, Japan1 s
27,000 km coastline would be difficult to defend in wartime. In
peacetime, with the myriads of fishing craft and coastal ships,
the assured interception of smugglers or infiltrators is
impossible.

Nevertheless, there are some possible countermeasures.
(1) Coastal surveillance radars should be improved. This ought
to be done anyway in conjunction with the 12-mile territorial
sea and the establishment of traffic separation lanes. (2) More
fast patrol boats would be useful. Although hydrofoils might be
better suited to open-water operations, their rather deep draft

while transitioning between foilbome and hullborne modes could

53
limit their effectiveness close to the beach. All-in-all,

some sort of fast launches or hovercraft might be more suitable.

Finally, (3) the general scope of Japan's intelligence activities

should be expanded. This, of course, would suit a variety of

other purposes as well.

-^The NATO Patrol Hydrofoil, for instance, draws only 2

meters with its foils retracted, but must extend them to nearly

7 meters prior to flight.

519

Defense of the Economic Zone

The extent of a Japanese 200-mile claim has been outlined
in Chapter Seven. Whatever the timing of the legal declaration*
Japan's exploitation of the continental shelf and coastal zone
will make her adjacent seas even more important than they have
been to date. The extent to which these activities can supply
the economy's demands will be explored in the next chapter. It
does seem, however, that the national resource base will be
significantly enhanced. Moreover, the additional space probably
will come to be cherished for its own sake.

In sum, there are ample economic and psychological reasons
why the Japanese will resent infringements on their economic
zone once it is declared. Moreover, nearly all of the states to
the west have defined their own ocean areas in ways which are at
variance with Japan's. At present, South Korea is almost the
only country with which Tokyo could safely let a conflict arise,
but whether or not this balance of more important interests will
continue to restrain oceanic disputes is questionable. In any
case, defense of a 200-mile claim and ocean development struc-
tures will pose special problems for the SDF.

It is about 400 kilometers from Naha airport to the Yaeyama
Retto where Japanese oil exploration now is underway. Some of
these same islands are only 110 kilometers from Taiwan and about
320 from the coast of mainland China. Indeed, they lie within

320

54
the Taiwan ADIZ. Japan's F4EJs are better aircraft than the

F5s and F104s of Nationalist China, and the locally- built

fighters of the People's Republic. There also are differences

in pilot training and logistics, but the Japanese aircraft do

depend on ground- control facilities. As noted above, warships

could be valuable as air control units away from the Home Islands

particularly if they are fitted with computer-aided equipment.

Such a capability might be a necessary backdrop to any negoti-
ations in the area. As has been noted with regard to the
Senkaku island ownership:

. . . [the] controversy is essentially a political
one that is being argued in the more polite language
of international law and diplomacy. No territorial
issue between East Asian states has ever been
settled in this way . . . .56

Air Defense Identification Zone, a unilaterally imposed

area in which aircraft must identify themselves. The Japanese

and Taiwanese ADIZ overlap in this region.

55
Examples were noted in Chapter One. One illustration of

the capabilities of such a system was provided by NTDS in the
Gulf of Tonkin. Computer-equipped frigates and cruisers were
assigned to a station known as PIRAZ (Positive Identification
Radar Advisory Zone) well north of the carriers on Yankee Station.
The ships were able to keep track of U.S. aircraft over the Gulf
(which sometimes numbered more than 100), weed out enemy air-
craft, if any, from returning U.S. strikes and vector fighters
to several dozen intercepts. In addition they accounted for a
number of MIGs with their own missiles and operated search and
rescue (SAR) helicopters. See G. Lockee, "PIRAZ," USNIP, XCV
(April 1969), pp. 100-102. While the LISDF is not likely to have
the resources to conduct PIRAZ- type operations, automated infor-
mation systems are planned for future units.

* Park, "Oil Under Troubled Waters," op_. cit. (note 7-39),
p. 257.

321

Aside from disputes at the borders of the economic zone,
offshore drilling platforms, pipelines, seabed mining equipment
and, of course, fishing boats also are vulnerable to attack or

harassment. NATO is worried about this in regard to the North

57
Sea fields. Among the defenses which have been considered are

fast patrol craft, ready-alert heliborne units or VTOL aircraft

based on offshore platforms, and increased reconnaissance. Once

again, an air-tight shield is impossible, but some security

improvements can be made.

Naval Power as a Bargaining Chip

Instead of starting the development of advanced strategic
weapon systems, Japan can use the threat of a qualitative change
in defense policy itself for international leverage. This is
perhaps more true in the nuclear sphere than in the naval one
(indeed, the advantages derived from the threat of nuclearization
has been advanced as one argument for not closing the option by
ratifying NPT), but some influence might be possible nonetheless.
Abrogation of the Security Treaty, or the removal of the U.S.
bases would bring Japan's actions under closer scrutiny through-
out the Far East. Announcement of plans for nuclear submarines
or helicopter carriers might then somehow be linked to negoti-
ations with Washington, Peking, Moscow, or even Southeast Asia.

J New York Times, December 25, 1974-

322

Summary

While it is difficult to postulate a single most likely
threat for the MSDP to prepare for, the range of possibilities
is broad enough to suggest that future force levels should be
keyed to balance and flexibility. The limits of conventional
warship design can go only so far in providing such options at
reasonable cost.

Containerized defensive systems for merchantmen have uses
ranging from local instabilities to full-scale wars against ship-
ping. Ocean escorts are complementary to such systems in many
cases. Indeed, they are the most flexible units which the MSDF
could acquire under its present constraints, although they are
becoming prohibitively expensive. Their effectiveness could be
greatly improved by the addition of tactical data systems and
three-dimensional radars, and the upgrading of aircraft facili-
ties to handle manned helicopters and RPVs. Nuclear submarines
might become politically possible in the 1980s. Wixhout an
increase in budget, however, the increased effectiveness of the
SSN might be outweighted by its additional costs. The present
emphasis on minesweeping must be continued, and new equipment
procured to deal with modern devices.

Surface skimming patrol craft would have great advantages
in invasion defense, policing of the economic zone and rapid
reaction missions. If surface effect ships or hovercraft develop
rapidly enough, they might fill both offshore and inshore roles.

323

Hydrofoils, however, probably would have to be supplemented by
displacement-hull patrol boats in restricted waters. Surveil-
lance radars will be needed for defense and safe navigation in
the economic zone. Hydrophone and sensor technology should be
developed to improve intelligence-gathering capabilities and
initial contact localization. In turn, this will necessitate
a more sophisticated command and control system, both to handle
the increased volume of data and to cover the expanded area of
operations. Provisions also must be made to upgrade the elec-
tronic warfare capabilities of individual units and to ensure
the ability of communications systems to operate in an intense
EW environment.

In a longer term, v/STOL aircraft eventually will be neces-
sary for ships or offshore platforms. Although new weapon
systems should be planned to include better domestic logistics
support than has been provided to date, the basic philosophy of
emphasizing long lead-time hardware still seems to be valid.
Should the international climate deteriorate, however, the focus
should be shifted to develop the full potential of existing
equipment before continuing with expansion.

Chapter 10
THE NON-MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF JAPANESE SEAPOWER

Japan probably makes more intensive use of the seas than
any other state. Her shipbuilding has led the world for nearly
two decades and completely dominated all competition in recent
years. The Japanese merchant marine ranks second only to the
Liberian flag of convenience in tonnage. Her fishing industry

has been characterized as "the most important, diversified,

extensive and far ranging in the world."

To date, these ocean economic interests have been largely
apolitical — particularly because of Tokyo's continuing efforts
to separate them from diplomatic problems. With the advent of
resource shortages, economic warfare, and the changing marine
political climate, however, the commercial elements of Japan's

seapower can have important political uses. The first of these
is protective — those ocean resources and marine services under
Japan's control can help to insulate her from pressures applied
by other states or non-national groups. The second is acquisi-
tive— maritime capital and expertise can be traded for resources.

United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Country Fishery Profiles, 1972.

524

325

Finally there is the potential for suasive applications of com-
mercial seapower. This is an aspect little explored to date,
but it holds some promise should Japan choose to exercise it.

The Scope of Japan's Commercial Ocean Interests

Shipping

The Japanese merchant marine consisted of 9,459 vessels of

36,790,000 GRT in March 1 974- Over three-quarters of this ton-
nage was accounted for by tankers and bulk carriers — rather above
the world average of about 67 percent (see Table 2-1 ). An
additional 711 ships of 15,070,000 GET were on charter. During
Fiscal 1973? Japanese ships and charters carried 319,200,000 tons

of cargo. 26.6 percent of her exports, and 43*7 percent of

imports were loaded in domestic bottoms. This share has been

declining for several years and it is doubtful that the Govern-
ment target of 50 percent ever will be met. Nonetheless, the
1973 figures do represent a 21 percent increase in absolute
volume .

Although Japanese shipping earned over 3 billion dollars

4
in 1973, her maritime transportation international payments

Ministry of Transport, Transportation 77hite Paper, 1974*

nJnyusho, Kaiun Koku (Shipping Bureau, Ministry of Trans-
port) , Ninon Kaiun no Genkyo (Present Condition of Japanese
Shipping), TokyS, July 20, 1974, p. 21. By contrast the 1973
U.S. flag share of American trade was 6.4/^, totaling 40 million
tons. (Blackwell Testimony, op_. cit. (note 1-52), p. 7.)

TCaiun no Genkyo , p. 23.

326

balance was in deficit by 1,707 million dollars in the same

5
period. This situation probably will worsen in the years ahead,

for Japan1 s merchant marine is faced with a number of serious

problems. In the short run, there are the current inflationary

pressures, and weaknesses in the international shipping market.

In the longer term, however, Japanese shipowners are particularly

vulnerable to the worldwide changes in the marine political

climate described in Chapter Three. Those pertaining to merchant

shipping include:

(1) Flag discrimination by developing countries.

(2) Possible navigation restrictions from broader
coastal state law of the sea claims.

(3) Marine anti-pollution regulations.
Counter-measures for each of these are being considered.

Despite some reservations, notably on the dispute settlement pro-
visions, Japan voted for the Declaration of Principles at the
Geneva Liner Conference. This was partly designed to improve
relations with the Third World. More important, however, was the
fact that a guaranteed 50 percent share in bilateral trade (40

percent where third country ships are involved), would be advan-

7
tageous if present trends continue. Nonetheless, the convention

^Nihon Kai.ji, June 10, 1974.

Maritime wage hikes averaged 41»5/J in the 1974 Spring
Offensive. The increase in operating costs due to these raises
is expected to vary from 5% i*1 the case of VLCCs, to nearly 30/£
for conventional cargo ships. In the case of the more labor in-
tensive coastal vessels, it is even higher. Ninon Keizai, April
19, 1974.

'Asahi, March 13, 1974.

327

will not be effective for several years, and in the interim the
Ministry of Transport is preparing options for legal retaliation
in the event of excessive damage to Japanese interests.

The principal victims of the law of the sea claims will he
the large tankers upon which Japan's economy is so dependent.
The restrictions on the Straits of Malacca already have been
described (Chapter Three). Nevertheless, unless the entire

Indonesian archipelago were totally closed to tankers, the

9
economic impact will not be excessive. It also is probable

that drastic limitations would be necessary to justify the long-

10
delayed Kra canal. The Showa Maru incident, however, may have

Some of the measures under consideration were listed in
Mihon Keizai, April 16, 1974.

9
In late 1974 a 250,000 ton Japanese tanker cost about

¥10 million per day — about $33)000. (Data provided by U.S.

Maritime Administration, Tokyo.) The voyage from the Persian

Gulf to Japan is about 6,800 miles via the Malacca Strait (the

shortest course), 8,000 via the Lombok Strait, and 14*000 south

of Australia. This translates to about 7 extra days (at 15 knots)

on a round trip via Lombok or 40 days via the southern route. At

$10 per barrel (and roughly 7 barrels per ton), the value of a

250,000-ton load would be about $17, 500,000.^ Thus the added

transportation costs would come to only 1.3$ of the value of the

cargo for the first alternative, or 7«5?° for the second. Clearly,

these figures will vary. Smaller tankers, for instance, would

cost more. The increased value of oil inventories tied up during

the longer voyages also must be considered. Although even the

sum of these costs might not make too much difference for the

Lombok route (note Japan' s willingness to re-route her ships

after the Showa Maru grounding), they could become significant

on the Australian transit, especially given the narrow profit

margins of Japanese firms.

Several construction plans for a canal across Thailand's

Kra isthmus have been drawn up since the project first was pro-
posed in the 19th century. Some schemes involve nuclear

328

11
given impetus to a pipeline across the isthmus.

Japan has begun to revise her pollution laws to reduce the
vulnerability of her ovm ships to foreign pressures. They also
may facilitate counter-measures on others' vessels in her waters.

In addition to these political problems, there also are
structural difficulties. These include the reduced efficiency
of existing general cargo liners in the face of containerization,
and the planned restructuring of the Japanese economy towards
service industries and reduced dependence on raw materials
imports.

It is not clear how the shipping industry will cope with
these changes, particularly the latter. However, the merchant
marine is too important to a maritime nation like Japan to let
it die. Suggested directions have included less emphasis on
tankers and more on oil product carriers, refrigerated vessels

to import fish, containerships and self-propelled petroleum

drilling ships. Nuclear ship development received a serious

explosives, which has made Japanese participation sensitive. For
some of the analyses, see Kra Canal Project, "Preliminary Survey
Report: A Summary," Revision 5 (Bangkok: K. Y. Chow, April 30,
1974) and Patrick Low and Yeung Yue-man, The Proposed Kra, Canal:
A Critical Evaluation and Its Impact on Singapore (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, February 1 973) •

NKIW, January 14, 1 975? P« 4» suggests that Saudi Arabian

interests may provide the capital for a CTS and pipeline.

See the excellent 25th anniversary supplement to the

Shipping and Tra.de News (Tokyo, October 25, 1974) for a review
of the development of Japan's shipping and shipbuilding indus-
tries and discussions of their future. Particularly, in this
context, see the panel discussion on pp. 67-70.

329

13
setback from the Mutsu debacle, but could be revived if world

trends pointed in that direction. Perhaps even more certain,

and revolutionary, will be the multi-nationalization of the

industry. Profitability could be increased by the use of

14
foreign subsidiaries, "tie-in" ships and a mixture of Japanese

and foreign crews. In turn, this may give the companies con-
cerned broader interests than those of Japan alone. As one ship-
ping executive noted:

... I think the Japanese Merchant Marine from now
on should become more international. I think it is
nonsensical for unarmed Japan to adhere to such . _
narrow concepts as Japanese territory or nationalism.

Such developments would make it progressively more difficult

to justify the commitment of the USE or SDP in defense of

merchantmen with suspect loyalties.

1 3

The sea trials of Japan's first nuclear powered ship,

Mutsu, were delayed for nearly too years by fishermen in her
homeport, who feared that their market would be damaged by con-
tamination, or even rumors of it. In August 1974 the ship
finally put to sea, only to develop a reactor leak due to gross
engineering defects. In the ensuing uproar, she was refused
re-entry to Japanese ports and drifted for over seven weeks
before arrangements were made to bring her in. As of January
1975 her fate is undecided, with suggestions ranging from
reactor shielding improvements to scuttling.

"Tie-in" (Shikumisen) and "Charter- back" arrangements
are ways of maintaining control of bottoms under less-expensive
foreign flags. See Bruce Littman, "How the 'Shikumisen' Deal
Works," Seatrade, December 1973, pp. 137-138.

Kikuchi Shojiro, President of Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Ltd.

(NYK Line), in Shipping and Trade Hews Supplement, op_. cit. ,
p. 70.

330

Shipbuilding

No less than 49*8 percent of worldwide ship construction

16
was launched from Japanese yards during 1973* Ship sales alone

accounted for more than 10 percent of export earnings, second

17
only to steel. The industry continued the spectacular rebound

begun in 1972, and by the end of fiscal 1973 (March 1974), a

backlog of 630 vessels of over 50 million gross tons was on order,

mostly for export. This should keep the yards busy well into

1978. 18

Forecasts, however, were not so bright as recent performance

As noted earlier, the world shipping market is weak, and there is

a widespread feeling that shipowners everywhere may have over-

19
booked during 1973* The oil crisis and potential reopening of

Suez also have undercut the market for VLCCs and ULCCs which had

20
been counted on for much of future business. Japanese yard3

1 £

Japan Times, February 28, 1974*

1 7
'Tsusansho (MITl), 1974 Tsilsho Hakusho (1974 International

Trade White Paper), Yoyakulian Shiryoshu (an) (Lata Summary

Volume — draft), Tokyo, June 1974, Figure 12. This was up from

about Tfo in 1972.

Japan Times, April 20, 1974*

Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Annual Report 1 974*

Reported in MLN, April 4, 1974.

Japan Times, Japan's Shipbuilding and Shipping, 1974

Survey, May 1974, P« 8. Also Shipping and Trade I Jews , Supple-
ment, op_. cit. According to figures published in Zosen, new
monthly orders for export ships had fallen from over 2,^00,000
tons in January 1974 "to about 250,000 tons in September.

331

have been hard hit by inflationary pressures, and these have cur-
tailed expansion plans (especially for very large dry docks) as
well as upsetting previous contracts. However such problems were
common to most other major shipbuilding countries, so Japan's
relative competitive position will not suffer too badly. Foreign
leads in sophisticated product carriers, such as LKG Tankers were
worrisome, however, as was the possibility of EEC or U.S. counter-
measures.

Another potential threat is from the growing shipbuilding
and ship repair industries in the developing countries. South
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore all have made sizeable commitments
in this field. Spain and Portugal also have been attracting
business which once went to Japanese yards.

It is likely that the construction of relatively simple
craft and those below 100,000 tons will cease to be profitable
in Japan. Nevertheless, the industry has shown remarkable
resilience in the past, and tliis is likely to continue. More-
over, despite their lower labor costs, developing country ship-
yards cannot match the skill of Japan's labor pool, her advanced
technology, and the integrated industrial structure which
enables her to produce both hulls and machinery for a variety
of ships.

Japan is fortunate in that the current backlog of orders

Ninon Keizai, June 8, 1974*

332

will give her managers tine to evaluate future prospects before

committing themselves. The future of her shipbuilding, how-
ever, would seem to be in a combination of advanced designs and

overseas movement. Among the former may well be oil product

23
carriers, super-automated ships and ocean engineering structures.

These are consistent with the needs of the merchant marine, noted
earlier. Joint ventures and technological assistance programs
already are well under way, originally in Brazil and East Asia,
and now increasingly in the Middle East. Such offshore invest-
ments have been dictated not only by the lack of land in Japan
itself, but also by the planned foreign diversification of the
steel industry.

It is possible that this construction will come to include
export warships, but such ships probably would not amount to more
than a small fraction of total work.

Fisheries

Well over 50 percent of the animal protein in the Japanese

see the round-table discussion in the Stripping and Trade
News Supplement, op_. cit . , pp. 98-102. Note also, however, that
many of these orders have become unprofitable because of higher
building costs.

^NKIYT, July 2, 1974, p. 4. Mitsui Shipbuilding has
received orders for a total of four dynamically positioned
drilling rigs in six months. The boom comes when "the business
of its shipbuilding division is dulling." (NKIW, July 16, 1 974>
p. 9)» This development has been serious enough to prompt U.S.
shipbuilders, who now lead the world in such structures, to con-
sider legislative countermeasures. (Official of the Shipbuilders
Association of America, interview, October 9> 1 97 4 • ) The Mitsu-
bishi shipyard in Nagasaki also is assembling the first full-scale
floating city (Aquapolis) for Expo 75 in Okinawa.

333

diet comes from the sea. The annual catch is the world's most
valuable, and overtook Peru's in tonnage when the latter 's
anchovy industry was devastated by over-fishing and a shift in
the Humboldt Current.

Pelagic (distant water and offshore) fisheries account for
some 70 percent by weight and 50 percent by value of the Japanese
catch. These are mostly large-scale, technologically intensive
operations under the control of a few influential companies.
Government regulation is maintained by licenses issued through
the Fisheries Agency of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
which are designed to discourage over- investment and prevent
species over-fishing.

Neritic (coastal) fisheries include family, cooperative or
corporate operations and bring in about 30 percent of the total
harvest value. Small unit fishing is tightly controlled at the
prefectural level where it has considerable political power.

Large coastal vessels, notably purse seiners, usually belong to

24
corporate interests and are regulated at the national level.

The remainder of the fishing industry is comprised of
aquaculture and fresh water operations. Whaling is a separate
issue and will be considered later.

The 1972 catch was a record, exceeding 10 million metric

%. C. Harrington, "Operation of the Japanese Fishery
Management System," in A. R. Tussing, T. A. Liorehouse and J. D.
Babb, Jr., eds., Alaska Fisheries Policy (university of Alaska,
1970), pp. 419-442.

334

tons for the first time. Japanese fleets range worldwide, driven

by a population which eats more than four times as much fish as

the world average. Their technology is superb, and is sup-
ported by extensive research efforts. Yet nearly all sectors

of Japanese fishing- face troubled futures.

The problems are fourfold.

(1) Domestic demand for marine products has become
larger and more diversified than domestic sup-
plies, thus increasing reliance on imports.

(2) Pollution has seriously affected coastal
fisheries and aquaculture.

(3) The international acceptance of the 200-mile
economic zone could affect up to 80 percent of
the pelagic catch.

(4) Inflation and the sharp increase in fuel prices,
as well as a shortage of fisheries product
material, have reduced fishermen's profit
margins

• • • •

In the first case, the demand/supply imbalance is not
readily correctable by market forces. Demand has centered on
medium and high grade fish (such as tuna), delicacies like shell-
fish or shrimp, and fishmeal for livestock. Largely because of
its efforts to meet this demand, coastal fisheries diversifica-
tion has stagnated, with some species coming close to being over-
fished. It may be that government efforts to promote aquaculture

Food and People, XVI.

Asahi (eve), April 12, 1 974» report on FY 1973> Fisheries

White Paper. Original in Suisancho, hen (Fisheries Agency, ed.),

GyoKyo Hakusho Showa 48 ("Fishing Industry White Paper FY 1973") >

T5kyo, 1974, PP. 4-5.

335

27
and the world-wide need to develop new ocean resources, will

send Japanese fishermen in search of other species which eventu-
ally will satisfy Japanese consumers. Virtually all forecasts,

however, show a continued increase in imports for the next few
28

years.

In the "battle against pollution in Japan, some isolated

29
progress has been made. But the overall problem is far from

30
being solved, and actually may be getting worse. During fiscal

1972, 345 claims (1.1 times those in fiscal 1971) were filed for
damages, but the amount of the damages was 115*9 billion yen, up
3.1 times from those of the previous year. The disastrous 1974
oil spill in the inland sea will seriously affect mariculture in
the area. From the standpoint of coastal fisheries, the intensi-
fied search for oil and minerals on the continental shelf can
only compound the problem. If previous negotiations are any
guide, a compromise eventually will be reached which will permit

Particularly the Antarctic krill which may lead to a

doubling of the world's catch. See also Suisancho Kenkyu bu

(Fisheries Agency, Research and Development Section), Shinkai

Gyo .jo Kai hat sura Suishin Hosaku Kenkyukai Hokoku ("Research

Society Report on Promotion Plan for Deep Sea Fishery Grounds

Development") (Tokyo, July 1974).

Fisheries White Paper, crp_» cit. , p. 67 •

Some fish reportedly have returned to the once- barren

waters around Enoshiiaa, and the production of mackerel-pike and
sardines has revived.

30
Note the massive oil spill which devastated inland sea

fisheries in December 1974*

336

seabed exploitation in exchange for the generous compensation of
local fishermen. But a quick resolution is unlikely.

To date, Japanese ocean fishing has been regulated through
a host of regional fisheries and bilateral treaties. The
latter mostly have been spawned by extensions of coastal state
jurisdiction. Typically, Japan either has established joint
ventures with developing country partners, or has arranged to
pay some sort of license fee for the privilege of fishing. Two
factors, however, are likely to complicate these arrangements.
The first is a proliferation of 200-mile claims, largely legiti-
mated at Caracas whether or not a formal treaty ever becomes
effective. The second is a general trend towards resources
nationalism, which is likely to intensify if a food crisis
approaches.

Most attention with regard to 200-mile economic zones has
focused on the developing countries. Despite their high visi-
bility, however, only about 370,000 tons of fish a year are

caught off the coasts of Africa, South America and Southeast

32
Asia. By far the largest part of the endangered catch comes

from the North Atlantic and North Pacific, the Sea of Japan and

the East China Sea. The principal adversaries thus are not

These are listed in Suisancho, Suissn Tokei Shihyo #4

(Fisheries Statistics Index £4) (Tokyo, June 1974) > p. 102.

flihon Keizai (ed.), June 3> 1 974*

On a species basis, a 200-mile limit would affect some

337

the developing countries (except for China and Korea). Rather,
they are the USSR, Canada and the United States, with whom
fisheries negotiations have been conducted almost continuously
since the 1950s* It is here, rather than in the Third World,
that resources nationalism poses the greatest hardship for
Japanese fishermen.

Fourth, the rapid rate of inflation has had a serious

34
impact on fishing operations at all levels. In general, fish

culture has become increasingly profitable, while boat operators

have been rather hard hit. In mid-1973 the number of fishermen

was 508, 200, a figure which has been declining since 1 9^4*

Fishing in Japan is supported by an extensive scientific
research organization; public, corporate and academic, at the
national and perfectural levels. In fiscal 1974? excluding the
funding for the Okinawa Ocean Expo, the Fishery Agency received

the largest share of the Government's marine development budget —

36
as it has in previous years. In addition to improving ship

and equipment design there are intensive efforts underway to

40/S of the tuna catch, and JCF/o of that of prawns, cuttlefish and
pollack. A total of about 4*5 million tons. Fisheries Agency
Data.

Suisan Keizai, January 9> 1974*

Fisheries White Paper, op. eft. (introduction), p. 12.

JAuiSTEC, Governmental Marine Development Program (by

general account) of Japan for 1974 Fiscal Year, by_ Ministerial
Agency (hereafter IJDP 74 j, Yokosuka, April 1974 (mimeo) .

338

promote the optimum usage of living ocean resources.

Aquaculture, however, attracts the major share of the
Fishery Agency marine development budget, and it is expected
to increase. Japan already boasts a cultivated yield of over
700,000 tons, more than any other country. Among the species
currently grown are salmon, greenling, octopus, crab and a host
of shellfish. In addition, the traditional harvests of pearl and
seaweed are taken. Several studies have called for the promotion
of fish farming, not only to provide more efficient use of the
resource, but also to increase national self-sufficiency in food.
Perhaps some lessons can be learned from the prototype "sea
ranch" at the 1975 Okinawa Ocean Exposition. A joint Japan-
Soviet symposium also recently suggested cooperative large scale

farming of aquatic products.

Whaling

Although whaling ha3 fallen precipitously, both in volume
and in value, it remains a highly emotional issue in Japan. The
primary reason has been the attempts of conservation groups, and
lately the U.S. Government, to impose a global ban on the indus-
try. Such pressures have intensified since the adoption of a

37
Kagaku Gijitsu Cho (Science and Technology Agency),

Kaiyo Kaihatsu no Gen jo to Tembo ("Present Situation of and

Prospects for Ocean Development"), Tokyo, November 1973> Sect.

4.3, PP. 171-177.

58MM, November 23, 1974.

339

U.S. proposal for a 10 year moratorium on whaling at the Stock-
holm Environment Conference in 1972.

The opposition arguments are three-fold. (1) Whales are
on the verge of extinction, (2) they are being taken for greed,
rather than necessity and (3) the slaughter of such mammals is

cruel, and the methods currently used are especially so. The

39
Japanese counter with data to dispute the first point and note

that seven percent of the nation's 1973 meat intake came from

po:
41

whales. They also point to the killing of animals for sport

and furs in the West.

Whatever the merits of each case, the ban has become a
most sensitive issue. For one thing even if the total prohi-
bition has not yet been accepted by the International Whaling
Commission (IWC), it has led to Japan's near-isolation in that

forum. For another, many Japanese feel that they simply are

being criticized for different eating habits.

39
For instance, some endangered species currently are

increasing at a rate in excess of the IWC quotas. (Mainichi

(ed.), June 17, 1974) -

It would take, it is said, nearly 220,000 tons of beef
to replace this whale meat, with a consequent increase in grain
demand. (Ninon Keizai, June 2, 1974)*

The timing of the U.S. anti-whaling campaign was unfortu-
nate in Japanese eyes. Beginning as it did in the late 1960s,
at the height of the Vietnam War, it led to comments that Ameri-
cans were more concerned about killing whales than killing
people. See, among o thers, Japan Times, April 22, 1974*

^ Tokyo Shimbun, June 20, 1974.

340

Most of the major newspapers have recognized the limited
future of whaling, and have recommended an intensified search
for new sources of food. Even the companies themselves have
accepted the inevitability of stricter quotas on the valuable
antarctic fin whales and are searching for alternatives. In the
process, however, the United States has come in for a good deal
of criticism.

Ocean Development

Aside from aquaculture, Japanese ocean development projects
may be divided into three categories: those in adjacent waters
or on the continental shelf, those on the deep seabed, and those
off the coasts of other states. Volumes have been written about
these efforts, but a brief recapitulation is in order since
they will become an increasingly important part of Japanese sea-
power in the future.

(1) Adjacent Projects

The Japanese Continental Shelf is relatively narrow, rarely
exceeding 25 miles except in the area of the Tsushima Strait and

^For instance, Asahi (ed.), June 30, 1974*

Among these are: Science and Technology Agency, Marine
Development in Japan 1972 (hereafter MDIJ 72); Japan ECCR, "Status
Report of Sea-Bed Exploration and Exploitation Technology in
Japan 1972" (Revised edition) (hereafter Seabed Status Report);
Science and Technology Agency, Kai.yo Kaihatsu No Gen jo to Tembo' ,
op. cit. ; and the June 1974 edition (Vol. 5> ilA) of Kaiyo" SangyP
Kenkyu, Shiryo (Ocean Industry Research Materials) entitled "V/aga
Kuni Kaiyo Sangyo No Gonen" (Five Year3 of Our Country's Ocean
Industry) .

341

north of HokkaidcS. Nevertheless, the shelf area is nearly 7 6

45
percent of the total land, area, so it has been the subject of

intensive investigation. The adjacent waters, which once pro-
vided most of the fish, now offer minerals as well. They also
are used for desalinization, man in the sea projects, fish farm-
ing and a host of scientific explorations including, unfortunately,
pollution studies.

(a) Marine Mineral resources include oil and natural gas,
coal, and iron sands. Manganese nodules will be considered
separately. Gold and other minerals have been found, but not
commercially exploited.

Japan's offshore oil fields are new, with prospects for expan-
sion. However, it is doubtful that domestic production, onshore
or off, ever will become a significant factor in her energy pic-
ture. Such sources accounted for .3 percent of 1973 demand, and
even a 50-fold expansion would provide less than 10 percent of
the expected 1980 requirements. Nonetheless, every little bit
helps, so it is being pursued vigorously.

The political problems often have been more formidable than

the geological ones. Notable among these have been the seabed

46
boundary disputes in the East China and Yellow Seas. Local

fishermen also have opposed even seismic surveys on the grounds

45MDLJ 22, p. 13.

See Park, "Oil Under Troubled Waters," _op_. cit. (note

7-39). Also pp. 251-252, above.

342

that they may lead to exploitation which would bring pollution
and interfere with fishing operations.

Major physical hurdles also must be overcome. In the Sea
of Japan, for instance, the working season rarely is longer than
from March to July. By August the threat of typhoons has arisen,
and they are followed by Fall and Winter storms.

Despite these impediments, progress is being made. There

are plans to develop the Sakhalin continental shelf in cooperation

48
with the USSR, possibly with American assistance. Recent surveys

indicate promising geological structures off the northeast coast

- 49
of Honshu. An ambitious three-year plan has been devised for

oil and gas surveys on the continental slopes, which nearly will

50
triple the size of the offshore areas under study. In addition,

new legislations had been proposed to promote the development of

continental shelf minerals.

The energy crisis has renewed interest in coal, whose pro-
duction had been allowed to decline in recent years. In 1970
about 12,500,000 tons (one-quarter of the national output) came
from seabed areas. Working shafts have been sunk from artificial
islands off Western Kyushu, but research also has been done on

47lihon Keizai, April 21, 1974.
48Nihon Keizai (eve.), April 27, 1974.
4%ihon Keizai, April 24, 1974.
* Nikkan Kowo, July 4, 1974.
51Nikkan Kogvo, May 21, 1974.

343

exploitation from ships or offshore platforms.

Gravel and magnetite placer sand have been recovered from
Japanese coastal waters for years. In the past the latter have
been less important than onshore iron sands, but may become more
attractive in the future. Moreover, the technology developed for
this recovery can be used for other placer deposits worldwide.

(b) Desalinization. By 1985 Japan is expected to face a

53
serious fresh water shortage particularly in urban areas. In

fact, it is estimated that nearly 22 billion tons of fresh water

may have to be recovered from the ocean. The annual capacity of

the three plants operating in 1972 was about 2,500,000 tons per

5/
year, which obviously will need vast improvements, both in

technology and capacity.

(c) Unconventional Ocean Energy Sources. The theoretical
attractiveness of harnessing waves, tides and marine currents in
Japan is limited by several physical factors. Among these are
the relatively low tidal ranges throughout the country and the
fact that the position of the Gulf Stream-like Kuroshio varies
too much to permit the use of fixed equipment. In the future,
solar plants or other advanced systems may become attractive,
but this will take many years.

(d) Effective use of Coastal Areas. The rapid rise of

See above, note 2-30.

Japan Times, June 4> 1 97 3 •

5%DLJ, 0£. cit., p. 19.

344

land prices, additional food requirements, the lack of space for
new industrial sites, the need for new port facilities, and a
host of other factors have made utilization of the Japanese
coastal zone more and more attractive. Coastal and brackish
water aquaculture has been mentioned. Large portions of Japan's
industrial areas already sit on reclaimed land. An airport in
Osaka Bay is planned to reduce complaints of noise pollution
which have limited operations at the present field. Superports
have been built, and more are planned. Even arable lands have
been recovered from the shallow seas.

The uses of the zone bordering Japan's 27,000 kilometers of
coastline will intensify rapidlj'-. Floating nuclear power plant

site studies have been made, but the density of sea (and air)

55
traffic along the east coast poses safety hazards. The location

56
of industrial complexes at sea has been considered. Eventually,

seabed oil tanks (such as Ekofisk City in the North Sea) or other

storage facilities will be built. Man in the Sea projects one

day may progress beyond the range of mere scientific research.

Marine recreation facilities in the form of undersea parks and

viewing towers already are being built.

In sum, the use of Japan's adjacent waters will grow

rapidly, from inshore areas out into the economic zone, however

Okamura Kenji, Japan ECOR, interview, December 8, 1 974*

J Odani Kosuke, JAMSTEC, interview, July 25, 1974.

545

far it may extend.

(2) Deep Seabed Projects

Japanese firms became interested in manganese nodules late

57
in the 1960s. Initially it was decided to develop their own

system, the so-called continuous line bucket (CLB). After several

years of testing, however, the approach was changed to investment

in joint ventures with American, French and German companies.

At the same time 33 corporations and 10 organizations have formed

a Deep Seabed Mineral Resources Development Association to

59
coordinate domestic efforts. Geophysical surveys of the waters

around Japan also will include prospective nodule sites.

Another area of interest on the deep seabed has been remote-
controlled drilling equipment. Recent technology has been
directed towards the recovery of petroleum and gas reserves from
the continental slopes and possibly the abyssal plain itself.
Japanese efforts may not be in the forefront of these develop-
ments, but her firms will be quick to make use of any break-
throughs which occur. There also is the possibility that local
geo thermal activity might produce mineral-rich springs such as

Seabed S tatus Report, op. cit. , p. 65.

3 Japanese firms have signed with Tenneco, four with

International Nickel (INCO), and Mitsubishi Shoji is cooperating
with Kennecott Copper. See Ninon Keizai, May 8, 1974? <"md
Nikkan Kogyo, July 2 and 12, 1974* Once again, this is con-
sistent with the philosophy of minimizing risks and maximizing
options.

^Nihon Keizai, April 10, 1974.

346

those found in the Red Sea and along the Mid-Atlantic Ridge.
(3) Foreign Projects

Japan has used its organization, technology and experience
very effectively to gain entry to foreign ocean development
markets. Foremost among these have been oil and gas, part of
the key to her "resources diplomacy."

In the future, such efforts will he coordinated with a
whole range of diversified assistance programs, many of them in
marine-related fields. These will be explored more fully in the
section below on acquisitive seapower.

Japan's Organization for Maritime Development

The business- government relationship in Japan has been the
subject of extensive inquiry. Many credit it for the nation's
post-war economic success. In the specific field of ocean tech-
nology, it has been argued that Japan is better organized than
any other country in the world to exploit the future riches of
the sea.

The ties between government and business in Japan are
undeniably closer than they are in most capitalist countries.
Nevertheless, the associations are more complicated than is sug-
gested by the term "Japan, Inc." Perhaps this is best

John P. Craven, "Indus try /Government Relations in Off-
shore Resource Development." Paper presented at the 5th annual
Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, April 29-LIay 3> 1 975 -
Pt. II, pp. 947-949.

U.S., Department of Commerce, Japan: The Government-

347

illustrated by an example from the deep ocean mining area.

Businessmen coordinate policies within the zaikai (business
leaders' clique) which includes such influential elements as
Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) and Keizai
Doyukai (Committee for Economic Development). Mutual interests
among bureaucrats lead to the so-called kambatsu (bureaucratic
clique) . Barriers between occupations are broken by the closely-
knit gakubatsu (university cliques) and innumerable informal
associations such as those for common birthyears or zodiac signs.
Most important of all are the keibatsu (familial ties) which per-
vade the upper echelons of Japanese business and government.

Decision-making is a continuous and often informal process
designed to establish the consensus so important to most Japanese
evolutions. Coordination is emphasized at all levels. There is
an ongoing dialogue, usually by telephone, between company repre-
sentatives and their contacts in the twelve ministries and five
agencies of the Government's executive branch. Petroleum and
seabed mining concerns work through the Ocean Division of the
Resources and Energy Agency. The Ministry of Transport is the
liaison for shipping companies, while fishermen approach the
Fisheries Agency. Formal lobbying may be resorted to if legis-
lation is pending before the Diet, but it must be paralleled by
continued consultation with the bureaucracy. Recently, however,

Business Relationship (Washington; U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1971), passim.

348

the growing importance of ocean- related projects has been empha-
sized by the development of more complex channels.

Aside from fisheries, probably the most important com-
mercial forces in Japanese ocean policy are the enterprise groups
associated with the major trading companies such as Mitsubishi,
Sumitomo and Mitsui. Functional successors to the pre-war

zaibatsu (financial cliques), the six major groups controlled

62
nearly 68 percent of Japan's corporate capital in 1971 • No

longer under family control, they still represent associations

of diverse companies linked by a parent bank and inter-locking

management. Much of the Japanese policy planning process can be

illustrated by a brief description of the interwoven competition

and cooperation of these units in search of seabed minerals.

(See Figure 10-1.)

Between 1970 and 1973 the Sumitomo group developed a

pilot system for seabed mining operations, The bulk of the work
was accomplished jointly by the parent trading company (Sumitomo
Shoji), Sumitomo Shipbuilding and Machinery, and Sumitomo Metal
Mining. Such cooperative efforts are common, although the indi-
vidual companies are distinct corporate entities which vie for
funds and projects within the group.

Among the 44 Sumitomo Companies there are some 60 organiza-
tions which are involved in ocean- related activities. To increase

62F£ER, August 6, 1973, p. 37.

I am indebted to the personnel of Sumitomo Shoji America,

Inc. for assistance in the preparation of this example.

349

Figure 10-1

ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS INVOLVED IN SUMITOMO MANGANESE
NODULE MINING (SUPERIMPOSED ON DIVERSE INTERPERSONAL TIES)

Seabed Mining
Negotiation Position

Foreign Ministry

Government
Ministries and Agencies

MITI

DOMA

JOIA

Trading Company
Groups

Sumitomo Mitsui

Other Interested
Industries

SODECO

Sumitomo
Shoji

Sumitomo
Shipbuilding
& Machinery

Sumitomo
Metal Mining

Other Sumitomo Companies

350

the competitiveness of such ventures, their management recently
has been coordinated within a newly-formed Ocean Development and
Engineering Company (SODECO) . The directorate of SCDECO is
drawn from the officers of the concerned Sumitomo companies, who
usually will hold multiple appointments.

Thus, future projects in seabed mining will be balanced by
SODECO against other ocean programs. Budget requests will be
forwarded to the Sumitomo Bank for consideration along with pro-
posals from other companies in the group. Finally, if approved,
the funds would be disbursed (effectively subcontracted) through
SODECO to the appropriate firm. Although, in most cases, the
companies which had done the work prior to the formation of
SODECO will continue to get the contracts, this system offers
better coordination. Equivalent mechanisms operate within the
other trading company groups.

However, according to SODECO President Nishimura
Tsunesaburo:

There is no sector in ocean development fields which
is small enough for a single company to tackle on
its own. All ocean development firms have to
cooperate with one another if they really want to
produce results. The Government, on its part, should
select several high priority projects for the com-
panies to pour everything in [sic]. Dispersing
emphasis on an unwieldily [sic] large number of pro-
jects will come to nothing. 64

In order to facilitate this policy coordination process,

the Deep Ocean Minerals Association (DOHA) was formed early in

HlKIW, October 2J, 1973.

351

1973* Managed by representatives from five trading companies
and including 27 firms from the mining/ smelting shipbuilding and
steel industries, it was designed to channel communications to
and from MITI. A year later DOMA was transformed into a legal
entity (hs.jin) as the Deep Seabed Minerals Resources Development
Association. Additional consultations are conducted through the
more broadly-based Japan Ocean Industries Association (JOIA).

While proposals are discussed between commercial interests
and their ministries, a similar process is underway within the
government it3elf. An "International Conference on the Law of
the Sea Preparations Promotion Headquarters" was set up prior to
the Geneva Seabed Committee meeting to draw inputs from interested
parts of the bureaucracy. In theory positions thus derived are
presented by the Foreign Ministry for international negotiation.
The inability to agree on a forward-looking position for Caracas,
however, is indicative of some of the rigidities in the system.

Although this summary has focused on ocean mining, it is
representative of arrangements in other industries. For instance,
there is the Japan Fisheries Association to link fishermen and
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (though it often is by-
passed). Several zaibatsu recently have withdrawn from a
Japanese multi-group venture, strengthened their individual oil
development companies and immediately begun to coordinate
negotiations for joint explorations with American firms in

Sankei, June 25, 1973.

352

Southeast Asia waters.

These organizations are, of course, superimposed on the
myriad of previously noted inter-personal ties. It is thus
difficult to separate a private stance from an official one.
Rarely in these circumstances will an interest group resort to
public pronouncements to try to bring pressure on the government.
On the other hand, it can be certain that its point of view at
least has been considered in some phase of the policy-making
process.

Dr. Craven, pointing to this cooperative approach, and the

level of government investment in private industry, concluded

that Japan "most closely approximates the ideal national manager

for ocean resources." Moreover:

There is a long range plan and goal which considers
the total system including environmental protection
and there are national resources of significant
amounts to implement the resource development plan.
The departure from the system manager idealization
is primarily in the fact that the industry response
to national planning is tacit rather than explicit. °

Although it certainly is true that Japan is closer to an
idealized ocean system managex* than the U.S. or Great Britain,
there are more serious weaknesses than may be apparent.

In the first place, the government itself is by no means

Nikkan Kogvo, June 16, 1973*
fi'j

Craven, cip_. cit. , p. 11-997 •

68Ibid., p. 11-949.

353

monolithic. Each of the ministries is, in many ways, a fief-

69
dom. Within the ministries disputes can be resolved by con-
sensus before external positions are presented. But between the
ministries, neither the resolution of differences nor adequate
cooperation is by any means assured. The Caracas negotiations,
as already noted, highlighted this, and such examples of disarray
are likely to continue as Japan reorients its national goals from
economic growth to social welfare.

Another example of a lack of bureaucratic coordination is
provided by the case of ocean surveys. Currently, these are
conducted by the MSDF, the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry,
and the Transportation Ministry. Additional surveys involving
petroleum development are conducted under MITI. JAMS TEC is keyed

to man in the sea projects, but MSDF cooperation is excluded by

70
pressures for the separation of civil and military activities.

A second problem is a surprising disinclination to engage
in really innovative planning. The mistrust of long-range plan-
ning in Japan stems in part from a view that major world move-
ments will be largely independent of her own efforts. There is
thus little point in setting forth extended programs in pursuit
of fixed goals when one has so little control over the events

See, for instance, Kusayanagi Daizo, "A Kingdom of

Bureaucrats: The Finance Ministry," Bungei Shunji, July 1 974»

translation in Magazine Summary, July 1974> PP« 6-20.

' VADM Kitamura Kenichi, MSDF (Ret.), interview, August 14,

1974 and Odani Kosuke, interview, December 9> 1 974-

354

which might prove critical. Once again, as in her diplomacy,
this leads to strategies which maximize options at each step.

A final point is a relatively low level of financing.
Japan's Governmental Marine Development Program totaled approxi-
mately $100 million in Fiscal 1974 (April 1974-March 1975). 71
Over 66 million of this was devoted to the Okinawa Exposition,
however. By contrast, the non-"national security" portion of

the U.S. Federal Ocean Program for Fiscal 1975 (July 1974- June

1975) equals $641 million — nearly 19 times that which Japan is

devoting to similar purposes. Such comparisons admittedly are
inexact because of undetermined levels of private spending, but
the imbalance certainly is significant.

In point of fact, a modest level of Research and Develop-
ment spending long has been characteristic of Japanese business
(with the possible exception of fisheries). This is consistent
with the joint venture approach to new technology, evidenced in
ocean mining. By waiting for foreign firms to do the pioneering
research and then providing capital at a later stage in the
development process, the risk in both funds and wasted effort is
greatly reduced, although the final cost in license fees and
patents may be more expensive. Such an approach offers great
flexibility, but it also may mean significant time lags before

71MDP 24, op_. cit.

Larry L. Booda, "Federal Ocean Program Budget Request

Up S64 Million," Sea Technology, XV (March 1974), P- 25.

355

Japan can take advantage of new opportunities in the rapidly

73
changing ocean development field.

Non-Military Seapower and Japan's Interests

Protective Maritime Ventures

One of the ways in which Japan can use her seapower is to
insulate herself from the effects of others' actions. This will
be termed protective seapower. The MS DP, of course, is specifi-
cally designed for this purpose, but commercial activities also
may contribute.

National security has been one of the classic rationales
for a strong merchant marine — guaranteed capacity in time of
emergency. Such arguments still can be heard, but trends to
multi-national crews, long-term charters, international insurance
markets and other economies of modern shipping will make it
harder to ensure Japan's control over large fleets even should
they still fly her flag. In general, however, this will be less
troublesome than it once might have been because the inter-
nationalization of maritime commercial linkages has affected
almost everyone.

Still, there may be problems. The transfer of control of
the tanker fleets to Arab states will undeniably make the indus-
trialized world more vulnerable in future confrontations.

Admiral Nakayama Sadayoshi, MSDF (Ret.), interview,

August 14, 1974.

556

Moreover, non-Japanese crews might refuse to sail in the face of
some of the threats outlined in the previous chapter. Japan's
encouragement of both of these trends has been dictated by her
resources diplomacy on the one hand, and profitability on the
other. Although the results are antithetical to her security in
the sense of protective seapower, there is little that can be
done to change them. The national merchant marine, insofar as
it exists, will continue to provide her with a buffer, but this
will play a subordinate part in future policy decisions.

The protective role of the shipbuilding industry lies in
its ability to replace war/ terrorist losses.

Since resources are Japan's principal vulnerability, how-
ever, the real protective value of her seapower will be the
extent to which it can contribute to self-sufficiency. At
present, there is no indication that ocean resources ever will
be able to make Japan independent of foreign suppliers, but data
are hard to come by. In the first place, long range forecasts
are regarded suspiciously, as noted earlier. In the second, the
events of late 1973 destroyed the basis of nearly all the plan-
ning that did exist. They also introduced such uncertainties as
to cast doubt on any studies which have tried to take them into
account. Finally, in the case of new ocean resources, there
simply is too little information as yet.

Even before the extensions of national ocean claims,
fisheries imports were expected to increase. It is possible

357

that new species, aquaculture and mid-ocean fishing grounds may
offset the losses expected from the North Pacific economic zones,
The harvesting of krill might even increase the total catch.
But without changes in the Japanese diet, there still will he a
demand for imports of seafood.

The limited near-term potential of Japanese off-shore
petroleum already has been noted. Detailed surveys of minerals
on her continental margins are just beginning. Except for
manganese nodules, which will be mined by foreign (U.S.) ships
for the next few years, abyssal resources hardly have been
studied at all. Regarding the nodules, incidently, a hypotheti-
cal 33 percent Japanese interest in a 3 , 000 , 000 ton per year
operation might yield results as noted in Table 10-1.

Table 10-1

POSSIBLE NODULE METALS PRODUCTION AS A
PERCENT OF 1972 JAPANESE DEMAND

Approximate 1972 Japanese (Metric Tons)

Metal Production (A) Demand (b) A/B

Manganese 230,000 n.a. n.a.
(if recovered)

Nickel 15,000 26,315 .57

Copper 13,000 927,679 .02

15,000

26,315

13,000

927,679

2,000

2,558

Cobalt 2,000 2,558 .78

Source: (A) United Nations, Economic Implications of Sea-Bed

Mineral Development in the International Area, p. 28.

(B) Ninon Tckei Nenkan 1973-74, Table 170.

358

It is evident that these outputs, while useful in reducing some
imports, will not be a panacea. Indeed, this would seem to apply
as a general statement about the protective value of all of
Japan's seapower. Even as an oceanic state, relying on hereto-
fore untapped wealth from the sea, it will be many decades, if
ever, before Japan could begin to consider herself detached from
foreign economic pressures.

Acquisitive Maritime Ventures

Acquisition, of course, is the usual goal of all marine
economic activities — to win either profits, resources, or foreign
exchange. Nonetheless, Japan's ocean-related industrial capacity
and technological expertise (which thus are elements of her sea-
power) have opened new ways for her to gain access to markets and
raw materials. In turn, many of these efforts also may reduce the
incentive to take action against Japanese operations.

First among these are joint ventures, which have become
especially important to fishermen. As of March 1 975> Japanese
firms were involved in 96 such projects in 43 countries, and
several have been established since, particularly in Africa and
the Middle East. Foreign subsidiary and joint venture shipyards
have been operating for years, for instance in Brazil and Singa-
pore. However, overtures to Persian Gulf States since 1973 have

*7 A

Suisancho, Suisanpyo No Taisuru Taigai Shihon Kyoryoku
Jiigyo no Genjo (Present Situation of Overseas Joint Ventures
Facing Fishing Industries), Tokyo, July 1974*

359

been designed as much to improve Japan's standing in the struggle

for oil as for profit. In the same vein, joint tanker companies

75
have been established with Iraq, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia.

Marine-related technological assistance is another way of

approaching the problem. The Foreign Ministry and an industry

source known as the Overseas Fishery Cooperation Fund have set up

a fund for loans to developing country fisheries which could grow

76
as large as 15 billion yen ($50 million). The above-mentioned

shipping agreements also include provisions for the progressive

phase-out of direct Japanese participation as local competence

develops. Thus they eventually also may become oriented towards

technological assistance. This encouragement of the merchant

marines of strategic coastal states, whatever competition it may

generate for Japanese vessels in the short run, could well work

to her long-run interests by increasing their stakes in minimum

restrictions on maritime commerce.

Finally, there are barter arrangements. Ships, for
example, or fishing equipment, could be built in Japan with
domestic funds and then exchanged for resources to save foreign
currency .

The majority of maritime commercial affairs probably will

'^Nihon Keizai, March 19 and July 16, 1974-

Suisan Keizai, January 9> 1974* This compares to
Japanese investment of $30.5 million in the 96 joint ventures
noted above.

360

continue to be profit-motivated. Moreover, such cooperative
arrangements outlined above are possible in fields that have
nothing to do with the oceans. Nonetheless, Japan is well-suited
to take advantage of the growing global interest in marine
industries to secure a variety of goods and services.

Suasive Measures

Japan would seem to have few means by which to exercise

suasion. She has renounced the "threat of force as a means of

7fi
settling international disputes." She also has sought to sepa-
rate politics and economics in her international dealings. There
are few signs that she will alter the deployments of the Self-
Defense Forces (outside of an extended economic zone). However,
domestic and foreign circumstances may enable her to exert more
international pressure through non-military ocean activities.

For one thing, Japan may be changing her policy to include
broad connections between political, economic and social con-
ditions, especially in relation to the Third World. Distinct

economic issues with diverse political overtones also may be

increasingly linked in the future.

Edward Luttwak, ep_. cit. (note I~5)» has discussed the

uses of naval forces as an exercise of "armed suasion." These

may be latent (i.e. undirected) or active. The latter in turn

can be broken down into deterrence and compellance. Herein, this

typology will be extended to non-military seapower as well.

Article IX of the Constitution.

It was reported, for instance, during President Ford's 1974

visit to Tokyo, that Japanese concessions on fisheries were offered
in exchange for guarantees of food supplies.

361

For another, the manipulation of currency markets, large-
scale investments and commodity flows have become weapons of
great consequence. Perhaps even more importantly, they have
become generally recognized as legitimate alternatives to mili-
tary power under many circumstances.

Japan's seapower, indeed most of her economic programs, can
operate most effectively in latent or deterrent modes. For
instance, efforts to promote interdependence through bi-lateral
shipping or fisheries agreements could give Tokyo1 some positive
counter-leverage. Attractive technology transfer provisions with
joint ventures could reduce the incentives for nationalization,
although local political and emotional concerns might easily
override such rationality. In the same way, long-term shipyard
or ocean development projects would be difficult to complete by
developing country assets alone.

The advantages of promoting coastal state interests in
shipping or distant-water fishing already have been noted.

Under some conditions, merchantmen can act as "trip wires"
almost as well as warships. Soviet freighters limited U.S.
freedom of action in Haiphong, for instance. An American tanker
tested the blockade of the Straits of Tiran in 1967* It may be
argued that this influence was derived only from the military
power of the two superpowers and the perception of a merchant
ship as the symbol of state interests on those particular
occasions. This may well be correct. But though Japan does not

362

have the military power to act on her own behalf, one of her
ships could be persuasive if it was seen as the representative
of most maritime powers on a given issue, i.e. the levying of
straits tolls. Alternatively, if the domestic situation in
Japan were unsettled, interference with her merchantmen or ocean
development projects might be deterred on the grounds that it
could stimulate an MSDF dispatch, with all the associated uncer-
tainties. Finally, merchantmen capable of self-defense could be
used to prevent the establishment of undesired precedents by
ignoring unilateral declarations of restrictions to navigation.

It is difficult to imagine Japan exercising much more
active suasion, either through her military or commercial
activities in the next several years. Were she to begin to,
however, the signs would be visible first at the fringes of her
ocean resources zone.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has recommended several specific programs for
the Maritime Self-Defense Force and Japan's commercial ocean
interests. These results are based on two fundamental conclusions,

The first is that world-wide technical, political and legal
developments will force major adjustments in national maritime
policies. In particular, these developments include: (1) A
shifting image of the sea itself from a neutral medium of communi-
cations and commerce to a territorial area with intrinsic value,
(2) asymmetries in the acceptability of force between developed
and developing states, (3) the current state of naval technology,
which favors the defenders of inshore areas, (4) the increasing
economic and political importance of near-shore ocean interests
and (5) the erosion of the foundations of freedom of the seas.
Whether or not such changes will offer new opportunities or fore-
close long-standing advantages, Japan must consider them more
carefully in her policy-planning.

The second conclusion is that projections of a militaristic
future for Japan, or even an expanded security role, are over-
drawn. In the face of pollution, resources nationalism, impending
earthquakes and other hazards, arguments can be made for the
impossibility of maintaining Japan's present course, but there is

363

364

almost no evidence that she will choose an expansionist path in
the near future. Domestically the opposition to such a role is
widespread and vocal. Internationally there are few states which
would either encourage or welcome it. Moreover, though the
economic and idealistic orientation of Japanese nationalism might
lead to strains between Washington and TQkyS, it shows little sign
of turning militaristic. An authoritarian government, and perhaps
a nuclear weapons program are possible, but Japan's physical limi-
tations and vulnerabilities would make foreign adventurism very
risky. By the same token an increase in tensions in Northeast
Asia would be more likely to drive Japan back towards the United
States, rather than off on her own. The most likely course is a
continuation of an opportunistic, low- risk foreign policy with
expenditures on conventional weaponry remaining at about one per-
cent of GNP while non-military security spending is increased.
Within this framework, more specific issues of Japanese
seapower were analyzed. For all the constraints which her
physical situation puts on expansive or aggressive activities,
Japan also has strengths which are less frequently recognized.
Her island status, topography and the limits of her neighbors'
amphibious capabilities would make direct invasion difficult.
Surface-skimming patrol craft, anti-ship missiles and improved
coordination between the MSDP and ASDF could further increase an
attacker's problem. At the same time, the size of her merchant
marine, shipbuilding capacity and other factors will reduce the

365

impact of a submarine campaign against the sealanes. Japan could
strengthen her defenses in this area by the use of unconventional
concepts, such as containerized weapon systems for merchantmen.
Although mines may pose a serious threat to the harbors and choke
points of the archipelago, they also can be extremely effective
in the narrow straits which control Soviet passage to and from
the Sea of Japan.

In time, the demands of near-shore ocean activities probably
will compel Japan to extend her own territorial sea and economic
zone. This will be a major change whose impact will extend
beyond the realm of ocean politics. In the first place, the
expanded ocean area will be nearly ten times as large as the home
islands themselves. In fact, under a 200-mile limit, Japan would
acquire the seventh largest maritime zone on earth. As ocean
development activities intensify, the psychological attractive-
ness of the additional productive territory could become very
important for a nation which has long been sensitive about its
population and lack of space.

In the second place, the extension of jurisdiction will
bring her oceanic borders with seven states, along with several
boundary disputes. Many of these quarrels probably will be
settled diplomatically or officially ignored in the interests of
larger issues. Some, however, may contain the seeds of future
violence, particularly with Taiwan and Korea.

Finally, the task of defending, or even monitoring such an

366

area will require improvements in MSDF and Maritime Safety Agency
ships, surveillance equipment and command and control facilities.

The concepts of protective, acquisitive and suasive sea-
power were introduced with particular emphasis on Japan's com-
mercial ocean activities. So long as she is vulnerable to
countermeasures at so many points, Tokyo's options for maritime
suasion, through military or commercial means, are limited. The
major values of protective seapower will be to increase fisheries
yield within the extended economic zone and to improve marine
pollution control techniques. Ocean resources will play an
increasingly important part in Japan's economy, but they will
only marginally reduce her dependence on raw materials imports.
Acquisitive ocean ventures, however, can contribute greatly to
the uncertain future. As ocean economic activities become
increasingly important world-wide, Japan should be well-placed
to trade on her stores of marine-related capital and expertise.

Japan's ocean activities could be managed more effectively.
The model of a smoothly-coordinated, rational animal, guided by
long-range planning has many weaknesses, at least in the area of
ocean affairs. The nation would profit by better planning and
intra- bureaucratic coordination at the least, and possibly by
higher levels of research and development spending as well. One
can understand the attractiveness of strategies which maintain
flexibility, but the lead times involved in modem industrial
projects, as well as their multiple side-effects dc seem to

367

warrant greater emphasis on forecasting.

In sum, the next decade is likely to see Japan's seapower
used to support opportunistic strategies in pursuit of interests
similar to those which exist today. Near-shore activities and
extensions of jurisdiction probably will be emphasized while
distant-water programs fall more and more under multinational
control.

Appendix One

UNITS CONVERSION TABLE

Units of Length

Units

Inch

Foot

Meter

Mile

N.M.

1 inch

.083

.025

1 foot

.305

1 meter

39-37

3.28

1 mile

63,360

5,280

1,609

.869

1 naut. mile

72,913

6,076.1
Units of Area

1,852

1.151

Units

Acre

Hectare

Sq .km.

Sq .mi.

' Sq.n.m.

1 acre

.405

.004

.002

.001

1 hectare

2.471

.01

.004

.003

1 sq. km.

247.11

100

.386

.292

1 sq. mile

640

258.9

2.589

.755

1 sq. n.m.

847.4

195.5

1.955

1.324

Units of Mass

Units

Pound

Kilogram

Sh.Ton

Long
Ton

Metric
Ton

1 pound

• 454

1 kilogram

2205

.001

1 short ton

2000

907.2

.893

.907

1 long ton

2240

1,016.0

1.12

1.016

1 metric ton

2204.6

1,000.0

1.102

.984

368

369

Units of Volume

Units

Liter

Gallon

Cubic Foot

Cut

dc Meter

liter

.264

.035

.001

gallon

3-785

.133

.004

cubic foot

28.317

7.840

.028

cubic me

ter

1,000

276.9

35.315

F = 9/5 C + 32
C = 5/9 (F - 32)

Temperature

0°C = 32°F
100°C = 212°F

Other Measures

Water

1 cubic ft.
25.96 cubic ft.

Crude Oil

= 62.4 lbs. 1 barrel (bbl) = 42 gallons

= 2240 lbs. 1 metric ton = 7.35 bbls.

1 bbl/day = 49*8 tons/year

1 kiloliter =6.29 bbls.

Ener,sy Conversions

1 bbl. crude oil
1 kwh electricity

= 5.60 x 10 Btu
= 5,413 Btu

1 cu. ft. day natural gas = 1,051 Btu

1 short ton of avg. coal = 27.7 x 10 Btu

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Thompson, Robert P. "Establishing Global Traffic Flows."
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Tsukudo Tatsuo, Vice Admiral, JMSDF (Ret.). "Defense of Terri-
tory." Translation in Articles from Staff College Review
1971-1972. Tokyo: Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff
College, undated, pp. 51-54*

. "Ninon no Kokubo nd Okeru Shokei Keikantei no Igi"

("Role of Light Naval Craft in Defending Japan"). Sekai
no Kansen, 208 (December 1974), 86-89.

"Sea Power and Our Defense in the New Era."

Translation in Articles from Staff College Review 1971-1972,
Tokyo: Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College, undated,
PP. 65-71.

Uchida Kazutomi. "Japan's National Defense and the Role of the
Maritime Self-Defense Force." Pacific Community (October
1974), PP. 38-54.

"The Rearmament of the Japanese Maritime Forces."

Naval War College Review, XXYl (November-December 1973) »
41-48.

"Verification Using Reconnaissance Satellites." SIPRI Yearbook
1973« Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, 1973, pp. 60-101.

Wakaizumi Kei. "Japan's Dilemma: To Act or Not to Act."
Foreign Policy, 16 (Fall 1974), 30-47.

"War Logistics and the Freight Container." Jane ' s Freight

Containers 1973~74» London: Sampson Low, Mars ton, 1 973 -

Wechsler, L.; Brown, C. E.; and Sundaram, T. R. "Engineering

Analysis of Systems for Extracting Useful Energy from the
Sea." Marine Technology Society, 10th Annual Conference
Proceedings. September 23-25, 1974, pp. 483-499.

Weinstein, Martin E. "The Strategic Balance in East Asia,"
Current Hist pit, LXV (November 1973), 193+.

396

Wells, Linton II. "Japan and the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea." Ocean Development and International
Law, II (Spring 1974), 65-91-

Wenk, Edward, Jr. "The Physical Resources of the Oceans."
Scientific American (September 1969), PP« 82-91.

White, R. M. "Our Changing Ocean Priorities." Marine Technology
Society Journal, VI (September-October 1972), 3_5»

Wilson, Desmond P. "Evolution of the Attack Carrier: A Case

Study in Technology and Strategy." U.S. Congress, Senate
and House Armed Services Committees, CVAN-70 Aircraft
Carrier. 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1970.

Wohlstetter, Albert. "Japan's Security: Balancing after the
Shocks." Foreign Policy, 9 (Winter 1972-73), 171-190.

Yasuda M. [pseudonym]. "No Drastic About-Face in Security
Policy." Yomiuri (English Edition), January 6, 1 971 .

Young, Elizabeth. "Arms Control and Disarmament in the Ocean."
In Borgese, Elizabeth Mann (ed.), Pacem in I/laribus .
New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1972), 266-284.

Periodicals

Those magazines consulted on a regular basis included:

Asian Survey

Aviation Week and Space Technology

Foreign Affairs

Foreign Policy

International Defense Review

Japan Interpreter

Japan Quarterly

Marine Technology Society Journal

N aval Engineers Journal

Naval War College Review

Offshore

Pacific Affairs

Pacific Community

Petroleum News Southeast Asia

Sea Power

Sea Technology; (formerly Undersea Technology)

Sekai no Kansen (Ships of the World)

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

Zosen

397

Newspapers

The most frequently read newspapers were:

Asahi Evening News

Japan Times

Mainichi Daily News

The New York Times

Nihon Keizai Shimbun International Weekly

Stars and Stripes (Pacific)

The Washington Post

Yomiuri (English)

Japanese newspapers and magazines mostly were reviewed
through the publications of the Translation Section of the
American Embassy, Tokyo, and Hiss Nakai Yoko.

VITA

Linton Wells II was born in Luanda, Angola, Portuguese West
Africa, on April 7> 1946. After attending school in New York,
Connecticut and Florida he was graduated from the Browning School
in New York City in 1963.

In 1967 he received a Bachelor of Science degree from the
U.S. Naval Academy with majors in Physics and Oceanography. He
was elected to Sigma Pi Sigma and received the Captain Charles
N. G. Hendrix award for oceanography.

After two years as weapons/ supply officer on a Pacific
Fleet patrol gunboat, Lieutenant Wells served as navigator of
the guided missile frigate U.S.S. Josephus Daniels (DLG-27) in
the Caribbean and Gulf of Tonkin.

Since January 1971? he has done graduate work at The Johns
Hopkins University and completed the requirements for an M.S.E.
degree in Mathematical Sciences in 1975* He is a member of Tan
Beta Pi.

<*L HVWO <

2 U 0 U o

Thesis

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W4427

Wells

The sea

and Japan's

strategic
1975-1985

i nterests ,

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DISPLAY
2U008

Thesis 1 L 9528

W4427 Wells

The sea and Japan's

strategic interests,

1975-1985.

thesW4427

The sea and Japans strateg

ic interests,

3 2768 001 95232 8

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